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This paper is a result of my research on the law of credit, debit, and charge cards. 
Although these cards are relatively important in Singapore as a consumers’ means 
of cashless payment and a source of income for the banks, the topic has not 
received much attention. The topic seems interesting to me as it concerns a 
relatively modern phenomena of banking law while still requires analysis of the 
fundamental principles of the common law.  
 
The paper began with an introductory Chapter I, which described the credit, 
debit, and charge cards in comparison with other types of payment cards, and 
analyzed the organization of the system and mechanism of transactions. The 
chapter completed with some analysis of statistics demonstrating the primary 
functions of the credit card system and its relative importance in Singapore.  
 
The analysis of the legal relationship between the parties in a credit card 
transaction began in Chapter II with the theories of characterization. Based on 
the conclusion on characterization we went on to analyze the features of the 
relationship between the cardholder, the merchant and the issuer. The chapter 
completed with a discussion on the finality of a credit card transactions.  
 
Chapter III is an attempt to apply the fundamental principles of the common law, 
including agency, bailment, estoppel, and negligence, to answer questions 
relating to liabilities for unauthorized card transactions. The analysis of the case 
law is necessary because there is no statute on this issue in Singapore. After that, 
we reviewed the risk shifting clauses in the standard credit card agreements of 
Singapore banks, and discussed the impacts of the UCTA on such terms. The 
chapter concluded with some practical suggestions for reforming the law relating 
to the allocation of fraud losses.  
 
Chapter IV focused on the sale contract between the cardholder and the 
merchant. The chapter began with an analysis of situations of disputes between 
them, possible claims of the cardholder, and the resolution of disputes via the 
card associations. In the second section, we shifted attention to the questions of 
issuer’s liability to the cardholder for the merchant’s default. The issuer’s 
liabilities in tort and contract under Singapore law were compared with that 
imposed by statutes in Britain and America resulting in a proposal of a reform in 
this area.  
 
The final chapter V started with a review of the existing regulatory framework of 
credit, debit, and charge cards in Singapore with an evaluation of the necessity 
and likelihood of a reform in the related area of consumer credit protection. In 
the second section, we analyzed several issues concerning card billing and 
resolution of disputes, for which regulatory controls should be introduced to 
ensure fair dealings between the banks and the cardholders. The final section 
concluded by summarizing the desirable features of a reform in the area of credit 
card law and proposing two possible methods of implementation, namely by 
issuance of a regulation under the Banking Act, or amendments of the Banking 





1. PAYMENT CARDS AND PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
 
The payment card is a relatively popular means of cashless retail payment in 
Singapore. The country has the highest number of payment cards per inhabitant 
in the world. On average, each of its residents has more than eight stored value 
cards and three credit or charge cards (please refer to detailed statistics below). In 
this section, we will briefly describe all types of payment cards, their features and 
the underlying payment systems to define the focus of this paper. 
 
1.1 Concept of payment cards 
 
 ‘Payment card’ is the term commonly used to denote pieces of plastic sized 
about 8.5 x 5.4cm, fitting a wallet, that may be used to make payment for goods or 
services without using cash. Payment made by cards is usually known as payment 
by plastic. 
 
As technologies and business methods evolve, payment cards takes on 
various physical forms such as “token, coupon, stamp, form, booklet or other 
document or thing”1 or even intangible “electronic”2 form. ‘Payment cards’, 
therefore, include not only the plastic cards but also other things or even pieces of 
information that can be used to avoid transportation of notes and coins when 
making payment.  
                                                        
1 Definition of stored value card, Section 78(9) Banking Act (Cap 19). 




As a means of making payment, the payment cards usually involve three 
parties, a cardholder, a merchant, and a card-issuer. One simple way to elaborate 
on the concept of payment cards is by describing the various types of cards that 
are used. We will do that very briefly in the next section. 
 
1.2 Types of payment cards 
 
(a) ATM cards 
 
ATM cards are issued by banks to their customers. The ATM cards can be used to 
make balance enquiry, initiate electronic fund transfer at ATMs as well as making 
electronic fund transfer at point of sales (EFTPOS) terminals locally. The 
cardholder uses the ATM card together with a personal identification number 
(PIN), known only to the cardholder and the issuing bank, which must be keyed 
in on the key pad of the ATMs or POS terminals before any payment takes place. 
The issuance and use of ATM cards are based on the relationship between banks 
and account holders created prior to or at the point of issuance of the card. Upon 
the completion of each payment transaction at ATMs or EFTPOS terminals the 
cardholder’s account is debited with the amount of cash issued or the funds are 
transferred instantaneously. Each payment transaction can be effected only if 
there is available balance in the bank account to be deducted. Because the 
cardholder deposits funds with the bank before using the card, the ATM card is 





(b) Stored value card 
 
The stored value cards are storage devices that work like digital purses to keep 
value of money in the form of encrypted digital information. Payment by stored 
value cards involves transmission of digital value between devices that requires 
only the card without any passwords, PIN, or cardholder’s signature. Stored value 
cards comprise of (i) single purpose stored value card (SPSVC) that can only be 
used to pay the card issuer (i.e. the issuer is also the merchant) and (ii) multi 
purpose stored value card (MPSVC) that can be used to pay all merchants that 
have the necessary arrangements with the card-issuer to accept payment. Beside 
plastic cards, digital money can be stored in other electronic devices such as 
personal computers or handheld computers and controlled by appropriate 
computer software. In this case, value can be transmitted via the linkage between 
computers such as the internet.  
 
(c) Credit cards 
 
Credit cards are issued by banks and financial institution under the payment 
systems maintained by international card associations such as Visa or 
MasterCard and bearing the insignia of the respective card association.  
 
When a credit card is used at a point of sale terminal, the merchant swipes the 
credit card presented by the cardholder in a card-reader device. The cardholder 
then signs on a transaction receipt printed by the reader. The merchant supplies 
goods or services to the cardholder and then submits the transaction receipt to an 
acquirer to obtain payment from the issuer.  
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A revolving line of credit is granted by the issuer to each cardholder. The issuer 
sends periodical statements of the card account (usually monthly) to the 
cardholder. The cardholder has options to either settle the debt in full (in which 
case he incurs no finance charge) or settle an amount equal or greater than the 
minimum payment required but smaller than the total amount owing (in which 
case the cardholder incurs finance charges from the due date specified in the 
statement). The cardholder may obtain cash from the counter of the card issuer or 
at ATMs, in which case he incurs finance charges from the date the amount is 
posted to his card account. 
 
In addition to usage at point of sale terminals, the credit cards can be used to 
make payment without the presence of the physical card and without signature by 
remote methods such as by telephone, mail or the internet. 
 
(d)  Charge card 
 
The charge card, also known as travel and entertainment or T&E card, may be 
considered a variance of the credit card because the procedure for its use is the 
same. The cardholder also makes purchases first and only pays after the monthly 
statements are delivered to him later. The difference with credit card is that the 
cardholder of a charge card is required to settle the entire amount owed under 
each statement on or before the due date.  
 
(e) Debit cards (signature based) 
 
In effect, this variance of the credit card looks almost the same as the credit card, 
and is used in the same manner. The difference is that with debit cards, the 
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cardholder uses the card to spend money out of the balance of his bank account 
linked with the card. Because of the popular use of signature in card-present 
transactions, this type of debit card is also called signature based debit card to 
distinguish with the PIN based debit card described in section (a) above. This 
may cause confusion because this type of debit card may be used without both the 
card and the signature. 
 
(f)  Prepaid card 
 
The prepaid card is a new type of card that is also used in the same payment 
system of the credit, charge, and debit cards. The prepaid cards look nearly 
identical to the normal credit, charge or debit card. The difference lies in that the 
amount available on each card is paid for in advance either by debiting from a 
bank account of the purchaser of the card or by a payment transaction by another 
credit card. Prepaid cards come in several forms, some with the cardholder’s 
name embossed on the card and some without, some are rechargeable (i.e. 
cardholder can add money to the card) and others non-rechargeable. The prepaid 
cards offer a more secure option for people who wish to limit the maximum 
amount of losses due to loss of cards or fraud. The prepaid cards also represent a 
convenient way of giving a gift to teenagers to help them become familiar with the 
most popular retail payment methods while limiting the risks. In terms of 
payment mechanism, the prepaid card works in the same way as the credit card, 
charge card or debit card except that the cardholders of prepaid cards have no 





(g) Proprietary card 
 
The proprietary cards are issued by department stores to save time evaluating 
credit worthiness of purchasers upon every purchase. This is a predecessor of the 
credit card introduced in the United States in 19143. Similar to the single purpose 
stored value card, the proprietary cards can only be used at retail outlets of the 
issuers. Because the issuer is also the merchant, this card involves only two 
parties. As a result, the procedure of use as well as the nature of the relationship 
between the parties is considerably simpler. 
 
(h) Other names for cards  
 
The individual cardholders of credit, debit, or charge card may request additional 
cards to be issued to other individuals such as their spouse or children. The 
additional cards are called supplementary cards (as opposed to principal card) 
and the additional holders are called cardusers. Payments made by 
supplementary cards are charged to the same account as those of the cardholder. 
The cardholders are made liable for all such usage and frequently the cardusers 
are made jointly liable for their own usage. 
 
When a credit, debit, or charge card is issued to a company, the company is the 
cardholder but no principal card is issued. All the cards are issued to the 
cardusers, usually employees or officers of the company. Where the cards are 
restricted for use with travel and entertainment purposes they are known as 
corporate cards. In Singapore, if the cardholder is a sole proprietor or 
                                                        
3 A.C. Drury and C.W. Ferrier, ‘Credit Cards’, Butterworth 1984 at page 19. The first credit 
card was issued in 1914 by General Petroleum Corporation of California (now Mobil Oil) to 
employees and selected customers. 
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partnership the card is called a business card. In Singapore, the cardholders and 
the cardusers are typically made jointly and severally liable for card transactions 
effected by corporate and business cards. In case the purposes of use of the credit, 
debit or charge card is restricted to purchases of goods or services on behalf of a 
corporation, a partnership or a sole proprietorship other than travel and 
entertainment purposes the card will be referred to as a purchasing card. 
 
1.3 Features of payment cards 
 
(a)  Credit extension 
 
Credit extension by issuer to cardholder is one of the features that can be attached 
to certain types of payment cards. The credit card is the one that most likely 
involves extension of credit. The cardholder is granted a revolving line of credit, 
an option to borrow from the issuer up to a certain limit by deferring payment 
due under the monthly statement. In this respect, the proprietary card is similar 
to the credit card as it also allows the cardholder to defer payment due to the 
issuer under the card statement. 
 
The charge card involves the provision of very short-term credit within the period 
from the point of each card transaction to the due date of the next monthly 
statement. The cardholders of charge cards are usually not allowed to defer 
payments due in each statement. 
 
The debit card (both PIN and signature based) generally does not involve the 
extension of credit, except when an overdraft facility is granted to an account 
linked to the debit card. The prepaid card and stored value card do not involve 
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any extension of credit by the issuer as the value available for each card is paid for 
in advance.  
 
The credit extension feature, even when attached to a credit card is only an option 
left open to the cardholder. He may chose to pay the entire amount due under the 
monthly statement or to pay less than that and incur finance charge. 
 
(b) Methods of use 
 
There are several methods by which a payment card can be used. The ATM cards 
can be used at ATM and EFTPOS terminals located within a limited geographical 
area. Most ATM cards issued in Singapore can only be used at a few hundreds 
ATMs owned by the issuing bank or shared between a few banks in Singapore. 
The EFTPOS acceptance function is limited within a local EFTPOS network 
(known as NETS) jointly operated by the major local banks within Singapore. 
ATM cards cannot be used without the presence of the card. 
 
In contrast, the credit card, charge card, and debit card can be used at millions of 
ATMs that display the insignia of the respective credit card network worldwide. 
When used at the point of sale these cards are swiped through separate reader 
equipment connected to a network separate from the local EFTPOS system. In 
addition, the card issued under the credit card system can be used to effect a 
card-absence transaction by remote method such as telephone, mail, facsimile, or 
internet. 
 
The multi-purpose stored value cards in Singapore can be issued, recharged or 
refunded at ATMs with the use of another ATM card but can not be used to 
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withdraw cash at the ATMs. The network for payment transaction by stored value 
cards is smaller than the EFTPOS network and is limited within Singapore. 
Currently the stored value cards are used mainly to make payments for small 
amounts such as road tolls, parking charges, library fees and for purchases at fast 
food restaurants. The stored value cards, however, may be used to make payment 
via the internet with an appropriate card reader device and publicly available 
software. 
 
(c) Primary function of the instrument 
 
Payment cards can be classified into three broad categories according to the 
primary function of the instrument, the card. The stored value card plays the 
function of a storage device to keep value of money in the form of digital 
information. It does not matter who is the cardholder, any bearer of a stored 
value card can use the card together with the value encoded in it. 
 
The ATM card primary function is an identification device, a security measure to 
control access to bank accounts. It is a digital substitute for a deposit passbook 
booklet issued to holders of bank saving-accounts. The ATM card is only a 
modern extension of the traditional methods by which banks already transact 
with their account holders. 
 
The usage of all the cards used in the credit card payment system, including credit 
cards, charge cards, signature-based debit cards and prepaid cards represents an 
undertaking by the issuer to pay the merchant regardless of the ability or 
willingness to pay by the cardholder, provided the procedures of effecting the 
transaction are complied with. In effect, this function is the substitution of the 
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credit of the cardholder with that of the card-issuer. The merchant supplies goods 
in exchange for only a piece of paper or information because he chose to trust the 
card association and the issuer of the card instead of the cardholder4. For this 
reason, the word ‘credit’ when used with ‘credit card payment system’ signifies 
the substitution of credit rather than the extension of credit by the issuer to the 
cardholder. While the credit, charge or debit card may be considered a means of 
identification (e.g. with the cardholder’s name, signature, and photograph on the 
card) the identification function is not essential. Such a function may be 
dispensed with in card-absent transactions. 
 
1.4 The payment systems of payment cards 
 
(a)  The concept of payment systems 
 
The concept of a payment system bases on the concept of money (i.e. coins and 
bank notes). The distinctive feature of money is that money passes “freely from 
hand to hand throughout the community in final discharge of debts and full 
payment for commodities, being accepted equally without reference to the 
character or credit of the person who offers it and without the intention of the 
person who receives it to consume it or to apply it to any other use than in turn 
tender it to others in discharge of debts or payment for commodities”5. Payment 
is the delivery of money by the payor to the payee in settlement of a debt. If a 
debtor makes payment otherwise than by money, he will not be seen to have 
made a valid tender of payment to the creditor, unless the parties have agreed 
                                                        
4 Please refer to the discussion of the conditional/unconditional discharge of the cardholder’s 
payment by credit card at Section 5.4 below at page 92. 
5 Moss v Hancock [1899] 2 QB 111 at 116 per Darling J. 
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upon that mode of payment before6. A payment system is an arrangement to 
facilitate the payment by payors to payees without tendering physical money. 
Professor Geva defined payment system as follow: “Any machinery facilitating 
the transmission of money which bypasses the transportation of money and its 
physical delivery from the payor to the payee is a payment mechanism. A 
payment mechanism facilitating a standard method of payment through a 
banking system is frequently referred to as a payment system. Payment over a 
payment mechanism is initiated by payment instructions, given by the payor or 
under the payor’s authority, and is often referred to as a transfer of funds”7.  
 
(b) Classification of payment system 
 
A payment system involves transactions between at least three parties, namely 
the payor, the payee, and the system operator. It has been suggested8 that, 
generally all payment systems can be categorized into two categories: (i) the 
‘embodied rights system’, the operation of which is functionally equivalent to the 
physical transfer of money without the intervention of a payment system 
provider; and (ii) the ‘account-based system’ which is essentially a system of 
transmission of instructions to effect the debiting or crediting of accounts which a 
user maintains with a system provider. 
 
According to this classification, the payment system of stored value cards can be 
placed into the ‘embodied rights system’ because (i) the value encoded in each 
card is transferred from device to device without the intervention of the system 
                                                        
6 Roy Goode, Payment Obligations in Commercial and Financial Transactions, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 1983 at page 9. 
7 Geva Benjamin, “The law of Electronic Funds Transfer”, Release No. 7, October 1999, 
Matthew Bender at §1.03, page 1-11. 
8 David Kreltszheim, “The legal nature of “electronic money”” (2003)14 JBFLP 161. 
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provider and (ii) the identity of the cardholder is not verified or relevant in each 
transaction. Stored value cards are digital purses, storage devices, as opposed to 
identification device facilitating the transmission of ‘instructions’ between 
parties. 
 
In contrast, all the other electronic payment system including the ATM/EFTPOS 
system and the credit card system are ‘account-based system’. Though these are 
usually referred to as electronic payment system, no value is transferred 
electronically. The term ‘electronic’ is used whenever any electronic means is used 
for transmission of instructions between the banks. Identifying the payment 
system of the credit cards as an account-based system may be a helpful point to 
assist the characterization of card transaction. 
 
In the next section, we will describe transactional aspects of the credit card 
system and distinguish them with the system of the ATM cards.  
 
2. TRANSACTIONAL ASPECTS OF CREDIT CARD PAYMENT SYSTEM 
 
2.1 Organization of credit card payment system 
 
(a) Credit card associations and its relationship with the issuer 
and acquirer 
 
The organizations that create, maintain, and promote the credit card payment 
system are consortiums of banks and financial institutions usually known as the 
credit card associations. These associations hold the insignia of the card and 
facilitate card transactions via their clearing and settlement systems. As with any 
 13
association, the credit card consortiums are owned, controlled, and managed by 
the joint efforts of their members under a common set of bylaws and regulations. 
We will come back to the analysis of the contents, validity, and effect of these 
bylaws and regulations later. It suffices to note here that the rules of each credit 
card association generally stipulate:- 
 
(i)  The conditions that a party must satisfy to become a member of the 
association, usually by being licensed as a bank or financial institution 
with certain capital adequacy;  
 
(ii)  The requirements of card issuance from necessary terms of agreement to 
technical specification of cards;  
 
(iii)  The procedures to effect and process card transactions by various methods 
from ATMs, point of sale to e-commerce transaction, clearing and 
settlement procedure; 
 
(iv)  The fees and sharing of costs and revenue for issuing cards and processing 
transactions; and  
 
(v) The procedures to correct mistakes and resolve disputes relating to 
unauthorized transactions, liability for products and services. 
 
Members of the card associations include issuers that issue cards and acquirers 
that assist the merchants to process payment transaction and obtain payments 
made by credit cards. To obtain the right to issue credit cards bearing the insignia 
of a particular card association or to accept payment by such cards, issuers and 
 14
acquirers have to accede to the rules of the respective card association. The 
relationship between members of credit card associations is maintained by 
‘indemnification’ method. This means the consortium undertakes to indemnify 
the acquiring members in the event the issuing member is unwilling or unable to 
make payment, provided the association’s rules were fully complied with. In 
terms of revenue, the acquirer earns revenue from credit card transaction in the 
form of a discount out of the transaction amount. A portion of this revenue is 
shared with the issuer by way of a percentage fee called the exchange fee.  
 
(b) Relationship with merchant and cardholder 
 
To obtain a credit, debit or charge card the cardholder must enter into an 
agreement with the issuer. We will analyze the relationship between the 
cardholder and the issuer in section 3 of chapter II. As a simple description, the 
cardholders are allowed to use the card to obtain cash at ATMs worldwide or to 
make payments to merchants that display the insignia of the respective card 
association. The cardholders undertake to reimburse the issuer the amount of 
such payments together with applicable fees and finance charges. 
 
To obtain the ability to accept payment by credit cards and other cards issued in 
the credit card system the merchants also need to enter into agreement with the 
acquirers. Under a merchant agreement, the merchant agrees to display the 
insignia of the respective card association and accept payment by cards in its 
ordinary course of business. The merchants must comply with the procedure to 
accept payments such as obtaining approval from the acquirer if a transaction 
amount exceeds a floor limit, verify the cardholder’s signature, and submit the 
transaction slip to the acquirer on time. For each card transaction, the acquirer 
 15
agrees to pay the merchant the transaction amount less a discount at a rate 
agreed between them. 
 
2.2 Typical payment transaction in a credit card system 
 
(a) Transaction stage 
 
In a typical card-present transaction effected by a credit card, charge card or 
signature-based debit card the merchant swipes the card through a card-reader. 
The equipment extracts information including the name of the issuer, the card 
account number and expiration date encoded in the magnetic stripe of the card. 
The equipment then contacts the acquirer via a telephone line or internet 
connection and sends an encrypted message identifying the card number, 
expiration date, amount of transaction, location of the merchant and merchant 
code. The acquirer, normally, routes that message to the card issuer via the card 
association. The issuer determines whether the credit card numbers are valid and 
whether the transaction amount is within the credit limit or the balance of the 
cardholder’s account in the case of a debit card. The issuer’s computer may also 
consider other information such as patterns of multiple transactions effected by 
the same card, location of card transactions and merchant code to measure the 
risk of fraud by the use of anti-fraud software. If the computer software 
determines that the transaction is legitimate, it sends an encrypted message back 
to the merchant’s terminal (via the card association’s and the acquirer’s computer 
systems) approving the transaction9. The merchant’s terminal then prints a 
transaction receipt, which contain the cardholder’s authorization for the issuer to 
                                                        
9 The issuer may engage an agent to process card transaction (“card processor”), in which case 
it is submitted that the issuer’s approval for the transaction is granted by the agent on behalf 
of the issuer. 
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charge the transaction amount to his card account. The cardholder is required to 
put his signature on the transaction receipt, which will be compared against the 
specimen on the back of the card by the merchant. The cardholder is then given 
the original transaction receipt for reference and the merchant keeps the carbon 
copy, which will be used in the collection stage. Increasingly merchants use 
terminals that have electronic pads that can capture the cardholders’ signatures 
electronically, in which event the payment slip may be transmitted to the acquirer 
electronically. 
 
(b) Collection stage 
 
In the collection stage, the merchant delivers the transaction receipts to the 
acquirer, usually on a daily basis. Increasingly the terminal that conducted the 
authorization transaction stores the information of all the transactions during a 
day, and, at the end of the day, transmits a batched message to the acquirer that 
describes all of the day’s transactions. A few days later the acquirer will credit the 
transaction amount to the account of the merchant with them less a certain 
discount as the fees for the acquirer’s services. Even though the fund is available 
in the merchant’s account, the acquirer usually reserves the right to charge back 
the amount in a number of circumstances prescribed in the agreement between 
merchant and acquirer.  
 
From the other side of the transaction, the issuer debits the credit card account 




For debit cards, the procedure of collection is slightly different. When the 
merchant swipes the debit card to obtain approval, an amount equal or equivalent 
to the transaction amount (if in different currencies) of the account linked with 
the card will be put ‘on hold’. The money ‘on hold’ is not yet deducted from the 
cardholder’s account but he cannot use it. The transaction amount will be 
deducted when the transaction is submitted by the merchant to the acquirer 
(typically by submitting the transaction receipt). If after certain time limit the 
transaction is not presented, the ‘hold’ will be removed. 
 
2.3 Effecting a payment transaction in credit card system remotely 
 
Besides the common method of swiping cards at point of sale terminals, there are 
several other methods to effect payment, some of which do not require the 
production of the card and the signature of the cardholder. These methods may 
be used with charge card and signature-based debit card as well as credit cards.  
 
(a)  Telephone method 
 
In a transaction over the telephone, the cardholder only gives the merchant the 
card number and expiry date of the card. In this case, the merchant does not have 
the transaction receipt with the signature of the cardholder. He, however, may 
use the same equipment as that used in card-present method to obtain approval 
for the transaction from the issuer. The difference is that the card and transaction 





(b) Mail and fax method 
 
When a transaction is made through mail or fax order, the cardholder fills in a 
printed form describing his name, card number, expiry date and signs the form. 
Authentication through the acquirer is usually required but the merchant does 
not have the obligation to compare signatures since he cannot see the specimen 
signature on the card.  
 
(c) Offline method (Imprinter) 
 
In the rare case where the merchant has no electronic terminal or where it is not 
possible or practicable to establish a connection between a terminal and the 
acquirer (e.g. when the merchant is moving or the sale occurs in a remote area), 
offline methods may be used. In the offline method, the merchant may use an 
imprinter, which is a simple tool to take a carbon copy of the card (because the 
card number and the cardholder’s name are embossed on the card) and obtain 
the cardholder’s signature. The difference in this case is that the authentication 
steps between the merchant and the issuer or the acquirer may not be conducted 
at the point of sale. Sometimes an electronic card reader may replace the 
imprinter but if a connection is not present and authentication is not conducted 
with the issuer, the transaction remains an offline transaction. Offline 
transactions have higher risks of fraud and the merchant may have to pay higher 
fees. 
 
(d) Internet method 
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In a transaction by internet, the cardholder provides cardholder’s name, card 
number, and expiry date via an electronic form. In a less secured way, the 
merchant may collect the information through an internet-based form and then 
submit it to the acquirer in the same way as for a telephone transaction. Recently 
due to the concerns that merchants or their staffs may abuse credit card numbers, 
secured socket layer (SSL) methods have been developed whereby the card 
number is concealed from the merchant except for the last 4 digits for 
identification purposes. In this case, the transaction information collected from 
the web site of the merchant is submitted directly to the acquirer through a third 
party payment service provider. As an additional security measure for internet 
transactions, certain acquirer or merchant may require that the cardholder 
provide card billing address and a security code printed on the back of the card. 
In such case, the acquirer’s computer interacts with the issuer’s computer to find 
a match of those additional criteria and the possibility of fraud is better 
prevented. This is especially helpful for merchants that deliver physical goods to 
the billing address of the cardholders as the cardholder’s defence may be limited 
if he benefits from the goods he receives. 
 
(e) Recurring transaction 
 
Merchants that provide continuous services such as telephone or public utilities 
companies offer their customers the option to make recurring payment by credit 
card. The cardholder signs a form to authorize the merchant to charge to his 
credit card account such amount that will be due in the future. Without the need 
to give individual authorization, all the future recurring payments will be made 
automatically between the merchant and the acquirer until the cardholder’s 
authorization is revoked. 
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2.4 Reversing a credit card transaction 
 
A credit card transaction may be reversed through the same channels that were 
used to effect the payment. There are two cases where a transaction may be 
reversed: refund and chargeback. Essentially the result of a reverse transaction is 
a refund or re-credit to the card account of the transaction amount. As a result, 




Usually the agreement between the acquirer and the merchant prohibits the 
merchant from giving cash refunds to their customer. This is probably because 
that cash refunds may cause difficulty in ascertaining the discount fees. Assuming 
a merchant has a refunds policy and a cardholder returned the goods purchased 
and request for a refund, the merchant needs to do a reverse transaction by 
issuing a credit receipt and send it to the acquirer via the same channel that was 
used when the original transaction was effected. The acquirer then routes the 
message back to the issuer via the card network and the transaction amount will 




In the case of chargeback, the reverse transaction is initiated by the cardholder 
through the issuer, which does not require the merchant’s consent. The basis for 
the cardholder to claim for chargeback can be divided into two categories: 
unauthorized transaction and breach of sale contract by the merchant. 
Unauthorized transactions can occur if the cardholder claims that the transaction 
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charged to his account was not authorized by him such as the case of lost card, 
stolen card numbers, or cancelled recurring transactions. Breach of contract by 
the merchant may include misrepresentation, non-delivery of merchandise or 
defective merchandise. The grounds for lodging a chargeback may be specified in 
the cardholder agreement, the bylaws, and regulations of the card association and 
the merchant agreement. When a chargeback is lodged by the cardholder, 
regulations of card association usually requires the issuer to immediately credit 
the transaction amount back to the card account pending resolution of the 
dispute. If the chargeback claim is valid, the bank account of the merchant with 
the acquirer will be debited. 
 
2.5 Comparison with ATM/EFTPOS system 
 
(a) Typical ATM/EFTPOS transactions 
 
A EFTPOS transaction effected by an ATM card is very similar to a card-present 
transaction effected by a credit card. The card is also presented and swiped in a 
reader device. The difference is that, instead of giving a signature, holders of ATM 
cards key in a secret personal identification number (PIN). The terminal then 
transmits an encrypted electronic signal, tagged with the PIN to the issuing bank 
via the card association, with a request to transfer funds from cardholder’s 
account with the issuing bank to the credit of the merchant. The issuer’s 
computer examines the signal, matches the PIN with the records of the 
designated account. If the account has sufficient funds, the issuing bank 
ordinarily sends a message back to the merchant’s terminal via the computer 
network approving the transaction. The merchant, in return, delivers the goods or 
services to the cardholder. The issuer’s obligation to pay the amount usually 
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becomes final when the ‘approval’ message is received at the merchant’s terminal 
and the account of the cardholder is debited with the transaction amount 
instantaneously. In the collection stage, the merchant receives actual payment of 
all card transactions to its bank account periodically, usually in a single daily 
deposit on the next working day. 
 
(b) Comparison between credit card system and the ATM/ EFTPOS 
system 
 
Besides the similar physical appearance of a plastic card, the ATM/EFTPOS 
system and the credit card system are similar in many respects. Both systems 
involve the cardholder, the merchant, the issuer, the acquirer and the card 
network being an association between issuers and acquirers. Both networks 
perform the function of facilitating the transmission of ‘messages’ or 
‘instructions’ electronically between the merchant’s point of sale terminals and 
the issuers via the acquirer. Both types of cards can be used at ATMs and point of 
sale terminals. However, there are fundamental differences between the two 
systems that may require different rules of law to apply to them, thus require 
further attention. 
 
The simple analysis partially made in previous sections shows several functional 
differences: 
 
(i)  In terms of method of authentication, a transaction made with the ATM 
card, whether at the point of sale or at the ATMs always requires the presence of 
the card together with a secret PIN. In contrast, credit card transactions at the 
point of sale require the cardholder’s signature instead of PIN. In several 
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circumstances, transactions in the credit card system can be effected without the 
card and even without the cardholder’s signature.  
 
(ii)  With respect to the nature of the network, the systems of ATM/EFTPOS 
cards are local while credit card systems are international10. Even where a 
merchant is able to accept both credit cards and ATM/EFTPOS cards at the same 
point of sale, the different cards use different equipment connecting to separate 
network of transmissions. 
 
The above differences, though easy to identify, may not sufficiently distinguish 
between the two systems. Firstly, several credit card association today give the 
cardholder the option to attach a secret PIN to their credit, debit or charge card 
(e.g. ‘Verified by Visa’ or ‘MasterCard SecureCode’) for use with internet 
transactions. This feature makes the PIN vs. signature difference less significant. 
Secondly, one might argue that the size and coverage of a card network has little 
to do with its legal nature. In the very beginning, the network of credit and charge 
card did not cover the world as it does today. 
 
A more thorough analysis, however, shows that the important difference between 
the two systems lies in the way the cardholders settle the transaction with the 
issuer. In ATM/EFTPOS system, the bank account of the cardholder is deducted 
with the transaction amount immediately when the transaction completes at the 
point of sale. In contrast, in the credit card system the cardholder settle the 
amount due to the issuer in a separate transaction that occurs days after the 
                                                        
10 Some ATM/EFTPOS cards issued in one country may be used in another country, for 
instance, Singapore NETS cards and Malaysian MEPS cards may be used in both countries. 
This, however, has happened only as individual bilateral arrangement and ATM/EFTPOS 
should still be considered “local” by nature. 
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payment transaction. Even with the signature-based debit card, the transaction 
amount is not deducted on the spot, but only put ‘on hold’ until the merchant duly 
submits the transaction slip to the issuer via the acquirer. Because of the 
instantaneous debit requirement, a transaction with an ATM/EFTPOS card 
cannot proceed without a live communication linkage between the issuer and the 
merchant. In contrast, a transaction in the credit card system can be effected 
offline. Furthermore, the holders of credit cards usually have certain recourse 
against the merchant in case of misrepresentation, defective products, which 
recourse is not available to holders of ATM/EFTPOS at all. 
 
Because of these differences, it is submitted that the transactions in the 
ATM/EFTPOS card system is characterized as an ‘electronic fund transfer’, in the 
same way as a ‘money transfer order’ or ‘wire transfer’ transaction are. In 
contrast, a transaction in the credit card system should be characterized not as a 
‘fund transfer’ but in a way similar to documentary credit. This submission is 
supported by further analysis in section 1.3 in chapter II.  
 
3.  ECONOMICS ASPECTS OF CREDIT CARD PAYMENT SYSTEM 
 
3.1 Costs and revenue sharing in the credit card system 
 
(a) Merchant’s discount and exchange fee 
 
As mentioned above, in return for the ability to attract more customers by 
offering the options to make payment by credit cards, the merchant has to pay the 
acquirer a fee for the payment service expressed as a discount deducted from the 
sale proceeds (hence the use of the expressions ‘discounting or acquiring 
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transaction receipts’ and ‘acquirer’). The rate of such discount varies from about 
2% to 7% depending on the method of effecting card transaction and the nature of 
the goods or services sold. Ultimately, the rate of discount depends on the level of 
risk of fraud in the card transactions of the merchant. The rate is lower if the 
merchant only accepts card-present payment and is higher when merchant 
accepts payment by telephone, facsimile, mail order, or internet. The discount 
rate is higher if the merchant accepts payment via internet and will probably be 
highest if the merchant supplies virtual services (e.g. internet telephony, digital 
music, digital books) instead of supplying physical goods (the delivery of which 
can be proved by airway bills). The merchant’s discount is a major source of 
revenue for the acquirer as well as the credit card system.  
 
For every card transaction, the fee collected from the merchant is divided 
between the acquirer and the issuer by way of an exchange fee, paid by the 
acquirer to the issuer also in the form of a discount. For each transaction the 
issuer is entitled to charge the entire transaction amount to the account of the 
cardholder but it need to pay the acquirer the transaction amount less the 
exchange fee. The difference between the merchant’s discount and the exchange 
fee is the actual revenue of the acquirer. 
 
(b) Annual fee and finance charge 
 
In addition to the exchange fee, the issuers have two other sources of revenue, the 
annual fee, and the finance charge paid by the cardholder. There are several 
indications that the annual fee is not significant revenue for the issuers. When the 
credit and charge card was first introduced in America it was not a tradiction to 
charge any annual fee. The annual fee was said to be a result of low usury ceiling 
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imposed by states law in a time of inflation in America11. Most banks in Singapore 
waive the annual fee for the first few years when accepting new card applications. 
The waiver can continue if the cardholders can maintain a sufficient level of 
spending on the cards. Besides the waiver of annual fee, most banks give the 
cardholder benefits such as discounts at restaurants and bonus points for 
purchases at qualified merchants to encourage cardholders to spend more with 
their cards. For an average cardholder the value of such freebies is about the 
equivalent of the annual fee paid to the card issuers. 
 
The issuer’s main source of income is, therefore, the exchange fee, and the finance 
charges. If the consumers use the credit card system more for reasons other than 
borrowing at super high interest rates the revenue from finance charge would 
shrink while the exchange fee would grow. The card associations cover their costs 
of operation from both issuer and acquirer by assessment of their members, 
usually quarterly. 
 
From the above analysis, it is found that the two main contributors to the credit 
card system are the cardholder and the merchant. The cardholders contribute 
more by paying finance charges where the system is used as a means of extending 
credit. The merchants contribute more if the system is used as a means of making 
cashless payment. We will attempt to find out which is the main function of the 
credit card system in section 3.4. 
 
3.2  The importance of the credit card system in Singapore 
                                                        
11 Barkley Clark, The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards, Third Edition, 
Warrant, Gorham & Lamont, 1991, at 11.02: “… bank cards have generally not involved any 
annual membership fee, such as the fee imposed by the travel and entertainment cards, low 
usury ceiling in a time of inflation have caused some issuers to impose such a fee.” 
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This section attempts to demonstrate the relative importance of the credit card 
system in Singapore in comparison with other countries, other payment cards 
system, and other cashless payment methods. 
 
(a) Payment cards usage in comparison with other countries  
 
In the comparison with other developed countries, the statistics of the Bank of 
International settlement in 1999 shows that the number of payment cards per 
1000 inhabitants of Singapore is the highest in the world.  
 











Singapore 8,043 2,978 na na 
Belgium 1,308 1,308 436 156 
Canada 2,027 2,482 na na 
France 636 567 na na 
Germany 1,200 1,297 552 97 
Italy 369 565 5.5 na 
Japan 2,388 na na 503 
Netherlands 1,527 1,527 na na 
Sweden 830 799 na na 
Switzerland 1,106 1,142 729 na 
United 
Kingdom 
1,881 1,529 911 
na 
United States 2,658 2,793 na 2,177 
 
Not only that the country has the largest number of payment cards per 
inhabitants, the plastic is used more frequently than in any other country, except 
for Canada.  
 
                                                        
12 Payment Systems in Singapore 2001, Bank for International Settlement, Table 7, page 39. 
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Chart 2: Percentage of payment card transactions out of total number of all 
cashless transactions from 1995 to 1999 13. 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Singapore 30.3 32.6 34.4 37.2 38.0 
Belgium 19.7 21.4 23.4 27.4 28.9 
Canada 33.3 38.8 44.5 48.4 51.7 
France 17.6 18.3 16.9 18.2 na 
Germany 3.6 4.2 4.1 5.1 5.2 
Italy 6.6 8.6 11.2 14.2 17.6 
Netherlands 13.4 19.5 23.2 26.2 28.6 
Sweden 14.2 14.8 18.9 23.0 24.1 
Switzerland 18.4 20.7 22.8 23.4 27.3 
United 
Kingdom 
24.1 27.1 29.6 31.7 34.6 
United States 20.0 21.4 22.9 24.6 26.6 
 
(b) Credit card and charge card capacity and growth 
 
There are a large number of credit and charge card in Singapore. As at October 
2006, there were 3,854,930 main credit and charge cards and 1,110,191 
supplementary cards with a total card billing of approximately SGD16 billion in 
year 200514. Chart 3 and 4 below show the growth of the credit card and charge 









                                                        
13 Payment Systems in Singapore 2001, Bank for International Settlement, Table 8, page 40. 
14 MAS’ Monthly Statistical Bulletin at 
https://secure.mas.gov.sg/frames/msb/msbIndexpage.html  
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Chart 3: Number of credit and charge cards in Singapore 1989-200415 
 
Number of credit and 
charge cards in 
circulation increased 
steadily from 631,737 
cards in 1989 to 
4,509,708 cards in 
2005 
 
Chart 4: Credit and charge cards transaction value 1989-200416 
 
Total value of credit 
card and charge card 
transactions 
increased from 1.97 
billion in 1989 to 16 
billion in 2005 
 
(c) Credit and charge card usage in comparison with other 
payment cards and other means of cashless payment 
 
In the comparison with other methods of cashless payment, the payment cards 
(including credit/charge cards, ATM cards and stored value cards) are used more 
often than any other means. The MAS reported that in 2003 there were about 87 
million SGD cheques and 550,000 USD cheques cleared, 62 million GIRO 
transactions effected while there were 106 million EFTPOS transactions and 
1,536 million stored value cards transactions.  
 
                                                        
15 Ibid note 11. 
16 Ibid note 12. 
 30
However, in terms of transaction value the cheque is still the dominating method. 
Chart 5 below illustrates the proportion of transaction value by credit cards in 
comparison with GIRO, cheque and other payment cards. 
 
Chart 5: Value of payment transactions (in SGD billion) – 2003  
 
 
Stored value card:  1.25 billion 
ATM card: 7 billion 
Credit/charge card: 12.4 billion 
GIRO 108 billion 
Cheque 391 billion 
 
The credit card system, however, is outpacing other means of payment in growth 
rate. Chart 6 below shows a constant decrease in the use of cheques, a slight 
increase in use of GIRO, very little increase in the use of ATM cards but a sharp 
increase of credit/charge cards usage. 
 
Chart 6:  Value of payment processed from 1996 to 2000 (SGD billion) 17. 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Cheques 586 619 471 504 474 
ATM cards  6 7 7 7 7 
Credit cards 7 8 8 9 11 







                                                        
17 Payment Systems in Singapore 2001, Bank for International Settlement, Table 13, page 28. 
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3.3 Potential of the credit card system 
 
(a) Capacity of major credit card networks 
 
The global credit card market is highly concentrated with only two giant credit 
card networks: Visa and MasterCard, sharing almost the entire market in 
approximately equal proportions. To illustrate the capacity of Visa and 
MasterCard, the table below shows the approximate statistics of network 
coverage, number of members, cards, transactions and the dollar value of 
payment processed as at end of 2004. 
 
Chart 7: Capacity of Visa and MasterCard as at end of 200418. 
Criteria Visa MasterCard 
Number of members  21,000 banks and 
financial institutions 
25,000 banks and 
financial institutions 
Number of cards Over 1 billion cards Over 700 million cards 
Number of transactions 43 billion per year  16.7 billion per year 
Dollar value of 
payment processed 
Total of USD3.3 trillion 
per  year 
Total USD1.5 trillion 
per year 
Number of merchants Over 20 million Over 23 million 
Number of ATMs Approx. 944,000 ATMs Approx. 1 million ATMs 
 
The networks of major credit card associations are enormous. Considering the 
number of banks and financial institutions that have joined the association as 
members, the number of ATMs and merchants ready to accept cards from the 
credit cards system, the number of card in circulation and the value of 
transaction, it seems fair to say that the credit card system is the most matured 
and established system for electronic retail payment worldwide. The business of 
issuing and accepting payment by credit, debit, and charge card is an important 
avenue for bank to generate revenue and to acquire and retain customers. 
                                                        
18 Data source: Visa and MasterCard worldwide report 2004. 
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Besides, the credit card system has several unique capabilities, which we will 
discuss further below.  
 
(b)  Electronic commerce 
 
While the credit card system continues to be the most favored means of making 
payments for travel and entertainment purposes, it is the only system capable for 
use in retail transaction on the internet. The ATM/EFTPOS cards cannot be used 
for internet transaction19. The stored value card may be used to make payment 
over the internet but is not capable to compete with the credit card in the near 
future because (i) it requires additional card reader device and software (ii) there 
is no stored value card network that operate internationally and (iii) the 
transaction mechanism of the stored value card gives the cardholder no recourse 
in case of merchant’s fraud.  
 
The Visa worldwide report 2004 reported that more than 50% of all internet 
payments were made with their credit and debit cards and their e-commerce sales 
grew 56%, exceeded USD150 billion in annual sales. E-commerce is growing fast 
as consumers worldwide become more accustomed to making purchase over the 
internet. Visa estimated that almost 20% of global Personal Consumer 
Expenditure (estimated at approximately USD 24 trillion in 2004) takes place 
using electronic payment method.  
 
(b) Expenditure management 
                                                        
19 The use of the ATM card to make payment on the internet should be distinguished with the 
use of the bank account number. The ATM card number cannot be used to make payment on 
the internet in a way similar to using the credit/debit card numbers. There is also no facility to 
use the ATM card with a card reader connected to a personal computer. 
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Credit, debit, and charge cards are not only used by individuals. Increasingly, 
governments and companies use these cards as a means to manage expenditure 
and risk by the use of corporate cards for T&E purposes, purchasing cards for 
office supplies and payroll prepaid cards for salary payment. According to statistic 
recorded by Visa and presented at its conference organized in 200520, the value of 
transaction made by credit and debit cards issued to companies and government 
exceeded USD 210 billion in year 2004, a 25% growth compared to previous year. 
The Visa Payroll card in America helps employers reduce the cost of processing 
pay cheques and allows workers without bank accounts to receive their salaries. 
Many countries are using debit cards to pay government workers, deliver 
pensions and benefits, and help enable their procurement processes. The 
technological power of credit/debit card system helps government and companies 
to keep track of expenditure at low costs and at the same time increase 
transparency and reduce the opportunities for corruption. Visa debit cards are 
now used by more than 2,000 departments and agencies at all levels in over 20 
countries. In Singapore, Visa debit cards are used by 38 government agencies 
with over 2,300 cards issued under 45 corporate or purchasing card programs. 
The use of Visa card by Singapore government grew 80% from 2000 to 2004. 
 
(c) Electronic government 
 
The credit, debit, and charge cards are becoming more and more popular means 
of making payment to the Singapore government in line with its effort to provide 
more services electronically. Currently, Singapore residents are allowed to make 
                                                        
20 Presentation by Michael Cannon, General Manager, Commercial Solutions, Visa Asia 
Pacific at Visa Conference 2005. 
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payment for various services such as application for visas, licences (e.g. various 
types of business licence, TV licence), purchasing of information (e.g. company 
and business registration search, bankruptcy search) by credit/debit cards. 
Unlike ATM and stored value card, payment by credit/debit card does not require 
any additional card-reader equipment or installation of software. Hence, the 
credit/debit cards are increasingly preferred by the consumers to make payment 
to government, in the same familiar way they pay other merchants. It is possible 
to say that the use of credit/debit cards makes electronic government easier to 
implement.  
 
3.4 Primary function of credit card system  
 
The primary function of the credit card, charge card, or signature based debit 
card is a means of making electronic retail payment. The credit extension aspect 
is only an optional secondary function. The holder of charge card obtains credit 
on a term shorter than the billing cycle of the card, mainly for convenience, not as 
a means of obtaining financial accommodation. The holder of debit card clearly 
does not use any finance from the card issuer. Even for the credit card, if the 
cardholder always pays his bill on or before the due date, the credit extension 
aspect does not surface at all.  
 
The dominating trend of the payment function in the of credit card system can be 
illustrated by two facts: (i) that debit card is becoming more popular than credit 
card, and (ii) that consumer uses credit card to make payment more than to 
borrow.  
 
(a) Comparison between credit and debit card importance 
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As MAS does not publish statistic on debit card, we had to use the data made 
publicly available by Visa. It is, however, submitted that the data is reliable 
enough for our enquiry because about 60% of credit cards in Singapore were 
reportedly issued by Visa. Chart 8 below illustrates that, in the Visa system, the 
debit card is nearly as important as the credit card worldwide. During a period of 
1 year ending June 2003, about 42% of cards bearing Visa brands are debit cards 
and 50% of the total 25 billion Visa transactions worldwide were made with debit 
card. The sale volume of Visa debit cards accounts for about 48% of total sale 
volume of all Visa cards.  
Chart 8: Comparison of credit card and debit card importance 21 
 
Just 6 months later than the date of the above statistics, the Visa’s Worldwide 
Association Report announced that its debit business grew 19% in one year and 
have exceeded credit business in total card sale volume. This is explained by the 
fact that debit card is growing at exceptionally high speed. Chart 9 below 
(extracted from the same source quoted above at note 17) shows a comparison of 
growth rates of debit card in comparison with that of credit card and cheque from 
1997 to 2000. 
 
                                                        
21 The chart was extracted from the presentation by Rahul Khosla, a consultant of Visa 
International at the Visa Conference 2005, which was then made available on Visa’s internet 
website. 
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Chart 9: Aggregate growth rate of payment 1997 - 2000 
 
 
The increasing importance of debit card over credit card may be due to many 
reasons. From the consumers’ point of view, obtaining a debit card is much easier 
as they do not have to qualify for the minimum income barrier. The card is also 
cheaper to maintain and there is no interest costs while performing the same 
essential features as credit card. From the bank’s viewpoint, debit card represents 
an opportunity to acquire customers who do not meet the minimum income 
requirements. Therefore, the debit card may be used by the banks as a channel to 
penetrate into younger generation of customers. More importantly, the debit card 
has high potential for banks to increase revenue. Chart 10 below shows the 
proportions of revenue, costs, and profit of card issuers in respect of an average 











Although on average, each active debit card brings about only about US$40-60 
compared to US$75-100 profit for the bank, the source of profit may be more 
stable. Revenue from debit card comes in the form of interchange fees and 
transaction fees, which would increase when the cards are used more often. The 
revenue in respect of credit card comes from interest may be less stable and may 
decrease when the use of credit function decline. Finally, from the viewpoint of 
the regulators the debit card should be favored over the credit card. Because the 
debit card does not involve lending, if debit card replaces credit card, there would 
be lower systemic risk. In addition, the consumer’s preference of spending money 
they already have over borrowing too easily at impoverishing rates is something 




                                                        
22 This chart was extracted from the same source of chart 9. 
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(b) Credit card no longer a means of extending credit  
 
While the number of credit card in circulation and value of transaction continue 
to increase as shown in chart 8 and 9 above, statistics shows that Singapore 
consumers increasingly use the credit card to make payment without borrowing 
money. The “Credit Card Report” published by Visa International (Visa) in July 
2004 reported that for every S$100 that Singaporean cardholder spends in 2003 
they repaid about S$96 and only borrow S$4. Chart 11 below (which was 
extracted from the above Visa’s report) shows the amount of spending in 
comparison with the amount of repayment of all Visa credit cardholders in 
Singapore from 1998 to 2003. The green line representing spending closely 
intertwines with the blue line indicating repayment. In several periods, 
repayment exceeded spending.  
 
Chart 11: Visa credit card spending versus repayment in Singapore 1998-2003 
 
 
In chart 12 below (also extracted from the same Visa’s report), the relative ratio of 
repayment over spending was shown to fluctuate between 90% and 115%. As 
noted in that report, the time series exhibits a saw-tooth pattern corresponding 
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with seasonal pattern of spending and repayment. The ratio usually decline 
during holiday seasons such as Christmas and quickly jumps as soon as the 
shopping seasons is over. In a long period from 1998 to 2003, the overall trend of 
the ratio remained stable along a straight line. This shows that the credit card has 
been and will continue to be a rarely used channel of obtaining financial 
accommodation in Singapore.   
 
Chart 12: Visa credit card repayment relative to spending 1998 -2003 
 
 
The above tendency of the consumers may be explained by the fact that the 
current MAS’ regulations only allow issuance of credit card to income earners of 
more than $30,000 p.a. People earning this level of income have many other 
sources of finance readily available at much lower costs that the credit cards are 
seldom seen as a viable option. With overdraft interest rates as low as 7% or 8% 
p.a. and the common credit card interest rate at 24% p.a. it is obvious that few 
people would take the option of borrowing at a rate that, if charged by a 
moneylender, would constitute harsh and unconscionable bargain.  
 
As the debit card is overtaking the credit card at high speed and the consumers 
continue to cut down borrowing by credit card even if they have one, it is fair to 
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conclude that the credit card payment system today (e.g. Visa, MasterCard) is 
primarily an electronic payment system with an optional secondary function of 
extending short term credit. This conclusion will be used in our discussion on the 






RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
 
1. CHARACTERIZATION THEORIES 
 
1.1 Contractual structure 
  
Banking law textbooks generally view the contractual structure underlying the 
credit card as a tripartite arrangement23. This proposition has its root in the 
decision of Re Charge Card Services Ltd24 (Re Charge Card) where Millett J. 
analyzed the typical credit card and charge card schemes as three separate 
bilateral contracts: 
 
“On the use of the card, three separate contracts come into operation. First, 
there is the contract of supply between the supplier and the cardholder (either in 
his own right or as agent for the account holder); second, there is the contract 
between the supplier and the card-issuing company, which undertakes to 
honour the card by paying the supplier on presentation of the sales voucher and, 
third, there is the contract between the card-issuing company and the account 
holder by which the account holder undertakes to reimburse the card-issuing 
company for payments made or liabilities incurred by the card-issuing 
company to the supplier as a result of his or his cardholder’s use of the card. 
There are thus three separate contracts and three separate parties, each being 
party to two of the three contracts but neither party nor privy to the third. While 
                                                        
23 For example, in Modern Banking Law 3rd Edition by E.P. Ellinger, E. Lomnicka and R.J.A. 
Holley the Visa, MasterCard schemes were called ‘tripartite credit cards’ and analyzed as 
essentially tripartite arrangement at pages 532 to 535. 
24 First instance [1987] 1 Ch. 150.  
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the legal consequences of these arrangements must depend on the terms of the 
particular contracts employed, one would expect each contract to be separate 
and independent and to be entered into between principals. In particular, one 
would expect the card-issuing company to enter into both its contract with the 
supplier and its contract with the account holder as a principal in its own right 
and not merely as agent for the account holder and the supplier respectively.” 25 
 
Because the credit card scheme is characterized as separate bilateral agreements, 
a sale paid by credit, debit, or charge card is clearly distinguishable with the 
tripartite arrangement in a credit sale or hire purchase situation. Although the 
cardholder only gives his signature or the card particulars to the merchant to 
make payment for the sale instead of paying cash, and the payment is expected 
from the issuer, the issuer never takes ownership of the goods purchased. The 
transaction, therefore, is distinguishable from a tripartite hire purchase 
arrangement. 
 
As the first case that analyzed the credit cards relationship in details, a landmark 
decision, Re Charge Card has frequently been relied on as an undisputed source 
of the law on credit cards. However, a comparison between the charge card 
scheme in that case and the credit, debit, and charge cards arrangement today 
shows considerable differences. The organization of a typical credit card payment 
system, which was described in chapter I, shows that there are five parties 
involved in the system. The chart below shows the agreements entered into 
between them. 
 
                                                        





In addition to the issuer, the cardholder, and the merchant, there are two new 
parties namely the card association and the acquirer. The agreement between the 
cardholder and the issuer created when the cardholder applied for the card and 
the sale contract entered into between the cardholder and the merchant when the 
cardholder makes purchase of goods or services from the merchant remain 
essentially the same as in Re Charge Card. The difference is that in today’s credit 
card schemes the issuers no longer enter into an agreement directly with the 
merchants. Before accepting payment by credit cards, the merchants must enter 
into the merchant agreement with the acquirer but there appears to be no 
contract between the merchant and the issuer. In practice, the merchant has the 
first contact with the issuer via the computer network of the card association 
when he attempts to authenticate the card transaction. In many cases (e.g. 
internet merchants), the identity of the issuer is not revealed to the merchant at 
all. 
 
The role of the card association as a separate party in this contractual structure 
seems less significant if a direct contractual link can be created between the issuer 
and the acquirer. Such an agreement may be deemed to be created between the 





Sale Contract Cardholder  Merchant 
Issuer  Acquirer 
Card Association 
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issuer and the acquirer when both of them agreed to the bylaws and regulations of 
the respective card associations. Although there is no bilateral agreement signed 
between them the contractual relationship may be created by virtue of their 
submission to the same set of rules and regulations of the card associations. 
There are English authorities to support this view26.  
 
However, even with the card association taken out of the picture, it is difficult to 
ignore the role of the acquirer. As the merchant only signs agreement with the 
acquirer, there is no basis for him to take action directly against the issuer or the 
card association. In practice, in a dispute with the issuer, the merchant usually 
has to pursue his claim to the acquirer and the dispute has to be resolved through 
the resolution procedure of the card association. To adapt the new structure to 
the three-bilateral-agreements framework of Re Charge Card, it may be necessary 
to regard the acquirer as an agent of either the issuer or the merchant. 
 
Our preliminary conclusion is that the three-bilateral-agreements analysis of Re 
Charge Card remains applicable to the credit card system today. However, to 
support such an application further analysis into the typical terms of agreements 
between the parties, the different theories of characterization and the practices of 
effecting and settling credit card transactions is necessary. In the next few 
sections in this chapter we will attempt to conduct such analysis based on a 
triangular structure between the issuer, the merchant and the cardholder with the 
acquirer and the card association only acting as agents or facilitator of the card 
transactions.  
 
                                                        
26 For example in The Satanita [1895] p. 248 and Clarke v. Dunraven (Earl) [1897] A.C. 59A 
members of clubs submitting to the same set of rules and regulations have been considered 
having direct contractual relationship. 
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1.2 Assignment vs. direct obligation theories 
 
The result of the sale contract is that the cardholder becomes obliged to pay the 
merchant the price of the sale, which in a cash transaction he pays by tendering 
notes and coins. However, when the sale is paid by credit, debit, or charge card, 
the cardholder becomes liable to pay the issuer instead of the merchant. There is 
clearly a connection between the cardholder’s liability towards the issuer and his 
liability to the merchant in the sale transaction. This can be characterized by 
applying two different theories.  
 
Under ‘assignment theory’, the cardholder’s liability is characterized as a claim 
for unpaid goods or services, which is ‘assigned’ by the merchant to the issuer. 
Alternatively, if the card is a debit card, the cardholder can be said to assign part 
of his property right (chose in action) owed by the issuer to him, to the merchant 
in satisfaction of the debt that arise from the sale. Alternatively, under ‘direct 
obligation theory’, the cardholder’s liability can be considered as arising directly 
from his relationship with the issuer. We will look at the application of both 
theories below. 
 
(a) Assignment theory 
 
Under the assignment theory, a credit card transaction is viewed as a factoring of 
the merchant’s book debt or account receivable. Accordingly, the presentment of 
transaction receipts by the merchant to the issuer constitutes assignment of book 
debt at a discount. The legal consequence of this is the cardholder becomes liable 
to pay the issuer instead of the merchant.  
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It has been suggested that it is theoretically possible to apply the assignment 
theory to the credit card arrangement in Singapore27. According to that analysis, 
the merchant’s claim against the cardholder arise from the sale transaction is a 
legal chose in action that is not assignable at common law but is assignable in 
equity. Where a legal chose in action is assigned in equity, the assignor needs to 
join with the assignee as plaintiff or defendant in an action against the debtor. An 
assignment of a debt in equity requires no special form since a contract to assign 
is tantamount to an assignment28. For the assignment to be valid and complete in 
equity, no notice to the debtor is necessary29. The issuer, as equitable assignee 
takes the debt ‘subject to equities’, i.e. subject to all defences which the cardholder 
may have against the merchant including any cross-claims which might have 
prevailed against the merchant before the notice of assignment was given to the 
cardholder. Because the merchant assigns the whole debt owed by the cardholder 
to the issuer absolutely, the assignment may qualify to be considered a statutory 
assignment under Section 4(8) of the Civil Law Act30 - the equivalence of Section 
136 of the Law of Property Act 1925 of England. The Section enables assignees to 
bring action against debtors in respect of assigned debt if the assignment was an 
absolute assignment made in writing and an express notice has been given to the 
debtors. The merchant agreement does not constitute the assignment of the debts 
because future properties cannot be assigned until it comes into existence31. 
However, the delivery of transaction receipts by the merchant to the issuer may 
                                                        
27 See C.Y. Lee, “Law on Consumer Credit”, 1990, page 81, 82. 
28 Marchant v. Morton Down & Co [1901] 2 K.B.829. 
29 William Brandt’s Sons & Co v. Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd [1905] A.C.454. 
30 Cap. 30, Section 4(8): “Any absolute assignment by writing under the hand of the 
assignor, not purporting to be by way of charge only, of any debt or other legal chose in 
action of which express notice in writing has been given to the debtor, trustee or other 
person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to receive or claim such debt or 
chose in action, shall be and be deemed to have been effectual in law, subject to all equities 
which would have been entitled to priority over the right of the assignee under the law as it 
existed before 23rd July 1909, to pass and transfer the legal right to such debt or chose in 
action, from the date of such notice, and all legal and other remedies for the same, and the 
power to give a good discharge for the same, without the concurrence of the assignor.” 
31 Collyer v Isaacs (1881) 19 Ch.D. 342. Chitty on Contracts, 28th Edition, Volume 1 at 21-047. 
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constitute statutory assignment if the receipts are attached with a written 
instrument under hand stating that the debts are thereby assigned absolutely to 
the issuer. The statement of account rendered by the issuer to the cardholder may 
constitute such a notice of assignment. 
 
Alternatively, the cardholder’s act of presenting the card to the merchant may 
also be characterized as an equitable assignment of his chose in action against the 
issuer to the merchant. The submission of the transaction receipt by the merchant 
to the issuer may constitute notice of assignment. A practical difficulty is that, in 
this case, the assignment is likely to be an assignment of part of the debt (unless 
the cardholder of the debit card pay exactly the amount he has in the account) 
which is not sanctioned by the Civil Law Act thus will not qualify as a statutory 
assignment. Therefore, in this case the merchant will need to join with the 
cardholder as to enable the action against the issuer. The equitable assignment, 
however, remains valid32. 
 
According to the above analysis, it is theoretically possible to apply the 
assignment theory to the credit card arrangement. Both the debt owed by the 
cardholder to the merchant, and the debt owed by the issuer to the cardholder (in 
case of debit card) are assignable chose in action. However, the assignment theory 
should not be followed because the operation of credit card system is inconsistent 
with the rules of the assignment of debts.  
 
                                                        
32 There are many cases to illustrate that the amount deposited by a customer in a bank 
constitutes an assignable chose in action. See for example Deposit Protection Board v. Dalia 
[1994] 2 AC 367 at 380-381, 392. There is also an American case that support this view: 
Delbruek v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F 2d. 1047, 1051 (1979). See also Ellinger, 
Lomnicka and Hooley, “Modern Banking Law” 3rd Edition, at page 495. 
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Firstly, the cardholder agreement invariably provides that the cardholder is liable 
to the issuer for not only all payment transaction, but also other late payment 
charges, fees, and other charges incurred regardless of any dispute with the 
merchant. When the card is used at the point of sale, the typical transaction 
receipt states “I agree to pay the above total amount according to the card issuer 
agreement.”33 In mail order or internet transaction, similar statements are used. 
Such a statement indicates acknowledgment of the debt owed by the cardholder 
to the issuers, not to the merchant. In case of debit card, the same transaction 
receipt is used, which does not indicate assignment of any debt owed by the issuer 
to the cardholder. 
 
Secondly, in the processing of card transactions, even when the merchant 
agreement uses the assignment approach, credit card debts are not assigned to 
the acquirer in accordance with the requirements of the Civil Law Act. There is no 
practice of giving written assignment instrument under hand for each batch of 
transaction receipts. Because the acquirers usually have recourse against the 
merchants in the event the merchant is in breach of the sale contracts for reasons 
like misrepresentation or defective products, an assignment, if any, is not 
absolute. Alternatively, even when the transaction between the merchant to 
acquirer is considered an assignment in equity, the common practice of issuers is 
that they do not join with the merchant to take actions against cardholder. The 
issuer simply relies on the direct obligation clause in the cardholder agreement to 
sue the cardholder and avoid the complicated route to involve multiple merchants 
that may be located in another country.  
 
                                                        
33 Page 62 of the “Rules for Visa Merchants, Card Acceptance and Chargeback Management 
Guideline”. 
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Furthermore, the application of assignment theory to credit card transaction may 
cause even bigger practical difficulties in other jurisdictions. For example in the 
United States, Article 9 of the UCC requires the assignee to file a financing 
statement indicating each assignor to perfect security interest in most types of 
personal property collateral, including “any sale of accounts, contract rights or 
chattel paper”34. For this practical difficulty, it has been commented that if credit 
card transaction is viewed as assignment, “the results under the UCC are 
devastating.”35 The legislations in the United States had adopted direct obligation 
theory and rejected the assignment theory officially. 
 
Because the credit card system is international by nature, it has to avoid any 
practical problem relating to the enforcement of the bank’s right to be paid. The 
choice of direct obligation method of characterization is natural. As a result, the 
systems of popular card associations have been built around direct obligation 
approach. The common understanding of credit card system is that the 
cardholder accepts liability to pay the issuer and the merchant expects payment 
from the issuers from the point when the card transaction takes place regardless 
of whether the card was a credit, debit, or charge card. 
 
(b) Direct obligation theory 
 
The main legal consequence of the ‘direct obligation’ approach is the separation 
of the cardholder’s obligation toward the issuer and the issuer’s obligation toward 
the merchant from the sale. On the one hand, the cardholder’s obligation to pay 
the issuer is not subject to any claims that the cardholder may have against the 
                                                        
34 UCC §9-102(1)(b). 
35 Barkley Clark, “The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards”, 3rd Edition at 
11.02[5]. 
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merchant under the sale transaction. Even if the goods purchased by the 
cardholder are defective, the cardholder must still pay the issuer. The cardholder 
cannot make a claim against the issuer for damages caused by the defective goods 
and must look to the merchant alone for any remedy. The issuer’s claim against 
the cardholder is not conditional upon his payment to the merchant. If the issuer 
has to sue the cardholder to enforce his claim, he does not need to join the 
merchant as a plaintiff. On the other hand, the issuer is liable to pay the merchant 
regardless of the cardholder’s ability or willingness to pay the issuer.  
 
The application of the direct obligation theory instead of the assignment theory 
has been supported by some English authorities. The last sentence in the analysis 
by Millett J. in Re Charge Card cited above seems to favor the direct obligation 
theory, where it was stated that “the supplier to be entitled to be paid whether or 
not the card-issuing company is able to obtain reimbursement from the account 
holder, and the card-issuing company to be entitled to be paid whether or not 
the goods or services supplied by the supplier are satisfactory”. In a subsequent 
case, Customs and Excise Commissioners v Diners Club Ltd 36, even though the 
merchant agreement used by Diners Club Ltd expressly structured their scheme 
as assignment of debts from the merchant to the issuer, the court cited Re Charge 
Card and held that the nature of the relationship between Diners Club and the 
merchant was that of provision of services to facilitate payments and not factoring 
of debt37. Based on these authorities and the analysis of the credit card system in 
(a) above, it seems safe to avoid the assignment arguments and adopt the direct 
obligation theory. 
                                                        
36 [1989] 2 All ER 385.  
37 It should, however be noted that this decision was based on the principle that for the 
purposes of value added tax the Crown was not necessarily bound by the words used by the 
contracting parties. Had the questions in the case were for purposes other than taxation, the 
outcome could have been different because it may be hard for the court to ignore the terms of 
the agreements between the parties. 
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The ‘direct obligation theory’ essentially requires that the cardholder’s liability 
must arise from the relationship between the cardholder and the issuer. Here, we 
are faced with a further question of characterization, because there is more than 
one way to view this relationship. If the issuer is considered a paying agent for the 
cardholder similar to a banker-customer relationship, the cardholder’s liability 
would be viewed as the liability to ‘reimburse’ the issuer after the issuer has paid 
the merchant on his behalf pursuant to his ‘instruction’ given to the issuer as his 
paying agent. Alternatively, the cardholder’s liability can be considered as arise by 
virtue of a contractual ‘undertaking’ made by the cardholder to the issuer either 
under the cardholder agreement or at the point of each card transaction. We will 
consider both the ‘agency’ approach and the ‘undertaking’ approach below. 
 
1.3 Cardholder-Issuer relationship: Agency vs. Undertaking 
approach 
 
(a) Agency approach 
 
In the majority of credit, debit, and charge card arrangement, the issuers open 
and maintain a separate account for each card. Therefore, the relationship 
between the issuer and the cardholder may be characterized in a way similar to 
the relationship between a bank and an account holder. In this view, the card is 
considered an identification device to give the customer access to his account. It 
follows that when the customer uses the card, he is considered to give 
‘instructions’ to the issuer to make payment to the merchant. The issuer, acting as 
a paying agent of the cardholder, would be entitled to deduct from the account in 
accordance with the mandate given by the cardholder. In the early American case 
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of Thomas v. Central Charge Service Inc38, this model of characterization was 
adopted. In that case, it was held that, because the issuer needs to have the 
cardholder’s mandate to deduct the card-account, the issuer would be reimbursed 
only if the transaction has been sanctioned by the cardholder. It is, however, 
submitted that this ‘agency’ approach is not a correct way to characterize the 
cardholder-issuer relationship because credit card transaction differs significantly 
from both payment by cheque and by money transfer orders. 
 
Credit card payment distinguished from cheque payment 
 
The relationship between the cardholder and the issuer of credit card is 
substantially different to that between a cheque book holder and his bank. The 
difference between cheque and credit card has been confirmed in Re Charge 
Card: “A cheque is a revocable mandate by the customer to his bank which 
authorises the bank, as his agent, to make payment out of the moneys standing 
to the credit of his account or which the bank is willing to advance to him.” In 
honouring the cheque and making payment to the merchant, the bank acts as an 
agent for the customer. In contrast, as indicated in the decision of Millett J. cited 
above, the issuer acts in its own capacity as principal when dealing with the 
merchant in a credit card transaction. While a cheque can be a negotiable 
instrument if drawn in a certain way, the cardholder authorization (by giving the 
card particulars or signing the transaction receipt) does not constitute a 
negotiable instrument even if electronic record is deemed to be writing. A 
negotiable instrument is payable to the payee’s order who can determine by 
transfer or endorsement to whom the instrument is to be paid39. In contrast, the 
                                                        
38 212 A 2d. 533 (DC Cir. 1965). 
39 Bill of Exchange Act 1882, Section 3(1). 
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cardholder’s ‘authorization’ nominates the merchant as a specific payee to whose 
account the money is to be paid. The transaction receipt is not a subject of 
transfer or negotiation in itself. The transfer of fund is made by the arrangement 
between the issuers and the merchant via the card association and the acquirer, 
not by giving the transaction receipt some special attributes. Therefore, when 
using a card, the cardholder should not be considered as giving any mandate to 
the issuer to pay the merchant. If a mandate were to exist at all, it would be the 
mandate by the issuer given to the merchant to accept the card in place of cash for 
payment.  
 
Credit card payment distinguished from money transfer order 
 
In Re Charge Card, Millett J. seems to refer to some analogy between the credit 
card payment and a money transfer order when he held that: “The essence of the 
transaction, which in my view has no close analogy, is that the supplier and 
customer have for their mutual convenience each previously arranged to open 
an account with the same company, and agree that any account between 
themselves may, if the customer wishes, be settled by crediting the supplier’s and 
debiting the customer’s account with that company.”40 If we apply this analogy to 
characterize a credit card payment as the processing of a money transfer order, 
the cardholder’s authorization will be regarded as an authority and instruction to 
the issuer (as the cardholder’s agent) to transfer the amount standing to the credit 
of the cardholder (or the amount the issuer is prepared to advance) to the account 
of the merchant with the acquirer. The acquirer acts as an agent for the issuer to 
receive and hold the fund and becomes an agent for the merchant upon crediting 
the merchant’s account. However, it is submitted that the credit card system is 
                                                        
40 [1987] 1 Ch. 150 at page 304. 
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substantially different from the money transfer order that they should not be 
characterized in the same way.  
 
First, the analysis from transactional aspects in chapter I shows that the credit 
card system is different to the ATM/EFTPOS system (which is essentially the 
same as the money transfer order system) in the way the cardholder settle the 
transaction with the issuer. While payment by ATM/EFTPOS is immediately 
deducted from the cardholder’s account when the transaction completes, the 
liability of the holder of credit, debit, or charge cards is deferred until the monthly 
statement is delivered to the cardholder. Secondly, in the money transfer order 
system there is no direct undertaking by the originator to make payment to the 
beneficiary. A payment by money transfer order only complete when the funds 
transferred becomes available to the beneficiary41. In contrast, the credit card 
system guarantees that the merchant will be paid by the issuer, and the issuer’s 
liability becomes irrevocable as soon as the merchant accepts the transaction 
receipt signed by the cardholder. In the credit card system, the cardholder usually 
has certain recourse against the merchant for defective products or non-
performance of services. No similar recourse may be available to the originator in 
the money transfer order at all.   
 
At a higher level of abstraction the conceptual difference between the credit card 
system and the money transfer order system (and other similar system such as 
GIRO, EFTPOS/ATM system) lies in that, the former consists of ‘undertakings’ to 
make payment while the latter is a mechanism to facilitate the payor’s access to 
his funds. Although electronic means may be used to transmit messages between 
                                                        
41 Please refer to section 5.1 below for a comparison of ‘finality’ in a credit card transaction and 
a money transfer order. 
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the parties in the credit card system, the arrangement does not enable the 
cardholder to give electronic ‘instructions’ to initiate fund transfer. In the words 
of Professor Geva:  
 
“Check guaranty and credit cards are not true payment mechanism. A check 
guarantee card only enhances the acceptability of paper-based checks and has 
never been widely used in United States. A credit card does not result in a direct 
transfer of funds from the payor to the payee; however, credit cards displace 
payment transactions by aggregating them into single daily or weekly 
payments to payee-merchants and monthly payments to consumers. In any 
event, inasmuch as the credit card payment does not facilitate access to the 
cardholder’s funds on the basis of electronic communication, it is not an 
electronic initiator of a fund transfer” 42. 
 
Because credit card payment is distinguishable from payment by cheque or 
money transfer order, the cardholder’s liability to pay the issuer has to arise from 
an undertaking by the cardholder. 
 
(b) Direct undertaking approach 
 
There are two ways to characterize the making of the cardholder’s undertaking. 
The first way is to consider the undertaking to be made by the terms of the 
cardholder agreement whereby the cardholder is liable to pay the issuer for any 
items that will appear on the monthly statement rendered to him. The other way 
is to consider the undertaking to be made at the point of each card transaction 
                                                        
42 Geva Benjamin, “The law of Electronic Funds Transfer”, Release No. 7, October 1999, 
Matthew Bender at §1.04[5], emphasis added. 
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based on the terms of the cardholder agreement, as a master-agreement. It is 
submitted that the second view should be preferred because the cardholder’s 
obligation cannot be established in a vacuum but requires a connection with a 
sale transaction. If the monthly statement shown an erroneous debit due to a 
computer malfunction, the cardholder should not be liable to make payment for 
such an item. 
 
To this point, the credit card transaction appears to be very similar to the 
arrangement of irrevocable letter of credit. The similarities have been 
summarized in an American textbook43 as follow “The function of the bank credit 
card, like the letter of credit, is to substitute the credit of the issuing bank for the 
credit of the purchaser, thus encouraging the seller to enter the transaction. Just 
as the issuer of a letter of credit is under the obligation to honor drafts without 
reference to whether it will ultimately be paid by the customer, so is the issuer of 
a bank credit card under a duty to remit sales draft proceed upstream to the 
merchant bank in spite of the cardholder’s inability to pay his credit card bill. 
The credit card, like the letter of credit, involves at least three separate parties 
and at least three independent contracts. In both situations, the customer is able 
to extract goods or services from a third party seller by presenting the direct 
obligation of an issuing bank to pay the bill if proper documents are presented 
through the bank collection system.” It has been suggested in an English textbook 
that the closest analogy to credit card payment is the traveler’s letter of credit44. 
The analysis of the similarities and differences between the two arrangements 
may be relevant to the discussion of finality of credit card transaction. We will 
                                                        
43 Barkley Clark, The law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards, Warren, Gorham & 
Lamont 1990 at 11.02[5]. 
44 E. P. Ellinger, E. Lomnicka and R.J.A. Hooley, Modern Banking Law, 3rd Edition, at page 
534. 
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consider the analysis in Re Charge Card further in conjunction with questions of 
finality in section 5.4 below. In the next three sections, we will look into the 
nature of the relationship between the cardholder, the issuer, and the merchant 
based on the typical contractual terms between them. 
 
2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CARDHOLDER AND THE MERCHANT 
 
The relationship between the cardholder and the merchant is a contract of sale of 
goods or services, which may be made in writing but most frequently verbally and 
sometimes in complete silence. The difference in a sale paid by credit, debit, or 
charge cards is that the money paid in consideration of the goods or services does 
not come from the cardholder but from the issuer. Therefore, we thought that it 
might be helpful to try to explain in legal terms how the debt owed by the 
cardholder to the merchant became the debt owed by the issuer upon the 
completion of the payment transaction. This seems to be a challenge in the 
application of the direct obligation theory. The analysis may help clarify the 
nature of the relationship between not only the cardholder and the merchant but 
also the issuer and the third party that uses the card.  
 
2.1 Nature of the consideration 
 
Our enquiry begins with the nature of the consideration in the sale contract. In Re 
Charge Card, Millett J. rejected the suggestions that the consideration for the 
supply of goods or services to the cardholder be characterized as anything other 
than ‘the price’ when he held that: 
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“Three possibilities have been canvassed. The first is that the consideration for 
the supply is not the price (which is to be paid by the card-issuing company, a 
stranger to the contract of supply) but production of the card and signature of 
the voucher. I reject this analysis, which is quite unrealistic. Production of the 
card and signature of a voucher are not the consideration itself but the means of 
obtaining it. Moreover, a sale of goods requires a monetary consideration: see s 
2(1) of the Sale of Good Act 1979. This analysis would thus lead to the conclusion 
that, where payment is to be made by credit or charge card, the contract of 
supply is not a sale of goods, with the result that the statutory conditions and 
warranties are not implied. The second possibility which has been suggested is 
that there is a sale of goods, but the contract is a tripartite contract under which 
the consideration for the supply to the cardholder is the undertaking of the card-
issuing company to pay the price to the supplier. I reject this analysis, which 
confuses the result of all the arrangements made with the legal means employed 
to achieve it. On the use of the card, there is no tripartite agreement, but three 
separate bilateral contracts come into operation. In my judgment, the true 
consideration in the contract of supply is the price, to be satisfied by the 
cardholder if he wishes by means of the card.” 
 
As indicated in the above passage, the main reason to characterize the 
consideration to be ‘the price’ is that it was considered necessary to bring the sale 
transaction under the ambit of the Sale of Goods Act or the Supply of Goods and 
Services Act. Because the Sale of Goods Act requires the consideration to be a 
‘money consideration’45, it follows that the consideration must be ‘the price’. 
                                                        
45 The Sale of Goods Act 1979 and the Supply of Goods and Services 1982 are part of 
Singapore law from 12th November 1993 by virtue of the Application of English Law Act (Cap. 
7A). The current version of the Sale of Goods Act (Chapter 393) Section 2. (1) provides that: “A 
contract of sale of goods is a contract by which the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the 
property in goods to the buyer for a money consideration, called the price”.  
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There has been much support for the decision not to draw distinction between 
sale transactions paid for by cash and by credit card46, which we fully agree with. 
 
The next question is whether the cardholder ever became liable to pay the 
merchant ‘the price’. The decision in Re Charge Card seems to suggest that 
because the consideration of the sale was the price, the obligation of the 
cardholder came into existence at some point, but, because of the merchant’s 
prior agreement with the issuer, the obligation was discharged at the latest when 
the sale voucher was completed. Millett J. explained how this happened by saying 
that: “The essence of the transaction, which in my view has no close analogy, is 
that the supplier and customer have for their mutual convenience each 
previously arranged to open an account with the same company, and agree that 
any account between themselves may, if the customer wishes, be settled by 
crediting the supplier’s and debiting the customer’s account with that company.” 
47 This view is very similar to the characterization of a money transfer order 
adopted in R. v. Preddy48. Subsequently, in Re Charge Card, the Court of Appeal 
arrived at the same conclusion by adopting the view that the payment transaction 
was a ‘quasi-novation’:  
 
“One way of looking at the matter is to say that there was a quasi-novation of 
the purchaser's liability. By the underlying scheme, the company had bound the 
garage to accept the card and had authorised the cardholder to pledge the 
company's credit. By the signature of the voucher all parties became bound: the 
                                                        
46 For example, Marcus Smith and Patricia Robertson, Chapter 4, Law of Bank Payments, 
Editor Michael Brindle and Raymond Cox, 3rd Edition, 2004, para 4-014 at page 200. 
47 [1987] 1 Ch. 150, page 304  
48 [1996] AC 815, a landmark case often cited to confirm that money transfer order does not 
involve the transfer of property, but that the payor’s chose in action against his bank reduced 
or extinguished and the payee’s chose in action against his bank created or increased 
simultaneously. 
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garage was bound to accept the card in payment; the company was bound to 
pay the garage; and the cardholder was bound to pay the company. The 
garage, knowing that the cardholder was bound to pay the company and 
knowing that it was entitled to payment from the company which the garage 
itself had elected to do business with, must in my judgment be taken to have 
accepted the company's obligation to pay in place of any liability on the 
customer to pay the garage direct.”49 
 
The Court of Appeal did not address itself to the issue of whether credit card 
transactions constitute ‘money consideration’ for the purposes of the Sale of 
Goods Act. The question of whether the cardholder’s obligation to pay the 
merchant ever came into existence was also left in doubt.  
 
The above analysis by the English courts was criticized by S.A. Jones50. According 
to her analysis, when the cardholder settles the monthly statement, he does not 
intend to pay for the goods or services. He, instead, intends to pay for the items 
posted to his account with the issuer. The Sale of Good Act does not require that 
the buyer promise to pay for the price of the goods. The Act only requires the 
consideration to be money. Since payment by cheque has been considered money 
consideration for this purpose, it would not be straining the language to include 
payment by credit card in the definition of money consideration under the Sale of 
Good Act. Therefore, the real question was not whether the consideration was 
money, but whether its move from the issuer to the merchant is sufficient to 
create a contract between the cardholder and the merchant. According to Chitty 
on Contract, in a sale contract, it is not necessary that a consideration have to 
                                                        
49 [1989] Ch 497, per Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. 
50 S.A. Jones, ‘Credit Cards, Card Users and Account Holders’, [1988] JBL 457, at 461. 
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move from the purchaser51. Alternatively, as it is only by the act of the cardholder 
that the merchant is able to claim payment from the issuer, consideration does 
move from the cardholder when he provides the merchant with the means to 
obtain payment. It is submitted that S.A. Jones’ observation is correct. What we 
can draw from this analysis are that:  
 
(i)  The contract of sale between the cardholder and the merchant should be 
treated in the same way as a sale paid by cash under the Sale of Good Act 
or the Supply of Goods and Services Act. 
 
(ii)  The consideration of the sale contract was money, which emanates from 
the issuer from the outset. The cardholder was not under an obligation to 
pay the merchant but only obliged to provide a means by which the 
merchant can obtain payment from the issuer. Because the cardholder’s 
obligation to pay the merchant never came into existence, it does not need 
to be ‘discharged’ or ‘quasi-novated’.  
 
2.2 Position of the carduser 
 
The above analysis has an additional advantage when applied to the case where a 
card transaction was effected by an authorized carduser who is not an account-
holder. In the article cited above, S.A. Jones pointed out52 that “If, as Millett J. 
suggests, the consideration is a promise to pay the price of the goods, clearly the 
card user would not be providing consideration as he never promises to pay for 
                                                        
51 “Chitty on Contract” Volume I, 28th Edition at 3-037: “This possibility is illustrated by the 
case in which goods are bought and paid for by the use of a cheque card or credit card. The 
issuer of the card makes a promise to the supplier of the goods that the cheque will be 
honored or that the supplier will be paid, and the supplier provides consideration for this 
promise by supplying the goods to the customers”. 
52 S.A. Jones, ‘Credit Cards, Card Users and Account Holders’, [1988] JBL 457, at 463. 
 62
the goods; and moreover he knows that he is under no obligation to pay the 
supplier for the goods, as the only contractual obligation regarding payment is 
for the holder to pay the creditor. It might be possible to argue that where the 
user and holder have some agreement between themselves regarding payment 
such may constitute a promise to pay by the user sufficient to support the 
contract of supply, but it would be impossible to argue this where the user and 
the holder has no such agreement.” S.A. Jones went on to explore an alternative 
interpretation that “the user had no contract of supply with the supplier (being 
an agreement not supported by consideration), but that the supplier always 
makes his contracts with the account holder whether or not that person is the 
person apparently contracting with him”. Indication of this interpretation may 
be found in the following analysis by Millett J.: 
 
“In the present case there are four, since cards were issued to account holders, 
who were entitled to authorise their employees or other authorised signatories 
(cardholders) to make use of the cards. This is an added complication which can 
be ignored for present purposes, since in such a case the account holder is liable 
as principal, disclosed or undisclosed, to pay for the goods or services obtained 
by the use of the card, whether or not the cardholder is also liable.” 
 
The observation by S.A. Jones follows that “If one were to conclude that the only 
contract made were one between the account holder and the supplier, the nature 
of this contract would also need to be considered. It would be a contract of 
supply of goods or services if the device of undisclosed principal were adopted, 
i.e. the card user was in all cases acting as agent for the holder. It would be a 
contract of indemnity if it were based on the idea that the holder impliedly 
agrees to indemnify the supplier for the user’s use of the card which results in 
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loss to the supplier.” The former interpretation may not always be correct because 
the application of undisclosed principal requires that in entering into the contract 
the agent must intend to do that on the principal behalf53. The latter 
interpretation, as was correctly pointed out by S.A. Jones, “… has in fact been 
thwarted by the decision in Re Charge Card Services Ltd. In that case, it was 
held that the holder’s liability on the contract of supply is exhausted at the latest 
when the supplier accepts the card as payment for the supply. As a general rule 
a contract of indemnity can only exist if there is a principal obligation in 
existence. A contract of indemnity is designed to protect a person in case the 
obligations under the main contract are broken; if liability is exhausted under 
the main contract, there can be no indemnity.” 
 
Therefore, S.A. Jones suggested that “The most logical conclusion is that the user 
contracts with the supplier as principal, the consideration being the provision of 
the means by which payment will be obtained, which is good consideration for 
this contract despite the fact that actual payment is to come from a third party 
(i.e. the creditor), which of course is no different than when the account holder 
makes a purchase. The acceptance by the supplier of payment by credit card 
exhausted the card user’s liability to pay on the contract of supply.” This 
adaptation of the rules in Re Charge Card, though seems small, helps to clarify 





                                                        
53 Chitty on Contract, 29th Edition, Volume 2, 31-063, note 373. Siu Yin Kwan v. Eastern 
Insurance Co. Ltd. [1994] 2 A.C. 199, 207.  
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3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CARDHOLDER AND THE ISSUER 
 
In contrast with the sale contract, the relationship between the cardholder and 
the issuer is defined in much more detail in the agreement made between them. 
We will begin with the typical terms of this agreement. 
 
3.1 The cardholder agreement 
 
(a) Card application form 
 
Typically, the making of the cardholder agreement begins with the cardholder’s 
submission of an application to the issuer. The application must be made in a 
standard form printed by the issuers and usually available at public places like 
shopping malls or lift lobbies. To assist the issuer in evaluating the credit 
worthiness of the applicant, usually the applicant must enclose with the 
application documents that prove his income, such as an income tax assessment 
or letter of employment. The typical application form used in Singapore contains 
the followings provisions: 
 
(i) The applicant’s request for the issuance of the card (and replacement, 
renewal cards), which request may be declined by the issuer without giving 
any reason; 
 
(ii) The applicant’s representation and warranty that the information declared 
in the form is true and complete in all respects, including the 
representation that he is not an un-discharged bankrupt and no statutory 
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demand has been served on him nor any legal proceedings commenced 
against him; 
 
(iii)  The applicant’s agreement to be bound by the set of standard terms and 
conditions of the card (a copy of which will be sent to the applicant with 
the card); other terms and condition relating to electronic services (a copy 
of which will not be sent but can be obtained at the issuer’s branch); 
 
(iv) The applicant’s agreement to bear the risk of sending the card and PIN to 
him by post; 
 
(v) The applicant’s undertaking to pay the annual fee and other charges 
related to the use of the card and be responsible for all liabilities which 
may be incurred in respect of the card; and 
 
(vi) The applicant’s agreement that the issuer may obtain and verify any 
information about the applicant from any party as the issuer deems fit at 
its absolute discretion. 
 
After receipt of the application form and supporting documents, the issuer 
evaluates the credit worthiness of the applicant with the information provided, 
obtains further information and verifies its accuracy with other sources (e.g. 
credit bureau, applicant’s employer). If the issuer agrees to issue a card, it will 
send the card to the applicant together with a printed set of standard terms and 
conditions governing the card (the ‘standard T&C’). Both the application form 
and the standard T&C usually state that the applicant will be deemed to have read 
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and agreed to the standard T&C if he retains signs or uses the card. He is required 
to cut the card in half and return it to the issuer if he does not agree.  
 
(b) The standard T&C 
 
The typical standard T&C governing a card in Singapore includes the following 
provisions, which are put in groups for ease of reference: 
 
(i) Provisions relating to normal use of the card: 
 
- Upon receipt of the card, the cardholder must sign the card immediately 
and not allow any other person to use the card. The cardholder is 
authorized to use the card to make payment to merchants or to obtain cash 
advances from ATMs or the counters of the issuers. 
 
- The issuer provides monthly statement of account, which specifies a total 
amount due, a minimum payment and a due date. The cardholder can 
choose to settle total amount by the due date or only pay a sum larger than 
minimum payment and smaller than the total amount due and incurs 
finance charges. The finance charge for payment to merchants starts from 
the due date under each statement while finance charge for cash advances 
start from the date of the cash advance. 
 
- The issuer is entitled to charge annual fees, finance charges, and late 
payment charges at the rates decided by the issuer from time to time. The 
cardholder undertakes to settle charges for all purchases and cash 
advances together with all finance charges and other fees. 
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(ii) Credit limit: 
 
- The aggregate amount of payment to merchant and cash advances is 
subject to a credit limit, which limit may be different for payment to 
merchant and cash advances. 
 
- The issuer has absolute discretion to change any credit limit at any time 
without giving any notice or reason to the cardholder.  
 
- Notwithstanding the credit limit, the issuer has the right to allow or 
disallow any attempted transactions or cash advances. The cardholder is 
liable to repay the amount of payment and cash advance even if the 
applicable credit limit was exceeded. 
 
(iii)  Liabilities for use by carduser: 
 
- Where a supplementary card, business card or corporate card is issued, 
charges incurred by the use of the cards are posted to the account of the 
cardholder. Both the cardholder and the carduser are jointly and severally 
liable to the issuer. The cardholder is liable for the total amount posted to 
the card account while the carduser is liable only to the amount he incurs. 
 
(iv)  Liabilities for unauthorized transaction: 
 
- If the card is lost, the cardholder must inform the issuer immediately.  
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- The cardholder is liable for all card transactions whether with our without 
his authorization. The card-issuer is liable only for card transactions that 
occur after its receipt of the notification by the cardholder that a card was 
lost.  
 
(v) Amendments and termination 
 
- The issuer can change any terms and conditions of the agreement by 
giving notice to the cardholder by publishing the new terms in newspaper 
or the internet website of the issuer. Any changes will become binding on 
the cardholder after being so published. 
 
- The cardholder can terminate the agreement at any time by giving notice 
to the issuer, return the card to the issuer cut in half and repaying all 
amounts owed to the issuer. The issuer can terminate the agreement, 
disable the use of the card, cancel all credit facilities, demand immediate 
repayment of all amount owed, and demand the surrender of the card at 
any time without giving any prior notice or reason. 
 
(vi) Relationship with the merchants 
 
- The issuer is not responsible for any claims or complaints by the 
cardholders in any sale transaction with any merchants. The cardholder is 
liable to pay the issuer regardless of any disputes with the merchants. 
 
(vii) Provisions to assist enforcement of issuer’s rights 
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- The issuer can combine the card account with any other accounts that the 
cardholder may have with the issuer or any of their branches anywhere in 
the world, in any currency, convert to Singapore currency at any rate and 
set off any amount owed by the issuer to the cardholder in any way the 
issuer deems fit. 
 
- The records of the issuer certified by any of its officers are conclusive 
evidence for the cardholder’s indebtedness and binding on the 
cardholders. 
 
- The issuer may rely on any instructions it believes emanate from the 
cardholder without verification. The cardholder is liable for all such 
instructions even if he has never actually given those instructions.  
 
- If the issuer has to sue the cardholder, the cardholder bears all costs 
incurred by the issuer, including lawyers’ fees on a full indemnity basis. 
 
(c) The card 
 
In addition to the provisions contained in the application form and the standard 
T&C, there are usually several provisions printed on the back of the card. 
Typically, these provisions state that: 
 




(ii) The card is not valid for use unless there is a signature of the cardholder 
on the signature stripe of the card; and 
 
(iii) The use of the card constitutes the acceptance by the cardholder of the 
standard T&C and other terms and conditions governing electronic 
services. 
 
The 3 documents namely the application form, the standard T&C and the several 
provisions printed at the back of the card together form the cardholder agreement 
governing the dealings between them.  
 
3.2 Cardholder agreements are standing offers 
 
As shown above, under the terms of the cardholder agreement, the cardholder is 
under no obligation to use the card for payment or to take up any credit at all. 
Therefore, even after the cardholder agreement has been entered into between 
the cardholder and the issuer, the cardholder has the option not to use the card to 
make any payment. If the cardholder only uses the card to play guitar or to 
scratch ice on the windshield of his car, the only obligations that arise from the 
cardholder agreement are to safeguard the card, to report loss of card and to pay 
the nominal annual fee during the validity of the card. If no card transaction 
occurs, the provisions relating to liability for card transactions will not have any 
real effect.  
 
The first sentence of Millett J.’s decision in Re Charge Card cited at the beginning 
of section 1.1 above indicates that the cardholder agreement ‘comes into 
operation’ only ‘on the use of the card’. It has been suggested by Professor 
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Dobson54 that, the cardholder agreement only constitutes a standing offer by the 
issuer to provide credit in case of a credit card or to provide payment service in 
case of a debit or charge card. The issuer’s offer is revocable because, as described 
above, the issuer reserves the right to decline any card transaction, to terminate 
the use of the card or credit facility and demand the return of the card at any 
time. The issuer’s standing offer, even if irrevocable is no more than an option 
that only bind both sides when accepted, by the act of the cardholder presenting 
the card to a merchant. The annual fee paid by the cardholder may be considered 
an option fee for the option to borrow money or to use the payment services. Each 
time the cardholder uses the card, he accepts the offer pro tanto and each card 
transaction should be considered a separate contract made in the terms and 
conditions stated in the master agreement. While there is no English authority to 
support this view, the suggestion seems to be valid and was supported by an 
American authority 55. 
 
Therefore, it is submitted that the contractual relationship between the 
cardholder and the issuer consists of not one contract but multiple contracts. The 
cardholder agreement should be considered as a master agreement that consists 
of (i) the cardholder obligations to safeguard the card, to report loss of card and 
to pay annual fee even if no card transaction occurs; and (ii) a set of terms that 
will be incorporated into individual contracts to be made between them at the 
point of each card transaction. 
 
There are several legal consequences of this analysis. First, it makes the rules of 
contract creation applicable to not only the making of the master agreement when 
                                                        
54 See A.P. Dobson, ‘Credit Cards’ [1979] JBL 332. 
55 City Stores Co. v. Henderson, 116 Ga. App. 114, 156 S.E.2d 818 (1967). 
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the card was issued, but also the making of individual contracts at the point of a 
transaction. Secondly, the unilateral changes of certain terms of the master 
agreement that only relates to the rights and obligations of the parties in the card 
transactions may be viewed as amendments of a standing offer instead of a 
binding contractual obligation.  
 
In any case, the validity of the master agreement is an important factor to 
determine the capacity in which the cardholder acts in the relationship with the 
issuer. We will consider this issue in the next section. 
 
3.3 Validity of the cardholder agreement and position of the 
cardholder 
 
(a) Solicited card 
 
In the majority of credit, debit, or charge card issuance, the issuer only sends a 
card to a person in response to his application for the card after considering the 
credit worthiness of the application. In this case, the card is generally referred to 
as a solicited card, as opposed to an unsolicited card, which is issued without 
request. Several different situations may occur in this process: 
 
First, if the solicited card was received by the applicant and duly accepted by him 
in accordance with the terms of the cardholder agreement (e.g. by signing a form 
acknowledging receipt of the card and acceptance of the standard T&C and 
returning it to the issuer), the master agreement will be formed between them. 
Because the majority of standard T&C provide that the cardholder’s keeping, 
using or signing of the card constitutes his acceptance of the agreement, the terms 
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and conditions of the cardholder agreement would generally become binding 
upon the card-applicant upon his receipt of the card, without any form of 
acknowledgement. Even in case the cardholder agreement provides that the 
making of the master agreement is conditional upon a condition (e.g. the 
cardholder returning of an acceptance form) which the cardholder did not fulfill 
the cardholder inaction would not likely be considered mere silence resulting in a 
failure of acceptance. As will be explained in section (b) below, because the 
cardholder made the application for the card, he may be under a positive duty to 
speak. The cardholder’s silence in this case would be tantamount to a 
representation, which operates to estop him from denying the existence of a state 
of facts, that he has accepted the offer from the issuer. 
 
The second situation is where the solicited card was lost or stolen before reaching 
the applicant. In this case, if the standard cardholder agreement was given to the 
applicant when he applied for the card, the application may be treated as an offer. 
The contract between the issuer and the applicant would be made upon the 
issuer’s acceptance by posting the card to the cardholder. According to the 
general rules of contract formation by post, the acceptance takes effect even 
though it never reach the applicant56, except where the applicant deliver a notice 
to withdraw his application to the issuer before the issuer’s posting of the 
acceptance57. The standard T&C would be binding on the cardholder in this case. 
If the lost card were used to make payment, the applicant would be liable for the 
transactions pursuant to the terms of the standard T&C. If the card were lost due 
to the negligence of the postman the applicant would also be liable because the 
postman would normally be treated as the applicant’s agent. 
                                                        
56 Household Fire Insurance Co. Ltd v. Grant, (1879) 4 Ex. D. 216. 
57 Re London & Northern Bank [1900] 1 Ch. 200. 
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However, in the current practice of Singapore banks the standard cardholder 
agreement is not given to the applicant when he makes the application. Therefore, 
the submitted application only constitutes an invitation to treat. The issuer’s 
posting of the card and the agreement to the applicant would, therefore, 
constitute an offer. If the offer was lost or stolen in the mail, there can be no 
contract between the issuer and the applicant. The standard T&C would have no 
effect on the card-applicant. As a result, the applicant would be liable neither for 
any card transaction effected with the lost card nor for any negligence of the 
postman (who is treated as the issuer’s agent in this case). 
 
To protect the banks, many card application forms used in Singapore contain an 
undertaking by the applicant to bear the risk entailed with loss of the card to be 
sent to him by post. Therefore, even if both the card and the cardholder 
agreement were lost in the mail, the applicant’s undertaking to bear the risk of 
lost cards would be binding on him after he has signed the form. The applicant’s 
liability is founded on his contractual undertaking contained in the application 
form, but not the terms of the cardholder agreement. Some card application 
forms attempts to make the entire standard T&C binding on the cardholder by 
incorporating into the application form by reference to an electronic version of 
the standard T&C published on the issuer’s internet web site. While such an 
attempt would fail in Europe58, it may succeed in Singapore due to the absence of 




                                                        
58 EC Directive 2002/65 on Distance Marketing of Financial Services [2002] O.J. L 271/16. 
requires terms and conditions to be communicated in a ‘durable medium’, the definition of 
which excludes information displayed on the financial service provider’s web site. 
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(b) Unsolicited card 
 
Where an issuer sends a new card to a person without his prior request the card is 
considered as an unsolicited card. Although this situation rarely happen in 
Singapore because the regulations of the MAS prohibits the issuance of 
unsolicited credit and charge cards by banks and financial institutions59 the 
situation deserves some attention because the regulations only affect banks and 
financial institutions. Theoretically, unsolicited card may still be issued by a non-
bank entity60.  
 
Whether an agreement is formed between the issuer and the card-recipient in this 
case depends on the application of the general principles of contract making to 
the circumstances. The card and the standard T&C only constitutes an offer by the 
issuer to the card-recipient. Generally, under the principles of contract 
acceptance in Felthouse v Bindley61, if the card-recipient kept the card and did 
nothing about it, no contract is formed between them, because mere silence does 
not constitute acceptance.  
 
If, in contrast, the card-recipient signed a form confirming his agreement to the 
standard T&C that accompanied the card, or sign or use the card to make 
payment and settle the card bills, such course of action would constitute 
acceptance of the issuer’s offer, sufficient to form a valid agreement between 
them, in the terms of the standard T&C. Difficult question arise where the card-
recipient did not expressly accept the offer, but his course of action amounts to 
                                                        
59 Regulation 7, Banking (Credit Card and Charge Card) Regulation 2004. 
60 The question whether the issuance of credit, charge card, debit card necessarily requires 
any licence will be discussed further in chapter V. 
61 Felthouse v Bindley (1862) 11 C.B.N.S. 869. 
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something more than ‘mere silence’. In the recent case of Midlink Development 
Pte Ltd v The Stansfield Group Pte Ltd62, the Singapore courts took a rather 
practical approach on the issue of contract acceptance. In this case, the plaintiff’s 
property had for several years been leased to the defendant and the contractual 
relationship was governed by written agreements. Although the parties had 
commenced negotiations on the renewal of the lease prior to that date and had 
agreed on a reduced rent, no written agreement was executed due solely to the 
defendant’s omission. However, the defendant continued to occupy the leased 
premises after the expiry of the written agreements, and made regular payments 
of the adjusted rent. The question arose whether the parties were bound by a two-
year term lease in such a circumstance. Rajah J.C. held on the facts, that an oral 
contract had been formed notwithstanding the absence of the formality of a 
written lease. The learned judge explained (at [50] and [51]): 
 
“Silence is a midwife that may ultimately deliver a contractual offspring that is 
stillborn or live. Silence and implicit acceptance are not invariably antagonistic 
concepts. Silence can signify affirmation at one end of the spectrum, 
disinterestedness or abandonment at the other end of the spectrum. It is a 
chameleon utterly coloured by its contextual environment. Silence will usually 
be equivocal in unilateral contracts or arrangements; in bilateral arrangements 
or negotiations on the other hand, there will usually never be true or perfect 
silence. In many such cases, while there may not be actual communication of 
acceptance, the parties’ positive, negative or even neutral conduct can evince 
rejection, acceptance or even variation of an existing offer.” 
 
                                                        
62 [2004] 4 SLR 258. 
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Relying on the authority of Spiro v Lintern63 and “The Law Relating to Estoppel 
by Representation”64, Rajah J.C. expressed the view that there could be instances 
where a party is placed under a positive duty to speak, and his silence in such 
circumstance would be tantamount to a representation which operates to estop 
him from denying the existence of a state of facts. The principle laid down was 
that the court would look at the entire circumstances and the conduct of the 
parties to determine whether a party’s silence could amount to the absence of 
acceptance. In the particular case it was found that a contract was formed because 
the defendant’s conduct to remain in possession of the property and continuing to 
pay the rent.  
 
Therefore, if the circumstance placed the card-recipient under a positive duty to 
speak his silence would be tantamount to a representation, which operates to 
estop him from denying the existence of a state of facts, that he has accepted the 
offer from the issuer. The facts that credit cards are popular means of payment 
that almost everyone knows of the purchasing power of the cards and the 
conditions of use of the card was given to the card-recipient together with the 
card lend weight to the argument that the card-recipient is under a positive duty 
to speak. However, it is also possible to argue for the opposite view based on the 
fact that there were no pre-existing relationship between the issuer and the card-
recipient to impose a duty to speak on the card-recipient. He might not actually 
know how a credit card may be used and he is under no obligation to read the 
documents accompanying the card. If the cardholder never read the documents 
and kept the card without the intention to ever use it to make payment, it seems 
difficult to impose on him a duty to speak. The outcome would depend on the 
                                                        
63 [1973] 1 WLR 1002 per Buckley L.J. 
64 G Bower & A Turner, 3rd Ed, 1977. 
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court’s analysis of the entire circumstances. The cardholder’s knowledge of the 
purchasing power of the card and the content of the standard T&C seems to be a 
relevant factor. 
 
Because of this uncertainty, there are two possible outcomes. If the card-
recipient’s act constitutes valid acceptance of the issuer’s offer, the rights and 
obligations between him and the issuer would be the same as the case of solicited 
card discussed above. Alternatively, if there is no acceptance, the relationship 
between them may be characterized as a bailment of the card, because there is a 
transfer of possession of the plastic, a personal chattel, to the card-recipient while 
the ownership of the card remains with the issuer. In this case, the card-recipient 
may be liable to the issuer, not on the terms of the cardholder agreement, but on 
other grounds such as breach of implied terms of bailment contract, negligence in 
taking care of the card, conversion or conspiracy. 
 
Because all credit, debit, and charge card in Singapore are issued in plastic, even 
where the cardholder agreement has been validly formed the cardholder may be 
characterized as a bailee of the card65. We will look into the issue of the 
cardholder’s liability as a bailee of the card or in the tort of conversion, 
negligence, or conspiracy in Chapter III. 
 
(c) Termination of the cardholder agreement 
 
The cardholder agreement will cease to have legal effect after it has been 
terminated in accordance with its terms. Terms relating to termination of 
cardholder agreement vary between banks in Singapore. DBS, for example, only 
                                                        
65 He is an involuntary bailee. Please refer to the discussion at page 138. 
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requires a written notice to be given while UOB requires both written notice and 
return of the card to the bank cut in half. The cardholder agreement will be 
terminated only when the conditions required by the standard T&C for a valid 
termination have been fully satisfied. Therefore, the cardholder may be liable for 
card transactions effected before the written notice of termination (and the cut 
card) is delivered to the issuer. The requirement that the card be cut in half only 
prevents it being used in retail card-present transactions. Because the card may 
be lost after the notice has been sent and two halves of a card fully reveal all the 
particulars required to effect fraudulent transaction via internet or telephone 
(including the card number, validity period and card verification number), the 
possibility that fraudulent transactions occur after the notice of termination has 
been sent is present. Pursuant to the terms of typical cardholder agreement, the 
risk in this case is placed on the cardholder. 
 
In practice, the cancellation of credit, debit, and charge card is treated in a way 
similar to a report of loss of a card. Whether the card was lost or the cardholder 
wishes to terminate the card, he would typically make a telephone call to the call 
centre of the card issuer. The computer systems of all issuers are capable of 
instantly deactivating the use of the particular card. After deactivation, any 
request to authenticate a card transaction, whether by card-present or card-
absent method would be automatically declined. Therefore, it would be safer for a 
cardholder to make the telephone call to terminate the card before sending the 







4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ISSUER AND THE MERCHANT 
 
4.1 Making of issuer-merchant contract  
 
A major obstacle to the application of the analysis in Re Charge Card to the 
modern credit card transaction is the difficulty to establish the contractual 
relationship between the issuer and the merchant. In that case, a basis of the rules 
laid down was that the issuer entered into direct contract with the merchant. 
Because the issuer-merchant agreement in that case existed long before the 
cardholder presented the card to the merchant, it was easier to hold that the 
cardholder’s act resulted in a binding contractual obligation of the issuer. The 
credit card system today is not the same as the arrangement in Re Charge Card. 
The system involves a huge number of banks participating as both issuers and 
acquirers (e.g. more than 20,000 banks in Visa and MasterCard systems as 
shown in chapter I). Although the merchant agreements were made before card 
transactions occur, they were not made between the issuer and the merchant. 
Although the merchant invariably makes an undertaking to accept any card 
bearing the insignia of the respective card association, this undertaking is not 
sufficient to create a contract between the merchant and the issuer, whose 
identity is unknown to the merchant before the relevant card is presented to him. 
The merchant has no means to know which of the over 20,000 issuers he will be 
contracting with. In many cases, even after a card transaction has been effected, 
the merchant is precluded from knowing the identity of the issuer. For example, 
merchants accepting payment by internet only see the last 4 digits of the card 
number while only the first 4 digits reveal the identity of the issuer. It is, 
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therefore, impossible to hold that the contractual relationship between the 
merchant and the issuer existed before the card transaction.  
 
The contractual relationship between the issuers and the merchant has to be 
created when the card transaction completes. The majority of credit card 
transactions today are effected by ‘online’ method where the merchant use a near 
instantaneous communication linkage to obtain an ‘approval’ from the issuer for 
each transaction. The ‘approval’ is required where the card transaction amount 
exceeds the merchant’s floor limit specified in the merchant agreement in 
accordance with the prevailing rules of the card network. The most common 
facility used by merchants to communicate with the issuer is the card reader 
terminal, which transmits the transaction amount and the card particulars 
extracted from the card to the issuer and displays the ‘approval’ signal a few 
seconds later. Where the data link with the issuer is not present, the merchant is 
required to use automated telephone system to obtain the ‘approval’ from the 
issuer. For card-absent transactions (e.g. by mail order, telephone order or 
internet) the issuer’s ‘approval’ is always required as the merchant floor limit is 
zero. The process of authenticating card-absent transaction is essentially the 
same except that the card particulars are keyed in manually by the merchant.  
 
Therefore, in the majority of card transactions, the issuer’s ‘approval’ may be 
sufficient to constitute an undertaking by the issuer to pay the merchant for the 
transaction amount. However, there is a small portion of card transactions in 
which ‘approval’ was not obtained from the issuer. The cardholder’s act of signing 
the transaction receipt has the same effect as the ‘approval’ signal from the 
issuer. In this case, to explain the creation of the contract between the issuer and 
the merchant, it is submitted that the card or its particulars may constitute the 
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issuer’s authorization for the cardholder to make a direct undertaking, as an 
agent on behalf of the issuer, to pay the merchant. There is no direct authority to 
support this suggestion. However, there are two authorities, which indirectly 
support this view.  
 
First, it will be recalled that, in the case of cheque card the issuer also make a 
direct undertaking to the merchant to honor the cheque upon presentation. The 
purpose of the cheque card is to provide the payee with the assurance that he can 
look to someone else other than the person who drawn the cheque for payment. 
The nature of the cheque card was summarized by Millett J. in Re Charge Card 
that: “The obligation undertaken by the bank to the supplier, which it enters into 
through the agency of its customers when he uses the bank card, is not to 
dishonour the cheque on presentation for want of funds in the account, so that it 
is obliged if necessary to advance moneys to the customer to meet it. If the 
cheque is met, the bank honours its own undertaking as principal to the supplier 
and, as agent for the customer, makes payment on its behalf out of his own 
moneys, whether or not this have been advanced to him for the purpose”66. The 
first sentence in the above passage confirmed that the holder of cheque card has 
the authority to convey the offer of the bank to the payee and that effectively 
created a valid contract between the issuer and the payee. This proposition was 
subsequently confirmed by the Court of Appeal in First Sport Ltd v. Barclays 
Bank Plc: “The bearer must have the authority to convey the offer on behalf of 
the bank. The authorized signatory has actual authority to do this, and even if 
this authority has been terminated, or is limited in any way, he will continue to 
have ostensible authority to convey the bank’s offer on its behalf”67. While a 
                                                        
66 [1987] I Ch. 150 at 166 C-F. 
67 [1993] 3 All E.R. 789, per Evans L. J. at 794 F. 
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credit card transaction receipt is different to a cheque, it is possible to suggest 
that when it is necessary to infer an undertaking by a payment card issuer and the 
party accepting card payment, it is possible to consider the cardholder an agent 
for the issuer. 
 
The second authority that also supports this view is the case of R.v. Lambie68. In 
that case, Ms. Lambie was issued a credit card known as Barclaycard by Barclays 
Bank. She exceeded the credit limit, ignored the issuer’s demand to stop using the 
card. The card was nevertheless accepted for payment at several merchants. The 
merchants were subsequently paid by the bank. Ms. Lambie was convicted for 
obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception contrary to the Theft Act. The 
House of Lord held Ms. Lambie liable for falsely representing to the merchant 
that she had authority to use the card. The conduct of Ms. Lambie was considered 
to have constituted the deception that she was an agent of Barclays Bank and 
authorized by them to enter into contract with the merchant’s on the bank’s 
behalf. Although this is a criminal law case, it is submitted that it could and 
should be applied to clarify the nature of the relationship between the parties.  
 
The content of the issuer-merchant contract has to be inferred from the 
combination of (i) the merchant agreement; and (ii) the agreements between the 
issuer and the acquirer in the form of the card associations’ bylaws and 




                                                        





4.2 Content of the contract between the issuer and the merchant 
 
(a) The merchant agreement 
 
The agreement signed between the acquirer and the merchant often contains the 
following provisions: 
 
(i) The merchant must display the insignia of the credit card association and 
accept payment by cardholder by the respective credit card in the ordinary 
course of business. The acquirer agrees to pay the merchant the amount of 
the validly effected transactions less an agreed discount by crediting the 
account of the merchant with the acquirer. 
 
(ii) Before accepting a card, the merchant must check the card number against 
a list of stolen cards given by the acquirer. Where the amount of a 
transaction exceeds a floor limit, the merchant must obtain an 
authorization from the acquirer. The merchant cannot split a transaction 
into multiple transactions to avoid obtaining authorization from the 
acquirer. 
 
(iii) In card-present transaction, each sale transaction must be evidenced by a 
transaction receipt signed by the cardholder. The merchant must check the 
signature of the cardholder against the signature on the back of the card 
and warrants to the acquirer that the transaction receipt was signed by the 
person presenting the card. 
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(iv) The transaction receipt for all types of transactions must be submitted to 
the acquirer within a specified time limit. By submitting the transaction 
receipt the merchant warrants to the issuer that it represent a bona fide 
sale, that the merchandize was actually delivered to the person effecting 
the transaction and the obligation of the cardholder is not subject to any 
disputes, set-off or counterclaim. 
 
(v) The merchant must not impose any surcharge upon the cardholder solely 
because of the fact that payment is made by credit card or to give discount 
to customer paying by other means such as cheque or cash to discriminate 
against customers using the cards. 
 
(vi) Even after the acquirer has paid the merchant for a card transaction, the 
acquirer has the right to “chargeback” and deduct the amount of the 
transaction from the account of the merchant with the acquirer if (i) there 
are mistakes in the transaction receipts or non-compliance with the 
procedure to effect card transaction by the merchant (ii) the transaction 
was allegedly not authorized by the cardholder (iii) the cardholder has 
claims against the merchant for breach of contract with the cardholder, 
e.g. non delivery or defect of products, misrepresentation or breach of 








(b) The bylaws and regulations of the card association 
 
Each the card association has a set of regulations that all of its members must 
comply with. The regulations of a typical card association contain the following: 
 
(i) General regulations include: requirements that a party must satisfy to 
become a member (e.g. banking licence, capital adequacy); member’s 
agreement to all the regulations of the association relating to obligations 
and penalty; and a recognition of acquiring member’s right to be 
indemnified by the association in the event the issuing member is 
unwilling or unable to make payment, provided the association’s rules are 
fully complied with. 
 
(ii) Requirements to issuers relating to the issuance of cards, terms and 
conditions of agreement with cardholder, payment services, risk 
management and customer support services. 
 
(iii) Requirements to acquirer relating to terms and conditions of agreement 
between acquirer and merchant, transaction receipt,  point of sale 
terminals, authorization, clearing, and settlement, cash disbursement, 
ATMs acquirer standards, electronic commerce, other transaction 




(iv) Payment acceptance rules specify requirements for merchants, including 
acceptance requirements, transaction receipt completion and processing, 
special merchant payment acceptance services, and risk management. 
 
(v) Payment services rules specify requirements for payment processing 
between members, including authorization, clearing and settlement. 
 
(vi) Dispute resolution rules govern the transaction receipt retrieval process, 
member’s attempts to resolve disputes and the procedures available if 
resolution efforts are unsuccessful, including chargeback, arbitration, 
mediation, and compliance. 
 
(vii) Fees rules specify international fees applicable to issuers and acquirers, 
and procedures for collection, disbursement, and problem resolution. 
 
(viii) Risk management rules specify general security requirements, the rights 
and responsibilities of card association and members related to risk 
management and security, allocation of counterfeit losses. 
 
(ix) Card and marks rules specify requirements for reproduction of the 
trademarks owned by the card association, responsibilities for the 
production of cards, and responsibilities for use of the trademarks.  
 
The card association’s bylaws and regulations have direct legal effect binding 
upon its members because each member has to agree to them when joining the 
association. Because the business of issuing and acquiring cards is an important 
channel for banks and financial institutions to generate revenue and to acquire 
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and retain customers while there are only a few large card associations having 
monopoly power, members of the card association have great incentive to comply 
with the regulations of card associations.  
 
The regulations of card associations have no direct binding effect on the 
cardholder even though they contain many requirements relating to the 
cardholders. Several issuers attempt to make the regulations binding on the 
cardholders by inserting a provision in the cardholder agreement or the merchant 
agreement whereby the cardholder undertakes to comply with the regulations of 
the card associations. The validity of such a provision may be doubtful unless the 
entire set of rules and regulations has been given to the cardholder. Presently, the 
regulations of all card associations (e.g. Visa and MasterCard) are treated as 
confidential documents with access limited to authorized personnel of their 
members. Therefore, at present, the regulations of card associations cannot be 
incorporated into the cardholder agreement by reference. 
 
The effect of the regulations of card associations on the merchant is also 
indirectly achieved via the terms of the merchant agreement. However, recently a 
portion of the regulations of two major card associations, Visa and MasterCard 
relating to usage of trademark, card acceptance, and chargeback procedures has 
been disclosed to the public via the internet. Even in this case, only the disclosed 
parts of the regulations may be considered binding on the merchant if they have 
been properly incorporated into the merchant agreement by reference. We will 
analyze the chargeback procedures of Visa further in chapter III and IV. 
 
Our analysis in the last four sections serves to reveal major characteristics of the 
relationships between the three main parties in a credit card relationship. 
 89
Because all of the three bilateral contracts between them came into existence at 
the point when the card transaction completes, an analysis of the contractual 
relationship will not be complete without a closer look at the point when a credit 
card transaction becomes final. 
 
5. FINALITY OF CREDIT CARD PAYMENT 
 
5.1  Meaning of finality 
 
The conclusion we arrived at in section 1.3 above was that a credit card payment 
is distinguishable from payment by cheque, money transfer order, and electronic 
fund transfer. Accordingly, when a cardholder effects a transaction, his act should 
be viewed as an ‘undertaking’ to pay the issuer the transaction amount, 
distinguishable from an ‘instruction’ to the issuer, as a paying agent, to make a 
fund transfer to the merchant in case of a fund transfer. In comparison with a sale 
paid by electronic fund transfer, the cardholder seems to be doing the same thing 
that is procuring the discharge of the debt owed by him to the merchant, not by 
the physical delivery of cash, but by substitution with a debt of nearly the same 
amount, which the issuer will owe to the merchant. As with any payment 
arrangement, a common question is when the payment becomes final. However, 
because of the nature of the credit card arrangement is about ‘undertaking’ as 
opposed to ‘instruction’ to pay, ‘finality’ bears a different meaning. A system of 
instructions, whether or not communicated by electronic means is built upon 
principles of agency. As an instruction may be revoked before a certain point, the 
notion of finality in the fund transfer system relates to the moment (i) when the 
payor’s obligation to pay is discharged (ii) when payment is regarded as complete, 
(iii) when countermand ceases to be available, (iv) when the funds transferred 
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become available to the beneficiary and (v) when the bank cannot reverse a 
transfer on its own volition, depending on the party to whom the question of 
finality is posed or the parties between whom that question is in controversy. In 
the fund transfer system, the general principle is that the transaction becomes 
final when the fund transferred is available to the beneficiary unconditionally at 
his bank69.  
 
In contrast with fund transfer, in the credit card system the critical moment of 
‘finality’ is when the merchant accepts the signed transaction receipt from the 
cardholder, in case of face-to-face transaction. After this moment, the cardholder 
has no right to reverse the transaction and neither the issuer nor the acquirer is 
entitled to reverse the payment, except in the event of a ‘chargeback’. It is not 
relevant when the funds become available to the merchant. Questions relating to 
the so-called ‘finality’ of the payment transaction can be made from two different 
angles. From the merchant’s point of view, it is whether the cardholder is entitled 
to reverse the payment transaction after this final point. To the cardholder, it is 
whether his obligation to pay is unconditionally discharged at that point.  
 
5.2 The final point in card-absent transaction 
 
In addition to retail card-present transactions where the card is swiped to a card 
reader terminal, the cards in the credit card system can be used in many other 
                                                        
69 As the focus of this paper is not fund transfer, for simplicity, this general statement was 
taken from the article by Eric Chan, “All about time: finality and completion of Payment by 
funds transfer”, (2005) 17 SAcLJ. In our opinion, this is an outstanding article that has 
successfully summarized the finality rules of funds transfer in the leading cases and in various 
textbooks such as Michael Brindle & Raymond Cox, Law of Bank Payments (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2nd Ed, 1999), E. P. Ellinger, E. Lomnicka & R. Hooley,  Modern Banking Law 
(Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2002), R. M. Goode, Payment Obligations in Commercial 
and Financial Transactions (2nd Ed, 1995) and Mark Hapgood, Paget’s Law of Banking 
(LexisNexis, 11th Ed, 1996) which we choose not to mention in details. 
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ways. The final point of card transaction may be different in each case. When a 
card transaction is effected by telephone, mail order or facsimile the merchant 
obtains all the card particulars and he usually needs to obtain an ‘approval’ from 
the acquirer either by telephone, but most frequently by a computer terminal. 
Only upon getting the ‘approval’ signal from the issuer, will the merchant deliver 
the goods or services, because he is assured of getting payment. If for some 
reasons the ‘approval’ is declined, the merchant will not deliver the goods or 
service but will revert to the cardholder to ask for another payment. In the case of 
internet transactions, although the merchant usually does not see all of the card 
particulars (i.e. the card number is masked except for the last 4 numbers, the card 
verification value is not disclosed to the merchant) but the merchant must always 
obtain the ‘approval’ signal from the acquirer and/or the issuer before acting on 
any internet purchase order. In the rare case where credit card number is taken as 
security, for instance by hotel for charges of room services, booking of rooms, the 
obligation of the issuer only arise when the merchant submits the charge to the 
acquirer. Therefore, it is submitted that the credit card payment transaction by 
card-absent methods should only becomes final when the merchant receive the 
‘approval’ signal from the acquirer and rely on it to supply goods or services to 
the cardholder.  
 
5.3 Reversing of payment by the cardholder 
 
As far as the merchant is concerned, credit card payment becomes final upon the 
point when the issuer becomes bound to pay the merchant. Beyond this point, the 
cardholder is not entitled to reverse the payment even if he changed his mind. In 
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the unreported case of American Express Europe Limited v. McCluskey70 a credit 
cardholder had used his card in Barbados but, before the records of the 
transaction arrived at the issuer in Britain, he purported to give instruction to the 
card issuer, American Express, to countermand payment. The High Court in 
England held that the cardholder has no right to stop the amount of the 
transaction being charged to his account. After looking at the terms of the 
contract between the cardholder and American Express, Kenneth Jones J. held 
that once the card has been used for the purchase of goods or services there came 
into being a payment incurred on the card account, which could not be stopped. 
 
5.4 Discharge of cardholder’s obligation 
 
To the cardholder, question of finality concerns with whether his obligation to pay 
the merchant becomes unconditionally discharged at the final point of the card 
transaction. If his obligation had not been discharged unconditionally at that 
point, the merchant would have a claim against the cardholder in case the issuer 
is unable or unwilling to pay the merchant.  
 
The answer to this question obviously depends on the terms of the sale contract. 
If under the sale contract, the cardholder’s obligation was to make payment or to 
provide a means of obtaining payment that must not fail the merchant may 
pursue action against the cardholder when the issuer fails to pay. If the sale 
contract only required the cardholder to provide a means of obtaining payment, 
which might not work, then the merchant may not have a claim against the 
cardholder even if he is unable to obtain payment from the issuer. Unfortunately, 
                                                        
70 See Peter E. Sayer, ‘Credit Cards and The Law, an Introduction’, the case was cited at page 
13. 
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the majority of sales transactions for which payment were made by credit card 
were made orally or by conduct instead of written contracts. Therefore, it is often 
necessary for the courts to infer in the sale contract terms implied by the conducts 
of the parties and the surrounding circumstances. In this case, the terms of the 
cardholder agreement and the merchant agreement seems to be the most 
important factors because the court often presumes that both the cardholder and 
the merchant would not contract with each other on terms that contradict with 
the pre-existing agreements with the issuer and the acquirer.  
 
As discussed in section 1.3, the arrangement of credit card is very similar to the 
irrevocable letter of credit. The law of documentary credit contains an established 
rule that payment by letter of credit is presumed to constitute only a conditional 
discharge of the payor’s obligation, unless the contrary was provided for by the 
expressed terms of the sale contract71. If we follow the analogy with documentary 
credit, the presumption of conditional discharge should be applied to the credit 
card payment. However, in Re Charge Card Services Ltd, Millett J. held that the 
credit card relationship was so different to the irrevocable letter of credit 
relationship that not only it was sufficient to displace any presumption that 
payment was conditional, but to support a presumption to the contrary:  
 
“Letters of credit are employed to finance international commercial transactions 
between traders who are normally known to each other, and the terms of which 
will have been the subject of negotiation. The contract will usually provide 
merely for payment to be made by letter of credit, the identity of the issuing 
bank being left to be nominated by the buyer after the contract has been 
concluded, and being a matter of indifference to the seller. Even where the 
                                                        
71 W. J. Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr Export and Import Co. [1972] 2 Q.B. 189, 210A. 
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identity of the issuing bank is agreed between the parties, there is no prior 
contract between the issuing bank and the seller its obligations to the seller arise 
under the letter of credit itself. The sole purpose of the letter of credit is to 
provide security to the seller to replace that represented by the shipping 
documents which he gives up in exchange for the credit. Finally, the terms on 
which the seller is entitled to payment must be identical to those to which he is 
entitled under the contract with the buyer. By contrast, credit and charge cards 
are used mainly to facilitate payment of small consumer debts arising out of 
transactions between parties who may well not be known to each other, and the 
terms of which are usually not the subject of negotiation. The identity of the 
card-issuing company is necessarily a matter for agreement, since the card 
must be one which the customer is authorised to use and the supplier has the 
necessary equipment to accept. The machinery of payment by charge or credit 
card does not require the disclosure of the customer’s address to the supplier, 
and in the absence of special precautions, which are seldom taken, at least in the 
case of small transactions, and which were not taken in the present case, the 
supplier might well have difficulty in identifying the customer without the co-
operation of the card-issuing company. The availability of the card as a method 
of payment is advantageous to both parties: the customer obtains free credit for 
a period longer than that which the supplier is prepared to give even to the 
card-issuing company, or than he himself would obtain from the use of a cheque, 
with or without a bank card while the supplier obtains not only better security 
(as he hopes) but the convenience of having a single debtor in place of many, 
and the prospect of extra trade by reason of the credit facilities which he is able 
to extend (without providing them himself) to the customer. Finally, the terms 
on which the supplier is entitled to payment from the card-issuing company are 
quite different from those on which the card-issuing company is entitled to 
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payment from the customer and both differ from those on which the supplier 
would be entitled to payment from the customer if he were subject to any 
residual liability not discharged by the use of the card. The card-issuing 
company is liable to pay the supplier very shortly after the receipt of the sales 
vouchers and claim form, but is entitled to deduct its commission while the 
customer is liable to pay the full face value of the voucher, but is entitled to much 
longer credit. If the customer is liable to pay the supplier on the failure or 
default of the card-issuing company, it is on terms more onerous than either, for 
he must be liable to make immediate payment of the full face value of the 
voucher. It is difficult to find any justification for imputing to the customer an 
intention to undertake any such liability.” 
 
The Court of Appeal arrived at the same conclusion based on the differences in 
commercial contexts of the two types of transaction:  
 
“The letter of credit is primarily an instrument of international trade issued 
pursuant to an individually negotiated contract of considerable substance made 
in writing: the credit card is used for small, over-the-counter transactions 
between strangers there being, at best, an oral agreement and more often an 
agreement by conduct. In the case of credit card sales, the seller does not even 
know the address of the purchaser, which makes it hard to infer an intention 
that he will have a right of recourse against the purchaser. It is normally the 
buyer, not the seller, who selects the bank issuing the letter of credit: if, 
unusually, the seller does select the bank, this factor may rebut the presumption 
of conditional payment by letter of credit: see W. J. Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr 
Export and Import Co. [1972] 2 Q.B. 189, 210A. In contrast, in a credit card 
transaction the seller has decided long before the specific supply contract is 
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made whether or not to accept the cards of the credit card company and has 
entered into an overall contract with it, under which the seller is obliged to 
accept the card and the credit card company is bound to pay him. With letters of 
credit, the issuing bank is the agent of the buyer and not the seller and it is the 
buyer who pays for the facility: in credit card transactions the credit card 
company is in a contractual relationship with both but it is the seller who pays 
for the facility by allowing the deduction of the commission. These differences 
are, in my judgment, so fundamental that the law affecting letters of credit is 
not of great assistance in deciding what law should apply to credit card 
transactions.”72 
 
With the confirmation by the Court of Appeal, the presumption that credit card 
payment unconditionally discharges the cardholder’s obligation to pay the 
merchant has been cited in subsequent cases and commentaries as an established 
uncontested rule of English law relating to credit, debit and charge card. 
However, the modern credit card system shows a difference with the arrangement 
examined in Re Charge Card, which, it is submitted that, may be sufficient to 
raise doubt to the unconditional discharge rules laid down in that case. Most of 
the ‘differences’ enumerated and relied on by the judges have become 
questionable in the context of modern credit card system: 
 
(i) The observation that credit card is only used in small, over-the-counter 
retail sale between strangers where the merchant does not care to know 
the identity and address of the cardholder may no longer hold true. 
Modern credit cards are frequently used in international transaction 
between buyers and sellers living in different countries. In card-absent 
                                                        
72 [1989] Ch 497, per Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C, emphasis added. 
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transactions, the merchant usually takes note of the identity and billing 
address of the cardholder for the dual purposes of goods delivery and 
prevention of chargeback. 
 
(ii) While the majority of sale contracts paid with credit card may remain oral 
contracts (as opposed to sale contracts paid by letter of credit that are 
usually written contract of some substance), there are increasing number 
of credit card sales that are well documented, such as sale contracts made 
on the internet. 
 
(iii) The observation that it is the merchant who not only selects the issuer of 
credit card but had entered into a contract with the user long before the 
making of the sale contract (as opposed to the selection of issuing bank of 
letter of credit by the buyer, which is a matter of indifference to the seller) 
may no longer hold true. When entering into the merchant agreement with 
the acquirer, the merchant nowadays only choose the card association, not 
the issuer. In fact, the merchant seems to be quite indifferent with the 
choice of the issuing bank. As long as the card bears the logo of Visa or 
MasterCard, he can accept the card without ever enquiring about the 
issuer. This fact is strikingly similar to the letter of credit, not a factor to 
distinguish it from a letter of credit.  
 
(iv) Another factor relied on in Re Charge Card is that “it is the seller who 
pays for the facility by allowing the deduction of the commission”, in 
contrast with letter of credit where the buyer bears the fees incurred to 
arrange the payment transaction. This is not entirely correct as in many 
cases the cardholder practically bears part if not all of the commission paid 
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to the issuer and the acquirer. Despite the fact that the rules of Visa and 
MasterCard prohibit merchants to discriminate between customers paying 
in cash and by card, in reality, the cardholders usually pay a higher price 
when he settles by credit card. This is especially true when the card is used 
in America and Britain, where the non-discrimination rule of Visa and 
MasterCard has been prohibited for competition law purposes73. Many 
retail merchants in Singapore charge an extra 3% for sales paid by credit 
card to recoup their cost of paying the commission fee to the acquirer. 
Even if the merchant is the only party that bears the costs of the credit 
card payment arrangement, this fact is not sufficient to infer that the 
issuer acts as the merchant’s agent in the card transaction. To hold that, 
because the merchant bears the costs for the facility of credit card payment 
he should be deprived of the right to claim against the cardholder when 
the issuer fails to pay him seems unreasonable. 
 
The main basis for their Lordship’s decision to reverse the presumption of 
conditionality is the close relationship between the issuer and the merchant. 
Because the merchant chooses to accept the card long before the payment 
transaction by entering into direct agreement with the issuer it was inferred that 
the merchant intended to bear the losses incurred because of his choice. The 
analysis of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C quoted above seems to suggest that 
only if the issuer is the choice of the seller, which choice must be made long 
before the payment transaction, then the unconditional discharge rule should 
apply. On the contrary, if the issuer is the choice of the buyer, then the normal 
rule of letter of credit should apply and payment should be conditional. 
                                                        
73 For example US Code § 1666f invalidated the Visa and MasterCard non-discrimination rule. 
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00001666---f000-.html  
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Therefore, it is submitted that the unconditional discharge presumption laid 
down in Re Charge Card should be confined within schemes where the merchant 
enters into direct agreement with the issuer before actual transaction occur and 
the cards must be used in over-the-counter sale transaction.  
 
However, as courts continue to cite Re Charge Card as a rule generally applicable 
to all credit card and charge card transactions, it may be necessary to use 
legislative measures to limit the rule of the case. In the mean time, merchants can 
reserve their claims against the cardholder in the sale contract by stating the 
condition in the written contract or displaying at the sale counter a notice that 
credit card payment only constitutes conditional payment. 
 
6. CONCLUSION AND OVERVIEW OF THE NEXT TWO CHAPTERS  
 
6.1 Conclusions on the relationship between the parties 
 
We conclude the analysis on the nature of the relationship between the parties in 
a credit card system by summarizing the result into two stages as follows:  
 
In the first stage before the cardholder uses the card to make payment to the 
merchant all of the 3 essential bilateral contracts between the cardholder, the 
issuer and the merchant have yet to be made. There were 3 master agreements in 
place, namely the cardholder agreement (which is primarily a standing offer by 
the issuer to provide payment services and/or credit for a fee); the agreement 
between the acquirer and the merchant; and the bylaws and regulations of the 
card association to which both the issuer and the acquirer subscribe to. The card 
not only represents the agreement between the issuer and the cardholder but also 
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serves as a representation by the issuer that the person legally holding the card 
has the power to render the issuer liable for the cardholder’ use of the card for 
payment in situations where an approval by the issuer of the card transaction is 
not required (i.e. transactions below merchant’s floor limit). At this stage, there is 
no direct contractual relation between the merchant and the issuer or the 
cardholder. 
 
In the second stage when the cardholder presents the card to the merchant to 
make payment, three bilateral contracts came into existence. First, there is a 
contract made between the issuer and the merchant whereby the issuer 
undertakes to pay the merchant the transaction amount provided the merchant 
complies with the procedure of card acceptance set out by the card association 
and the contract of sale with the cardholder. This contract is most often made by 
electronic telecommunication based on the terms and conditions of the acquirer-
merchant agreement and the regulations of the card association. In less common 
cases, this contract may be made through the agency of the cardholder where the 
amount of the transaction was less than the merchant’s floor limit. Secondly, 
there is a contract between the cardholder and the issuer made on the terms and 
conditions of the master cardholder agreement whereby the cardholder 
undertakes to pay the issuer the amount of the transaction, which will be re-
confirmed in the monthly statement to be delivered to the cardholder. In return, 
the issuer sends the ‘approval’ signal to the merchant, based on which 
undertaking the merchant supplies the goods or services to the cardholder. 
Finally, there is the sale contract between the cardholder and the merchant, 
which should be treated in the same way as a sale contract paid by cash. Under 
this contract, the merchant supplies goods or services on credit of the issuer 
instead of the cardholder. The cardholder’s obligation is to provide the means by 
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which the merchant can obtain the money consideration from a third party, being 
the issuer.  
 
In terms of finality, the issuer’s liability to pay the merchant becomes final and 
irrevocable after the ‘approval’ signal is received by the merchant and after the 
cardholder signed the transaction receipt and handed it over to the merchant. 
After this moment, the cardholder’s liability to pay the issuer also becomes final. 
He is not entitled to demand that the issuer stops payment to the merchant 
except in the case of chargeback. The merchant is entitled to enforce his right to 
obtain payment from the issuer by submitting the transaction receipt to the 
acquirer provided goods or services were supplied and the payment for which was 
not made by any other means.  
 
Even after a payment transaction has become final, if the transaction was found 
to have been made without the cardholder’s authorization, or if the merchant fails 
to deliver the goods or services, the goods delivered were defective or not as 
described in the contract of sale or if the payment for the sale was made by other 
means, the cardholder is usually entitled to request the issuer to give him his 
money back, by charging the sale amount back to the merchant. 
 
The acquirer is involved as an agent for the merchant in the payment transaction 
to verify the validity of the card with the issuer, to obtain payment from the issuer 
via the card association network and to hold the funds and credit it to the account 
of the merchant. The contract between the acquirer and the merchant is that of an 
agency. The content of this contract is only relevant for our analysis to determine 
the terms of the contract between the merchant and the issuer.  
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The key in this analysis is separating the sale contract and the payment 
transaction. For example, the dealing between the cardholder and the merchant is 
separated into two contracts. The cardholder acts as issuer’s agent in the payment 
transaction and at the same time acts as principal in the sale transaction. In the 
next section, we will outline the situations in which disputes may arise between 
the parties and their possible causes of action. The outline serves as an agenda for 
our discussion in the next 2 chapters. 
 
6.2  Situations of disputes and causes of action 
 
(a) Disputes relating to the sale contract 
 
In chapter IV, we will discuss the rights and obligations of the parties in the 
situation of a dispute relating to the sale contract. Such a dispute generally 
concerns either the quality of goods or services or the non-performance of the 
sale contract by the merchant. The rights and obligations of the parties first 
depend on the proper law of the sale contract and we will consider this issue 
further in chapter III. 
 
If the proper law of the sale contract is Singapore law, the cardholder may have 
causes of action in both tort and contract. The cardholder may sue the merchant 
for breach of contract or breach of express or implied warranty if the product is 
defective or if the merchant is otherwise in breach of a condition of the sale 
contract. He may also claim for damages if he suffered injury or damages as a 
result of a defect in the goods or services purchased.  
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Because of the practical difficulties and expenses in the various steps involved in 
the pursuit of legal action against the merchant, from establishing jurisdiction 
and governing law to obtaining recognition and enforcement of judgments, the 
majority of cardholders would generally prefer to request assistance from the 
issuer via the chargeback procedure than taking action in the courts of law. In 
Singapore, due to the absence of any regulation on credit card or consumer credit 
protection the issuers of all types of cards are generally not responsible to their 
customers for any disputes with the merchants. The only cause of action that may 
be available to the cardholder is negligent misrepresentation under the Hedley 
Byrne rule. However, the application of this rule is limited because of the 
exclusion of liability clauses carefully drafted in the banks’ standard terms. 
 
The main purpose of chapter IV will be the proposal of a reform in the area of 
issuer’s liability towards the cardholder for defaults or misrepresentation by the 
merchant in the sale contract without incurring excessive liabilities or expenses to 
the banks.  
 
(b) Disputes relating to the payment transaction 
 
There are two types of disputes relating to the payment transaction, the first of 
which concerns alleged errors by the merchant to either charge to the cardholder 
the correct amount, to charge the same amount multiple times while there was 
only one transaction, to charge the cardholder after recurring payment 
arrangement has been terminated or after services purchased have been cancelled 
or failing to process credit for the cardholder after products has been returned. 
These types of situations will be analyzed in chapter IV together with merchant-
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cardholder disputes because these mainly involve these two parties and the issue 
of authority of the person who effects the payment transaction is not relevant. 
 
The chapter III will focus on the situation where the cardholder alleges that the 
transaction was made without his authority. These are situations usually referred 
to as unauthorized transactions.   
 
As between the merchant and the cardholder, because of the presumption that 
the transaction was effected by a third party without the cardholder’s authority 
there cannot be any contract between them. If the merchant has any claim against 
the cardholder, that claim has to be founded in the tort of negligence if the 
cardholder owes a duty of care to the merchant. Pursuant to the neighbor 
principle of Donoghue v Stevenson74, as the merchant is a person who is directly 
affected by the cardholder’s want of care, such duty of care may exist. If the 
cardholder is found negligent in safeguarding the card (e.g. leaving the card 
unsigned facilitating forgery) the cardholder may be liable to the merchant. The 
merchant would not supply goods or services if he knew the person presenting 
card or card particulars was not the genuine cardholder. Because the merchant’s 
loss is goods delivered for which no payment is received, the damage caused to 
the merchant is physical damage, which is probably recoverable75. On the other 
hand, the cardholder may have a claim against the merchant for negligence in 
accepting the card (e.g. failure to conduct the security checks, failure to find 
obvious forgery of signature). However, the damage caused to the cardholder is 
likely to be pure economic loss, which may be more difficult to recover.  
                                                        
74 [1932] All E.R. Rep. 1 (H.L.). 
75 As suggested by C.Y.Lee: “…if the issuer had merely refused to pay the supplier his charges 
on the fraudulent purchase, when the supplier would have lost are his goods, i.e. a physical 
chattel or thing, and not the value of his goods. Physical loss has always been a recoverable 
head of damage” at page 97, Law of Consumer Credit, 1990. 
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As between the merchant and the issuer, there is obviously a contract between 
them. However, most, if not all, of the rights or obligations arise from this 
contract are enforced via the card association. There are two reasons for this. 
First, it is difficult for the parties to establish the contents of the contract between 
them. For example, in a card-present transaction, the only word that readily 
represents the nature of the relationship between them is the word ‘approved’ 
displayed on the merchant’s terminal. Secondly, the rules and regulations of the 
card association are effective enough to ensure the compliance by all of its 
members. Therefore, the need for any issuer or merchant to pursue action in 
court is near zero.  
 
Therefore, disputes between the cardholder and the issuer will be the focus of the 
next chapter III because this is the subject matter of the legislation concerning 





DISPUTES RELATING TO THE PAYMENT TRANSACTION 
 
Once issued, a credit debit or charge card may be used not only by the cardholder 
(i.e. the account-holder) but also by anybody who is in the possession of the card 
or the card particulars. A man can use a woman’s card and a child can use its 
parent’s card without the merchant, the acquirer, or the issuer ever noticing any 
difference. As these cards are increasingly used to effect payment remotely by 
telecommunications such as facsimile, telephone, or internet, the issue of 
allocation of financial losses due to unauthorized use of cards is becoming more 
important. In this chapter, we attempt to describe the state of the law relating to 
the question of cardholder’s liability for unauthorized use of credit, debit, or 
charge card in Singapore. In the absence of any legislation on the subject matter, 
the analysis will focus on the application of common law doctrines to the various 
situations of credit card usage. At the end of the chapter, we will suggest some 
measures of protection for the cardholder with reference to the legislation in 
Britain and America on fraud loss allocation. 
 
1.  GENERAL ANALYSIS 
 
Where the card is used by a party other than the cardholder (carduser), the 
liability of the cardholder for the card transaction may be established based on 
the analysis of two different relationships. Firstly, the liability of the cardholder 
may arise from the contract between him and the issuer or some other duty owed 
by him to the issuer based on the relationship between them. Secondly, the 
cardholder may be liable for the act of the carduser if the nature of the 
relationship between them is capable of making the cardholder liable. We will 
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look into each analysis below, bearing in mind that each of them may operate in 
the absence of the other but they often overlap in reality. 
 
1.1 Nature of the cardholder’s liability to the issuer 
 
(a)  Contractual liability 
 
The most prominent basis for the cardholder’s liability towards the issuer is the 
contractual relationship between them. The features of any credit, debit or charge 
card scheme, as described earlier, invariably require the cardholder to reimburse 
the issuer the amount of card-transactions effected by the card. The nature of the 
cardholder’s liability, however, remains a question, subject to different models of  
characterization. 
 
As discussed in section 1.2 and 1.3 of previous chapter the cardholder-issuer 
relationship should neither be characterized as an assignment of the merchant’s 
unpaid debt to the issuer or assignment of the cardholder’s chose in action to the 
merchant, nor in a way similar to the relationship between a bank and a customer 
using a cheque.  
 
The correct characterization model, which we submit in this paper, considers the 
cardholder’s liability arises from his bilateral contract with the issuer. This 
contract is made at the point of each card transaction based on the terms of the 
master agreement made between them when the card was issued. The main term 
of this contract establishes the cardholder’s liability to repay the issuer the 
amount of the card transaction. Where the undertaking is made by a third party, 
the carduser, the cardholder’s liability towards the issuer depends on the 
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authority of the carduser to bind the cardholder. The application of the principles 
of agency to the relationship will be analyzed further in the next section. It 
suffices to note here that, in order for the issuer to succeed in its claim against the 
cardholder based on this bilateral contract, it is necessary to prove that the 
carduser either has the actual or apparent authority of the cardholder to use the 
card. 
 
As will be discussed in section 2, the process of proving the carduser’s authority 
may be difficult, especially when it involves proving a deliberate action, 
knowledge or consent of the cardholder. The results may be uncertain, if 
achievable at all. As profit making organizations, the issuers would naturally 
attempt to shift the burden of loss due to fraudulent card transactions to another 
party. In the absence of a prohibition by statutes, which is the case in Singapore, 
card issuers tend to deploy a series of ‘risk shifting’ terms in their standard 
application forms and cardholder agreements to make the cardholders liable for 
unauthorized transactions. Common risk shifting terms includes disclaimer of 
issuer’s liability and cardholder’s express undertaking to take liability for not only 
authorized transactions but also some or all of the unauthorized transactions. If 
the risk shifting terms were valid and enforceable, the cardholder would be 
contractually bound to pay the issuer. The basis for the cardholder’s liability is the 
master agreement, as opposed to the contract made at the point of each 
transaction. 
 
(b) Account-holder’s liability as a bailee 
 
Because credit, debit and charge cards in virtual forms, which have been issued in 
some other jurisdictions, have yet to be issued in Singapore, there is always the 
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presence of physical cards given to the cardholders. The cardholder agreement 
invariably stipulates, in both the standard terms and the several provisions 
printed on the card, that the card remains the property of the issuer and must be 
returned upon demand by the issuer. For this reason, there is always an option to 
characterize the cardholder as a bailee of the card. The relationship of bailment 
may be contractual if there is a contract between the issuer and the cardholder. It 
may also be a relationship of involuntary bailment for no rewards in case of 
unsolicited cards. As a bailee, the cardholder owes certain duties to the issuer, as 
the owner of the card, and may be liable for any loss suffered by the issuer as a 
result of the cardholder’s breach of his duties.  
 
Although this model of characterization has not been tested in the courts, 
arguments supporting it may be found in some commentaries76. Therefore, it is 
thought that the analysis of the cardholder’s liability for unauthorized card 
transactions would not be complete without considering the application of the law 
of bailment in this relationship. However, as will be shown in section 3 below, to 
base the liability of the cardholder on the duty of a bailee of the card, while 
theoretically possible, is not entirely effective in all cases. 
 
(c) Account-holder’s liability in tort 
 
The issuer may have several cause of action in tort against the cardholder. If the 
cardholder is characterized as a bailee of the card, the tort of conversion may be 
applicable where the cardholder refuses to return the card to the issuer upon 
demand. A recipient of an unsolicited card who turns the card to another person 
to cause damage to the issuer may be liable in the tort of conspiracy. These 
                                                        
76 For example, C.Y. Lee, Law of Consumer Credit, 1990.  
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possibilities will be considered together with the cardholder’s liability as bailee in 
section 3 below. 
 
The relationship between the cardholder and the issuer may give rise to a duty of 
care owed by the cardholder (as a debtor, an agent, a bank’s customer or a bailee) 
to the issuer. A breach of such duty of care by negligent conduct of the cardholder 
resulting in consequential loss suffered by the issuer may entitle the issuer 
damages in actionable negligence or estop the cardholder from denying liability 
to the issuer for the card transaction. The questions relating to the application of 
the tort of negligence to credit card situation will be considered in section 5 
below. 
 
The existence of a contract between the cardholder and the issuer does not 
prevent the issuer seeking remedies in tort77. However, the terms of the 
cardholder agreement usually give the issuer better protection compared to 
remedies in tort. Therefore, there is less practical need for the issuer to base their 
claim in tort and, as a result, there is a dearth of authority directly applicable to 
cardholder’s liability as a tortfeasor. However, an analysis of this area is still 
necessary for completeness. 
 
Whether the issuer claim is based on contract, bailment or tort, the determination 
of the cardholder’s liability for usage of a card by a third party usually involves 
analysis of the relationship between the cardholder and the carduser. We will look 
into this relationship in the next section. 
 
 
                                                        
77 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1952] 2 AC 145. 
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1.2 Account-holder’s liability for the act of the carduser 
 
(a) The situations 
 
In practice, there are wide ranges of third parties other than the cardholder who 
may use the card to effect a card transaction. For convenience, the cardusers can 
be divided into three groups based on the way they obtain the card. 
 
First, there are the holders of supplementary cards issued to individuals and the 
holders of corporate cards and business cards issued to employees, managers, or 
directors of sole proprietorships, partnerships, or companies. These cardusers are 
allowed to use the cards both for the purposes of the cardholder and for the 
cardusers’ own purposes. Cardusers in this group are usually referred to as the co-
applicants because they are required to sign the application form, pursuant to the 
regulations issued by the MAS and the practice of issuing cards in Singapore. As 
these cardusers enter into the cardholder agreement directly with the issuer, they 
are liable to the issuer for all card transactions effected with the card issued to 
them in the same way as individual cardholders. The respective account-holders 
bear joint and several liability with the carduser by a contractual undertaking in 
the cardholder agreement.  
 
Secondly, there are the purchasing cards issued to employee of corporations and 
government agencies. Holders of purchasing cards are not required to take joint 
liability with the cardholder but the purchasing card can be used for the purposes 
of the cardholder at a limited number of merchants only.  
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Thirdly, there are the card-bearers, which include any person who is in the 
possession of a card or its particulars, with or without the authority or consent of 
the cardholders to use the cards to make payment. 
 
(b) The applicable doctrines 
 
With the first group of cardusers, the liability of the cardholder may be 
characterized as liability for charges incurred by an authorized agent with express 
authority written in the cardholder agreement. Alternatively, the cardholder’s 
liability may be characterized as a guarantee or indemnity given by the cardholder 
to the issuer.  
 
With the second group, the carduser is not directly liable to the issuer for charges 
made with the card. However, the authority given by the cardholder to the 
carduser is expressed in writing in the cardholder agreement. The cardholder is 
liable for the act of his agent within the scope of his express actual authority.  
 
In the third situation, there may be difficulty to define liability of the cardholder 
because the relationship between him and the card-bearer is not clear. There is 
apparently no contract between the card-bearer and the issuer, and usually, no 
contract between the cardholder and the card-bearer either. Where the card was 
obtained from the cardholder with his consent, the card-bearer may be 
characterized as an agent of the cardholder, or as a sub-bailee of the card. Where 
the card was stolen from the cardholder, there is no actual authority given by him 
to the card-bearer. However, the cardholder may still be held liable to the issuer 




The liability of the cardholder for the use of the card by the carduser is founded 
mainly on the principles of agency law. We will look at the application of the 
doctrines of agency law to credit card relationship in section 2 below. 
Alternatively, the cardholder may be liable for the act of the card-bearer as a sub-
bailee of the physical card. This will be discussed in section 3. 
 
2. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY 
 
Because the issuer’s claim against the cardholder is mainly founded on contract, 
the application of the principles of agency is of primary importance to decide 
whether the cardholder would be liable for a particular card transaction. In this 
section, we will briefly summarize the relevant doctrines of agency law as 
reflected in leading cases and textbooks78 and attempt to apply the doctrines to 
the situation of credit card. 
 
2.1 Actual authority 
 
In Freeman & Lockyer v. Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd, Diplock L.J. 
defined actual authority as follows: 
 
“An ‘actual’ authority is a legal relationship between principal and agent 
created by a consensual agreement to which they alone are parties. Its scope is 
to be ascertained by applying ordinary principles of constructions of contracts, 
                                                        
78 We select to rely on the classification and definitions of different types of authority adopted 
in Boustead & Reynolds on Agency, 17th Edition Sweet & Maxwell 2001 as our primary source 
of authority on agency law while some quotes were taken directly from the transcripts of the 
cases. 
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including any proper implications from the express words used, the usages of 
the trade, or the course of business between the parties. To this agreement the 
contractor is a stranger: he may be totally ignorant of the existence of any 
authority on the part of the agent. Nevertheless, if the agent does enter into a 
contract pursuant to the ‘actual’ authority, it does create contractual rights and 
liabilities between the principal and the contractor” 79 
 
Actual authority is usually divided into express and implied authority80. Express 
authority is the authority, which the cardholder has given the carduser by 
means of words or writing. The most obvious case of express authority in credit 
card usage is found in respect of holders of supplementary cards, business cards 
and purchasing cards because the authority is written in standard forms drafted 
by the issuer and signed by both the cardholder and the carduser. Express 
authority may also be established if an agreement exists between the cardholder 
and the card-bearer relating to the use of the card by the card-bearer. 
 
As opposed to express authority, implied authority is that inferred from the 
relationship and dealings of the two parties by interpretation by the law. Implied 
authority may be found in the form of incidental authority, which is the 
authority for the agent to do whatever is necessary or normally incidental to the 
activity expressly authorized81. An agent authorized to buy shares has implied 
authority to do everything in the usual course of business necessary to complete 
the bargain, e.g. make payment to the seller82. In case of credit card, if a card-
bearer has express authority to do something, which requires the use of the card, 
                                                        
79 [1964] 2 Q.B. 480 at 502. 
80 Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency 17th Edition, 2001 at 3-003. 
81 Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency 17th Edition, 2001 at 3-018. 
82 Bayley v. Wilkins (1849) 7 C.B. 886. 
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e.g. make a purchase for the cardholder, which card he may have obtained from 
the cardholder without express instructions to use, implied incidental authority to 
use the card may be inferred. Another form of implied authority is usual 
authority, which is the authority for the agent to do whatever the agent of the 
type concerned would usually have authority to do83. The typical example of usual 
authority, as a type of implied authority, is the authority which arises from 
appointment to a particular managerial post. When the board of directors of a 
company appoints one of their members to be a managing director, “they thereby 
impliedly authorize him to do all such things as fall within the usual scope of 
that office”84. Therefore, usual authority may be relied on to hold a corporate 
cardholder liable for card transaction made by its director. Usual authority may 
be found where an agent who has been authorized to do any act in the course of 
his trade, profession or business has implied authority to do whatever is normally 
incidental, in the ordinary course of such trade, profession or business, to the 
execution of his express authority. In this case, the usual authority arises from the 
occupation of the agent, not from a post of managerial nature. The application of 
usual authority in this sense to credit card is limited, because card-bearer does 
not encompass any occupation of any particular trade. It should be noted that the 
word ‘usual authority’ used here as a type of actual authority. If the actual 
authority of the carduser does not exist or has been terminated, the applicable 
doctrine is apparent authority, which will be discussed in the next section 2.2. 
 
The next type of implied authority is customary authority, which is authority 
to act in accordance with applicable business customs in the sphere in which he 
operates, in the execution of his express authority, provided that the custom is 
                                                        
83 Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency 17th Edition, 2001 at 3-006. 
84 Hely-Hutchinson v. Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 Q.B. 549 at 583, per Lord Denning M.R. 
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not unreasonable or unlawful85. The rules concerning proof of customs for the 
application of customary authority are strict. To establish the existence of a 
custom it must be shown that the custom is certain, reasonable, lawful, 
universally accepted by the particular trade or profession or place and not 
inconsistent with expressed or implied term of the contract between the parties86. 
Customary authority is of limited application to the situation of credit card not 
only because of the requirement to prove custom, but also because of its limited 
application to particular trade or profession. 
 
Another avenue to establish implied authority is presumed authority. The 
term does not denote a separate type of authority, but “simply refers to the fact 
that the existence of actual authority may sometimes be presumed, subject to 
rebuttal”87. Originally, the principles of presumed authority arise with authority 
of married English women, who, until the late 19th century was unable to own 
separate property and to be liable on contracts. Together with the evolution of the 
law on women’s rights, the principles of presumed authority now based on 
cohabitation and housekeeping, not on marriage and applied to men and women 
equally. According to presumed authority rules, a person who cohabitate in a 
domestic establishment88 with, or acts as a housekeeper for another person, 
would be presumed to have implied authority to enter into contracts on behalf of 
the latter for “the reasonable supply of goods and services”89 for the household. 
The presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the alleged principal has 
forbidden the agent to pledge his credit or that the agent was provided with 
                                                        
85 Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency 17th Edition, 2001 at 3-030. 
86 Oricon Waren-Handels GmbH v. Intergraan NV [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 82 at 96. 
87 Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency 17th Edition, 2001 at 3-040. 
88 Debenham v. Mellon (1880) 6 App. Cas. 24. The existence of a marriage between principal 
and agent is no longer a requirement. It is also not necessary that the principal is a man and 
the agent a women. A domestic establishment cannot be a hotel. But a husband who is absent 
on military services is considered as cohabiting with his wife. 
89 Miss Gray Ltd v. Earl Cathcard (1922) 38 T.L.R. 562 at 565. 
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adequate necessaries or sufficient and agreed allowance for such necessaries. The 
doctrine of presumed authority based on cohabitation may be applicable to credit 
cards issued to individuals even though it was noted in Chitty on Contract that 
“In contemporary English conditions, it is doubtful whether it has much 
relevance”90. 
 
Incidental authority, usual authority and customary authority are the most 
frequently used doctrines to infer the implications of the relationship and 
dealings between the alleged principal and agent. The task of ascertaining such 
implications involves the application of ordinary principles of constructions of 
contracts to the entire circumstances of the agent’s position. Therefore, there is 
often said to be a residual category of implied authority called “authority derived 
from the circumstances of the case”91. However, this is not a separate category of 
authority as it is not clear what the other circumstances are that may give rise to 
implied authority. The existence of the terms seems to be a reminder that 
although existing categories of implied authority (e.g. incidental authority, usual 
authority and custom authority) may be established, the court would take into 
account the entire surrounding circumstances and the course of dealings to either 
widen or narrow the agent’s authority92. The notion of authority derived from the 
circumstances of the case, therefore, concerns with scope of authority rather than 
its existence. 
 
Agent’s consent. The passage from Diplock L.J. statement above suggests that 
the agent’s consent is required in respect of actual authority. Such consent is 
                                                        
90 29th Edition, Volume 2, at 31-048. 
91 Chitty on Contract, 29th Edition, Volume 2 at 31-047. 
92 Hely-Hutchinson v. Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 Q.B. 549; Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency 
17th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2001 at 3-039. 
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certainly relevant in the relationship between the cardholder and the carduser. 
Consent is needed to hold the carduser liable to the cardholder for non-
performance or breach of the agreement with the principal. However, as the main 
question is the relationship between the cardholder and the issuer, the relevant 
act is the conferring of authority. It has been suggested that the basis of agency is 
a unilateral manifestation of will and that it is not necessary that the agent’s 
consent have been manifested at all when the issue is whether the agent’s act was 
authorized93. 
 
2.2 Apparent authority 
 
(a) Notion of apparent authority 
 
When the cardholder has not authorized a carduser or has even forbidden the use 
of the card the cardholder may be bound by the act of the carduser under the 
doctrine of apparent authority. Apparent authority is usually treated separately 
from actual authority because there is an assumption that there is in fact no 
authority at all in the reasoning behind the doctrine of apparent authority94. 
While actual authority is created by an agreement between principal and agent to 
which they alone are parties, “ostensible or apparent authority is the authority of 
an agent as it appears to others”95. In a leading case of agency law, Diplock L.J. 
defined apparent authority as follows96: 
 
                                                        
93 Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency 17th Edition, 2001, at 1-006 and 2-033. 
94 “Apparent authority, which negatives the existence of actual authority” Rama Corp. v. 
Proved tin & General Investments [1952] 2 Q.B. 147 at 149, per Slade J; Bowstead and 
Reynolds on Agency 17th Edition, 2001, at 1-013.  
95 Hely-Hutchinson v. Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 Q.B. 549 at 583, per Lord Denning M.R. 
96 Freeman & Lockyer v. Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 Q.B. 480 at 503. 
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“An ‘apparent’ or ‘ostensible’ authority … is a legal relationship between the 
principal and the contractor created by a representation, made by the 
principal to the contractor, intended to be and in fact acted upon by the 
contractor, that the agent has authority to enter on behalf of the principal into a 
contract of a kind within the scope of the ‘apparent’ authority, so as to render 
the principal liable to perform any obligations imposed upon him by such 
contract. To the relationship so created the agent is a stranger. He need not be 
(although he generally is) aware of the existence of the representation but he 
must not purport to make the agreement as principal himself. The 
representation, when acted upon by the contractor by entering into a contract 
with the agent, operates as an estopel, preventing the principal from 
asserting that he is not bound by the contract. It is irrelevant whether the 
agent had actual authority to enter into the contract.”  
 
The dictum of Diplock L.J. suggests that the doctrine of apparent authority is 
based on the doctrine of estoppel. There have been clearer statements of the same 
view, such as that made by Slade J.: “Ostensible or apparent authority … is 
merely a form of estoppel, indeed, it has been termed agency by estoppel, and 
you cannot call in aid an estoppel unless you have three ingredients: (i) a 
representation (ii) a reliance on the representation, and (iii) an alteration of 
your position resulting from such reliance”97. There is still much argument 
whether apparent authority should be regarded as based on estoppel or not 
because (i) the representation giving rise to apparent authority may be more 
general than the representation required for estoppel and (ii) the detriment 
incurred to the third party required by apparent authority may be smaller than 
that required by estoppel. In respect of credit card transactions, there may be 
                                                        
97 Rama Corp. v. Proved tin & General Investments [1952] 2 Q.B. 147 at 149-150.  
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little problem establishing the reliance by the issuer and the detriment incurred 
by it. The problem would most likely arise in respect of the representation. If the 
words or conducts of the cardholder constitute or is deemed by the law as 
constituting a representation to the issuer that the carduser has authority to act 
on behalf of the cardholder, it is not difficult to prove that the issuer relied on 
such representation to pay or undertake to pay the merchant, which results in a 
financial loss to the issuer if the cardholder later refuses to reimburse the issuer. 
The focus of our analysis should, therefore, be the representation. 
 
(b) Nature of the representation 
 
According to Bowstead & Reynold98, the cases on apparent authority may be 
divided into two categories based on the nature of the representation. Firstly, 
there are cases where a ‘genuine representation’ was made by the principal of the 
agent’s authority, which may be: 
 
(i) expressed orally or in writing; 
(ii) implied from a course of dealing between the parties99; 
(iii) implied from the principal’s “permitting the agent to act in some way in 
the conduct of the principal’s business with other person”100; 
(iv) entrusting the agent with the conduct of a particular negotiation101; 
                                                        
98 Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency 17th Edition, 2001, at 8-018. 
99 In Debenham v. Mellon (1880) 16 App. Cas. 24 at 36. A husband who has regularly paid for 
contract made by his wife later revoked his wife’s authority to pledge his credit. He was found 
liable when his wife ordered goods from the usual tradesmen who did not know about the 
revocation. Course of dealing, however, requires a multiple transactions with repetition of 
pattern.  If the husband only paid for one transaction, or if the goods were supplied to a 
different address there may not be a course of dealing as held in Durrant v. Holdsworth 
(1886) 2 T.L.R. 763 and Swan & Edgar Ltd v. Mathieson (1910) 103 L. T. 832. 
100 Freeman & Lockyer v. Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 Q.B. 480 at 503. 
Permitting someone to act as a managing director of a company without proper appointment 
as director gave rise to apparent authority in this case. Panorama Developments (Guildford) 
Ltd v. Fidelis Furnishing Fabrics Ltd [1971] 2 Q.B. 711 (company secretary). 
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(v) using the agent as a medium of communication102; or 
(vi) entrusting the agent with the indicia of ownership of property.  
 
The secondly category, according to Bowstead & Reynold103, includes “cases 
where the representation is only of very general nature, and arise only from the 
principal’s putting the agent in a position carrying with it usual authority, e.g. 
making him a partner, appointing him managing director104, or using the 
services of a professional agent105, viz., some one whose occupation normally 
gives him a usual authority to do things of a certain type, e.g. a solicitor … Here, 
the notion of representation to the third party seems more artificial and the 
connection of the principal’s liability with estoppel much more difficult to 
maintain. It seems further that in this category the authority which the third 
party is entitled to infer is that which would normally be implied between 
principal and agent, and it is of this that the court receives evidence”.  
 
In relation to this category of representation, it has been suggested in Chitty on 
Contract106 that “Sometimes negligence conduct is relied on as constituting a 
holding out: this is principally so in the case of property transactions. In that 
                                                                                                                                                               
101 In Crabb v Arun D.C. [1976] Ch. 179 at 183, the directors of a company permit the 
chairman and majority shareholder to conduct negotiation, together with the company’s 
solicitor, to enter into a contract to sell shares. The contract held to bind the company. In 
Egyptian International Foreign Trade Co. v. P.S. Refson & Co. Ltd (The Raffaella) [1985] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 36 at 41, a documentary credit manage or a trading bank signed a guarantee 
without obtaining the director’s ascent, the bank was bound because the evidence showed that 
the bank entrusted the handling of the matter to the manager.  
102 Magripilis v. Baird [1926] St. R. Qd. 89 at 96. 
103 Bowstead and Reynold on Agency 17th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2001 at 8.018. 
104 Hely-Hutchinson v. Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 Q.B. 549 at 583. 
105 A professional agent is someone whose occupation normally gives him a usual authority to 
do things of a certain types. For example in Waugh v. H.B. Clifford & Sons Ltd [1982] Ch. 
374, a law firm was entrusted with the conduct of litigation for clients, which involves a 
compromise in the purchase of a property by the client. The clients instructed the firm not to 
agree to the appointment of a valuer, which instruction failed to reach the person handling the 
matter. The clients were bound by the appointment of the valuer and the compromise because 
the agent was put in a position carrying with it usual authority of a solicitor. 
106 Chitty on Contract, 29th Edition, Volume 2 at 31-056, page [34]. 
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context, it is often said that there must be a duty of care towards the third 
party107, but here again it appears that such a duty can be owed to a wide class 
of persons. It does not seem that the third party’s reliance need have been to his 
detriment: although it is clear that if he did not rely on the representation at all, 
or ignored the opportunity of ascertaining the agent’s authority, or was put on 
inquiry by the facts of the transaction, he cannot hold the principal liable, it is 
probably sufficient reliance merely to enter into transaction on the faith of the 
representation.” We will consider the issue of cardholder’s duty of care towards the 
issuer further in Section 3 below. 
 
(c) Application to credit cards 
 
To apply the doctrines of apparent authority to credit card we will attempt to 
analyse situations of credit card usage in which the words or conduct of the 
cardholder constitute a representation to the third party. The cardholder’s 
express representation may be easily established in respect of supplementary 
cards, corporate cards or purchasing cards. The application form, which specifies 
the identity of the carduser, evidently constitutes its express representation in 
writing of the carduser’s authority to the issuer. In this case, because actual 
express authority exists, apparent authority does not arise. Apparent authority, 
however, assists the issuer to hold the cardholder liable for transactions in case 
the authority of the carduser has been terminated or limited without notice to the 
issuer. Even where no separate card was issued to the carduser apparent 
authority may be established if the cardholder informed the issuer (orally or in 
writing) that the card would be used by a specific card-bearer. This situation, 
                                                        
107 Swan v North British Australasian Co (1863) 2 H. & C. 175 at 182; Mercantile Bank of 
India v Central Bank of India Ltd [1938] A.C. 287 at 298-299; Mercantile Credit Co. Ltd v. 
Hamblin [1965] 2 Q.B. 242 at 271; Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Twitchings [1977] A.C. 
890. 
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however, rarely occurs in Singapore because standard cardholder agreements 
usually prohibit the cardholders from giving the cards or card particulars to 
others108. The issuer would not be entitled to rely on apparent authority if it had 
knowledge of the limit or the lack of the carduser’s actual authority109. Any 
termination or qualification of the cardholder’s authority does not have to be 
contained in the application form or the cardholder agreement as a notice given 
by the cardholder should suffice to limit the scope of apparent authority. 
 
The remaining categories enumerated in (b) above do not seem to be applicable 
where a card-bearer uses the card. First, the cardholder representation may not 
be implied from the course of dealings between him and the issuer. As Singapore 
standard cardholder agreements usually prohibit the cardholders from giving the 
cards or card particulars to others, it seems illogical to infer that the cardholder 
repeatedly allows the card to be used by another person. The course of dealing 
cannot contradict with the express terms of agreement. For the same reason, it is 
also difficult to say that the cardholder permits the card-bearer to act in some way 
in the conduct of the cardholder’s usual business dealing with the issuer. 
Secondly, the card-bearer does not appear to be entrusted with the indicia of 
ownership of any property. The card remains the property of the issuer, as usually 
stated on the card itself. Thirdly, the cardholder does not seem to be using the 
agent as a medium of communication. Fourthly, the cardholder’s act of giving the 
card or card particulars to a card-bearer may fit within the category of entrusting 
the agent with the conduct of a particular negotiation if the act of using the card 
                                                        
108 For this reason, the act of giving the card to other may constitute a breach of the 
cardholder agreement. We will consider the liability of the cardholder as a breach of contract 
in section 5 below as we are only considering the application of agency principles in this 
section. 
109 As was said in the American case of Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Thornburgh 106 P 2d 511 
at 512: “Apparent authority loses all of its apparency when the third party knows that actual 
authority is lacking” 
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to effect a card transaction is considered a negotiation of a contract between the 
card-bearer and the issuer. It seems that a deliberate act of the cardholder to give 
the card or card particulars is necessary to establish apparent authority. 
 
Under the last category labeled ‘artificial, non-genuine representation’ by 
Bowstead & Reynolds, a principal may be deemed by the law as making a 
representation by putting the agent in a position, which in normal circumstance 
would give rise to a relationship of implied usual authority. As discussed in 
section 2.1 above, usual authority, as a type of implied actual authority typically 
arises from (i) the agent’s appointment to a particular managerial post or (ii) the 
agent’s occupation in a certain trade, profession, or business. In the prior type of 
case, apparent authority may not arise because actual implied authority may be 
established. The latter situation may not be applicable because there is no 
occupation or profession that usually involves the use of credit card of other 
persons. 
 
The above analysis shows that the doctrine of apparent authority is most helpful 
in the situation where the pre-existing actual express authority of the carduser is 
terminated or limited without notice to the issuer. Where the cardholder did not 
make any express representation to the issuer, it is possible to establish apparent 
authority where the cardholder gives the card to the card-bearer or the cardholder 
appoints the card-bearer into a managerial post involving use of the credit card. 
Both of these situations seem to require a deliberate act of the cardholder. The 
dictum of Diplock L.J. quoted in section 2.1 above110 seems to suggest that the 
representation by a principal needs to be ‘intended to be acted upon’. Although it 
has been said that, generally, in respect of apparent authority, the representation 
                                                        
110 Freeman & Lockyer v. Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 Q.B. 480 at 502. 
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need not be deliberate111, it is submitted, based on the above analysis a deliberate 
voluntary act of the cardholder is necessary to establish apparent authority of the 
card-bearer. 
 
2.3 Usual authority and agency by estoppel 
 
(a)  Usual authority as a third category 
 
In sections 2.1 the term ‘usual authority’ referred to the situation where the agent 
is put in a position which normally carried with it authority. The principal is 
deemed to have given implied authority unless the authority is withdrawn from 
the agent. In this sense, usual authority is a type of actual implied authority. In 
section 2.2, the same term was used again to refer to cases where the principal’s 
representation is inferred from putting the agent in a position carrying with it 
usual authority while, in fact the authority may have been withdrawn. In this 
sense, usual authority is a type of apparent authority.  
 
It was further suggested in Bowstead & Reynolds112 that a case may be made out 
for considering the notion of ‘usual authority’ as a third type of authority, which 
is neither actual nor apparent. For completeness, this third meaning will be 
discussed below. 
 
As an independent category of authority, ‘usual authority’ arose in the 
exceptional case of Watteau v. Fenwick113, where an undisclosed principal was 
held liable for a contract made by his agent within such authority as would 
                                                        
111 Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency 17th Edition, 2001, para 8-020 at page 310. 
112 Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency 17th Edition, 2001, para 3-006 at page 92. 
113 [1893] 1 Q.B. 346. 
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usually be possessed by a person in such a situation, but the authority has in fact 
been withdrawn. The fact that the authority was withdrawn by the principal 
suggests that the case cannot base on actual authority. On the other hand, the 
undisclosed principal cannot be considered as making any representation to the 
third party, because even his existence is not known to the third party. Therefore, 
the principal’s liability cannot be based either on actual nor apparent authority 
doctrine. 
 
The Watteau v. Fenwick type of usual authority can only be found in situations of 
an undisclosed principal, because if the principal’s existence is disclosed to the 
third party, then the case should base on apparent authority. The application of 
this situation to credit card is not likely to occur because the identity of the 
cardholder is well known to the card-issuer (acting in the position of the third 
party in this case). It is, therefore, safe to conclude that the credit card cardholder 
liability can only be based on actual or apparent authority.  
 
(b) Agency by estoppel 
 
The situation of an agency by estoppel arises where a principal, as a result of his 
representation or conduct, is estopped from denying the authority of his agent. It 
might seem that, in this situation, estoppel and apparent authority coincide. 
However, it has long been confirmed that agency by estoppel is not agency114. 
Because agency by estoppel is distinguishable from agency in general and 
apparent authority in particular, agency by estoppel must be a form of estoppel. 
We will analyse the application of the doctrine of estoppel in section 4 below. 
 
                                                        
114 Pole v. Leask (1863) 33 LJ CH 155, per Lord Cranworth at 161-2. 
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2.4 Conclusion on the application of agency doctrines to credit card 
 
In respect of supplementary cards, corporate cards and the purchasing cards the 
authority given by the cardholder to the carduser constitutes actual express 
authority. In case actual authority is withdrawn or limited by the cardholder, the 
cardholder remains liable for usage of the card based on apparent authority if the 
issuer has no notice of the withdrawal or limitation of the carduser’s authority.  
 
Where no separate card is issued to the carduser the liability of the cardholder 
may be based on several different grounds. First, the authority of the card-bearer 
may be established based on his appointment in a managerial post in the 
company of the cardholder. The fact of the card-bearer appointment may serve 
both as a basis for usual authority or a representation giving rise to apparent 
authority. Secondly, if the cardholder voluntarily gives the card to the card-bearer 
for a specific transaction, both implied incidental authority to carry out a 
transaction and apparent authority for entrusting the card-bearer with the 
conduct of a negotiation of contract with the issuer may be established. Thirdly, 
the authority given by individual cardholder to the card-bearer may be presumed 
based on fact of co-habitation or housekeeping if the card was used for 
purchasing necessity for the household, subject to rebuttal.  
 
In some cases, the issuer may also rely on the cardholder’s negligent conduct (e.g. 
carelessness in keeping the card) to establish the holding out of a representation 
giving rise to apparent authority. However, to establish apparent authority in this 
case it is necessary to prove the existence of the duty of care owed by the 
cardholder to the issuer. The analysis of the cardholder’s duty of care will be 
made in section 5 below together with the question of cardholder’s duty in tort. 
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2.5 Unauthorized card transaction in Britain and America 
 
Although not directly applicable to Singapore, the legislation concerning credit 
cards in America and Britain may help to clarify and confirm some of the points 




The Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA) is often said to confirm the common law 
position relating to authority to use credit card in its Section 83, which provides 
that: “The debtor under a regulated consumer credit agreement shall not be 
liable to the creditor for any loss arising from use of the credit facility by 
another person not acting, or to be treated as acting, as the debtor's agent.” The 
word ‘acting’ in the section seems to refer to actual authority and the words ‘to be 
treated as acting’ refers to the doctrine of apparent authority. Under Section 173 
of the act, contracting out of Section 83 is prohibited. The issuers’ practice to use 
‘risk shifting’ terms to place the burden of fraud loss to the cardholder were, 
therefore, defeated conclusively. The effect of section 83 extends to issuer’s claims 
in both contract and tort. Thanks to the Section 83, the application of agency law 
doctrines works both ways, to render the cardholder liable for transaction effected 
by other person with actual or apparent authority and to help him escape liability 
otherwise. 
 
More interesting for our purposes is Section 84, which specifically deals with the 
questions of cardholder’s liability for misuse of credit card by a card-bearer. The 
treatment in this section is achieved based on the notion of ‘authorized person’: 
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Section 84 (1): “Section 83 does not prevent the debtor under a credit--token 
agreement from being made liable to the extent of £50 (or the credit limit if 
lower) for loss to the creditor arising from use of the credit-token by other 
persons during a period beginning when the credit-token ceases to be in the 
possession of any authorised person and ending when the credit-token is 
once more in the possession of an authorised person.” 
 
The words ‘authorized person’ is defined in Section 84 (7) as: “The debtor, the 
creditor, and any person authorised by the debtor to use the credit-token, 
shall be authorised persons for the purposes of subsection (1).” 
 
Therefore, if the card remains in the possession of the cardholder or his 
authorized agent, the £50 limitation does not apply. However, the issuer will be 
liable for losses caused by use of card before the card reaches the cardholder, 
because the card is in the possession of the issuer in the possession of a person 
authorised by the issuer. This position has been further confirmed by Section 66, 
which provides that the cardholder cannot be liable until the card is accepted by 
him. Where acceptance by the cardholder is by his first use, the cardholder’s 
liability during the period after he received the card and before his first use will 
also be limited to £50. Under section 84(8) the limitation of £50 is applicable for 
each card in circulation.  
 
In addition to the qualification in Section 84(1), the protection afforded under 
Section 83 is not applicable if the card-bearer acquired the card with the 
cardholder’s consent. Section 84(2) provides that “Section 83 does not prevent 
the debtor under a credit-token agreement from being made liable to any 
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extent for loss to the creditor from use of the credit-token by a person who 
acquired possession of it with the debtor's consent.” 
 
Therefore, as long as the cardholder has consented to the possession of the card 
by the card-bearer the cardholder will be liable for the total amount of all card 
transactions effected. Therefore, the section is applicable when an authorized 
card-bearer exceeds his authority as well as to the situation of a mere bearer of 
the card who used the card by forging the cardholder’s signature. A literal 
interpretation of section 84 (2) suggests that the cardholder will be liable even if 
the card was obtained by the card-bearer by a fraud or trick (e.g. the card-bearer 
borrowed the card to play guitar but used it to make payment). To minimize the 
liability under sections 84 (1) and (2) the cardholder needs to give a notice (oral 
or written) to the issuer that the card was lost, in which case the cardholder would 
not be liable for card transaction effected after the notice. Under sub-section (5) 
the notice takes effect when received, but if given orally, must be re-confirmed in 
writing within 7 days. 
 
(b) United States 
 
In America, the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act addressed the problems 
relating to allocation of fraud losses from its 1970 amendment. The Act, now 
codified as 15 USC §1643115, placed a strict limit of $50 to the maximum liability 
of credit and charge card holders for unauthorized use of their cards. To be 
entitled to the claim of the amount of $50, the issuer must satisfy various 
requirements such as providing a method whereby the cardholder can be 
                                                        
115 15 USC §1643 
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00001643----000-.html. 
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identified as the person authorized to use the card, giving adequate notice of 
potential liability, providing the cardholder with a description of a means by 
which the issuer may be notified of loss or theft of the card, proving the 
cardholder has accepted the card and that the unauthorized use occurs before the 
cardholder has notified the issuer of the loss or theft. We will come back to these 
specific requirements at the end of this chapter. What we are concerned with here 
is the application of the doctrines of agency law under the legislation. The Act 
preserved the common law position by a definition of ‘unauthorized use’ of card 
as follows: 
 
“(o) The term “unauthorized use,” as used in section 1643 of this title, means a 
use of a credit card by a person other than the cardholder who does not have 
actual, implied, or apparent authority for such use and from which the 
cardholder receives no benefit.” 116 
 
The Official Commentary to Regulation Z117 subsequently clarified that the 
question whether such authority exist is determined by applicable law. By using 
the words “actual, implied, or apparent authority” the definition enabled both 
the application of the established doctrines of agency law and the continuing 
evolution of such doctrines in the circumstance of credit card usage. In the 
leading case of Minskoff v American Express Travel Related Services Co.118, it 
was clarified that actual authority concerns the manner in which the cardholder 
communicates with the carduser, whether the carduser can infer the principal’s 
consent for the carduser’s action by words (express) or conduct (implied) of the 
                                                        
116 15 U.S.C. § 1602(o) and Regulation Z §226.12(b)(5)-2 
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00001602----000-.html. 
117 Official Staff Commentary on Regulation Z §226.12(b)(1)-1. 
118 98 F.3d 703, 708. 
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principal. Apparent or ostensible authority lies in behaviour of the principal that 
led the third party dealing with the agent to believe the agent acted with the 
authority. The demarcation line between actual and apparent authority was 
further clarified in Martin v American Express, Inc.119. This case involved 
unauthorised use by an authorized carduser. A company gave a card to an 
employee with instruction to limit purchases to $500, which instructions were 
not known to the issuer. It was held that the employee had actual authority for the 
first $500 and apparent authority for the amount that exceeded $500. 
Application of apparent authority was again confirmed in American Express 
Travel Related Services Co. v. Web, Inc.120 where misuse of a card by an 
authorized carduser was held to constitute authorized use.  
 
The situation where the card was used by a mere card-bearer was considered in 
Tower World Airways Inc. v. PHH Aviation Systems Inc.121. In this case, the use 
was held to be authorized because the card was obtained voluntarily from the 
cardholder. More interesting situation was considered in Blaisdell Lumber Co. v 
Horton122. In this case, a former boyfriend stole his girl friend’s card with only a 
name on it, signed it and used it. The court found no apparent authority because 
no action of the girl friend was present. Therefore, as a matter of American law, as 
long as the card or card number was obtained by a voluntary act of the 
cardholder, the card transactions effected by the card-bearer will be deemed 
authorized and the cardholder will be made liable for all the charges incurred123. 
It does not matter whether a separate card was issued to the carduser. The usage 
                                                        
119 361 So. 2d 597 (ala. 1978). 
120 261 Ga. 480, 405 S.E.2d 652 (1991). 
121 933 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1991). 
122 242NJ Super 98, 575 A.2d 1386 (1990) 
123 Mark Budnitz and Margot Saunders, Consumer banking and payments law : credit, debit 
& stored value cards, checks, money orders, e-sign, electronic banking and benefit 
payments, 2nd Edition, National Consumer Law Center, 2002 at § 3.3.3.2 at page 58-60. 
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of ‘cardholder’s voluntary act’ as an indication of authority is similar to our 
conclusion on the question of authority in respect of card-bearer.  
 
The $50 limit imposed by §1643 applies to both consumer and corporate credit 
and charge cards. Corporate cardholders issued with more than 10 cards have the 
option to contract out of the limit. In the absence of any contracting out 
arrangement, the limit applies equally to both consumer and corporate cards. The 
limit appears to be an absolute ceiling as provided for in its sub-section (d)124. 
Therefore, even if the cardholder knows that the card has been stolen and failed 
to notify the issuer of the loss, his liability would not exceed $50. However, the 
courts have refused to apply this ceiling limit the in several cases where the 
cardholder was found to be so grossly negligent. Two leading authorities are 
considered below. 
 
In Minskoff v. American Express Travel Related Services Co125, a personal 
secretary of the CEO of a company cardholder forged the boss’ signatures on the 
application for the Amex card, cheques made in payment of the card statements 
and card transaction receipts. The company was held liable for the entire amount 
of all the card transactions effected by the employee, which went far beyond the 
$50 ceiling. Interestingly for our purposes, the basis for the court’s decision in 
this case is the cardholder’s negligent conduct resulting in apparent authority. 
The court applied the rule of New York law that cardholders are obligated to 
exercise reasonable care and promptness to examine bank statements to discover 
any unauthorized signature and alteration126 and held that the cardholder was in 
                                                        
124 “Except as provided in this section, a cardholder incurs no liability from the unauthorized 
use of a credit card.” 
125 98 F.3d 703 (2d Cir. 1996) 
126 N.Y.U.C.C. §4-406, Woods v. MONY Legacy Life Ins. Co.,641 N.E.2d 1070,1071 (1994). The 
bank’s customer duty to discover and report unauthorized transaction is now stipulated in 
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a superior position to determine whether the charges reflected on his regular 
billing statements were legitimate. The cardholder’s failure to examine the 
monthly card statement for an exceptionally long period of several years, 
therefore, constituted negligent omission that creates apparent authority for the 
charges that would otherwise be considered unauthorized under the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act. 
 
In the exceptional case of Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones127, both the principal 
cardholder and a supplementary carduser were held liable when they retained 
their card and continued to make charges to the card account after having given 
notice to the issuer to terminate the agreement with the issuer. The basis for the 
court’s decision in this case was that the use of the card even after notice of 
termination constitutes an express representation giving rise to apparent 
authority for the charges to be considered authorized. 
 
In this section 2 we have looked at the application of relevant principles of agency 
law to answer the questions of liability for card transaction effected by a party 
other than the cardholder. In the next section, we will consider the next 
alternative to answer the question of liability for card transaction based on the 
criteria of possession of the physical card. 
 
3. APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF LAW PROTECTING PERSONAL CHATTEL 
 
As discussed in chapter I, credit, debit, and charge cards usually take the physical 
form of a plastic cards, paper coupons. Credit card issuers in several countries 
                                                                                                                                                               
Uniform Commercial Code Article 4 at § 4-406 (electronic version of the Code is available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/4/4-406.html). 
127 672 P2d 73 (Utah 1983). 
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have started to issue credit card in virtual form. An example of virtual credit cards 
is the single use credit card numbers, which automatically expire within a few 
months, issued by major issuers such as Citibank for use solely on the internet. 
While this fact has been recognized in the current regulations on credit and 
charge card of Singapore legislations128, credit cards in electronic virtual form 
have not been issued in Singapore. As the cards continue to be issued in plastic, 
the body of law that affect the rights and obligations of the issuer and the 
cardholder as bailor and bailee of the card remains applicable. In this section, we 
attempt to find out how the existing rules of law may be applied or adapted to 
protect the issuer’s rights, as the owner of the physical card in the relationship 
with the holder of the card. The analysis in this section will be divided in two 
different situations of unsolicited card and solicited card. 
 
3.1 Unsolicited card 
 
Where an issuer sends a new card to a person without his prior request the card is 
considered an unsolicited card. Although this situation rarely happen in 
Singapore because the regulations of the MAS prohibit the issuance of unsolicited 
credit and charge cards by banks and financial institutions129 the situation 
deserves some attention because the regulations only affect banks and financial 
institutions. Theoretically, unsolicited card may still be issued by a non-bank 
entity130.  
 
                                                        
128 Regulation 2(1), Banking (Credit card and Charge card) Regulations 2004 defined credit 
card as “any article, whether in physical or electronic form, of a kind commonly known as a 
credit card or charge card or any similar article intended for use in purchasing goods or 
services on credit”. 
129 Regulation 7, Banking (Credit Card and Charge Card) Regulation 2004. 
130 The question whether the issuance of credit, charge card, debit card necessarily requires 
any licence will be discussed further in chapter V. 
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(a) Contractual relationship 
 
The analysis in section 1.1(d) in chapter II shows that in case of unsolicited card 
the contract between the card-recipient and the issuer may or may not exist, 
depending on the circumstances. First, the contract may be formed if the 
recipient confirmed his acceptance of the issuer’s offer or simply use the card and 
settle the monthly bills. Secondly, if there were no express or implied acceptance, 
but the entire circumstance satisfies the requirements to put the recipient under a 
positive duty to speak131, his silence may be tantamount to a representation, 
which operates to estop him from denying the fact that he has accepted the offer 
from the issuer. Thirdly, if the recipient were under no duty to speak, his silence 
may not constitute acceptance.  
 
If a contract existed between the recipient and the issuer, on the terms of the 
standard cardholder agreement, the rights and obligation between him and the 
issuer would be the same as the case of solicited card. We will analyze this 
situation in section 3.2 below.  
 
If the contract was not formed, the relationship between them may be 
characterized as a bailment of the card, because there was a transfer of possession 
of the plastic, a personal chattel, to the recipient. In this case, the card-recipient 
may be liable to the issuer, not on the terms of the cardholder agreement, but on 
other grounds such as breach of implied terms of bailment, negligence in taking 
care of the card, conversions or conspiracy. We will consider this question in the 
next section. 
                                                        
131 Such as in the case of Midlink Development Pte Ltd v The Stansfield Group Pte Ltd,  





As a tangible chattel, in appropriate circumstances the plastic card may give the 
issuer a cause of action against the card-recipient in conversion. The most 
obvious case of conversion arise where the recipient destroyed the card or refused 
to return the card to the issuer because, as a bailee, he is not allowed to destroy 
the card and obliged to return the card to the issuer upon his demand132. 
However, the more interesting case arises where the card-recipient did not 
destroy the card but dealt with it in a manner, which may also amount to 
conversion. This is due to the special characteristics of the card. 
 
The credit card is special in that it is almost useless as a piece of plastic, which 
may be used to play guitar or scratch ice on the car windshield in winter but when 
activated, can be used as a device of identification and a powerful means of 
payment. While a credit card is clearly not a document of title or an instrument 
with some value embedded in it like a negotiable instrument, it does carry with it 
certain intangible purchasing power that cannot be ignored. The 18th Report 
(1971) of the Law Reform Committee of Britain on conversion and detinue placed 
‘bank and other credit card’ in the category of ‘token’ along with ship, rail, air 
tickets, theatre and luggage tickets, travelers’ cheques, club membership cards, 
car log books, book tokens, trading coupons, stamps and gaming chips133. It is 
interesting to see how the law of conversion may be adapted to protect the rights 
of the owner of these items of little intrinsic value but may be considerable 
intangible value. Secondly, there are cases and commentaries suggesting that 
                                                        
132 Mitchell v. Ealing London B.C. [1979] Q.B. 1. 
133 Cmnd 4774 at para 91, Chairman Lord Pearson. 
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conduct other than the physical destruction of the card may constitute 
conversion. There are cases in respect of conversion of cheques, documents of 
title or tokens, which suggest that conducts other than total destruction of such 
items may constitute conversion. In the Canadian case of Borden Chemical Co. 
(Canada) Ltd v. J.G. Beukers Ltd134 a creditor who was handed a list of customers 
as part of a charge over book debt, used the contact information stored in the list 
to conduct its own marketing campaign. The creditor’s act was held to constitute 
conversion even though the list was not physically destroyed or impaired and its 
return to the owner was not entirely necessary. The level of damages granted in 
this case was not only the value of the converted property, but also the damages 
for its detention and usage. Professor Palmer, in his excellent book on the law of 
bailment regarded the approach taken in the Borden case as a ‘desirable’ 
approach to adapt the tort of conversion to accommodate new and unusual 
circumstances. If the court follows this approach in a case of an unsolicited card, 
it may be possible to hold a card-recipient liable in conversion if he did not 
destroy the card, but uses the card in some way that causes financial loss to the 
issuer (e.g. use the card number for internet transaction or simply show the 
number to a third party). However, there has been some doubt raised as to the 
court’s readiness to apply conversion in such a flexible manner135:  
 
“But there are limits to its efficacy and it seems unlikely that a court would 
readily characterize every misuse of intellectual or economic property 
as a conversion of the document which symbolises or contains it. To do so would 
involve the artificiality not only of equating the intangible benefits of a 
document with the material personality of that document itself, but of asserting 
                                                        
134 (1973) 29 D.L.R. (3d) 337, Supreme Court of British Columbia. 
135 N.E. Palmer, “Bailment”, 2nd Edition at page 231-232, emphasis added. 
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that conduct which may involve no physical touching or impairment of 
that document (for example, allowing a third party to look at it) can of itself 
constitute conversion. In the absence of any specific principle of restitution, it 
may be preferable to construct the plaintiff’s remedy around the 
terms, both expressed and implied, or the bailment under which the document 
was originally delivered and to hold that any loss sustained by the bailor, as a 
result of a breach of that bailment is recoverable from the bailee”. 
 
In the dearth of authority directly on the point, it is not certain what course of 
action of the card-recipient constitutes conversion of an unsolicited card. It is, 
however, worthwhile to note that there is a possibility to hold the recipient of an 
unsolicited card liable based on the adaptation of the tort of conversion to the 
category of chattel known as token. The next question is what kind of damages 
may be recoverable by the issuer. 
 
Many cases in respect of conversion of cheque, negotiable instrument and 
document of title suggest that the bailors of such instruments have been entitled 
not only to sue for the value of a piece of paper but also to recover as damages the 
interest represented by the instrument136. It has been accepted in a textbook on 
tort that “in all actions for a conversion the plaintiff may recover, in addition to 
the value of the property or of his interest in it, any additional damage which he 
may have sustained by reason of the conversion which is not too remote.”137 The 
18th Report of the Law Reform Committee on conversion and detinue, cited 
above, suggests that “the true measure of damages in respect of a token may 
vary according to the circumstances from a face value to a trivial cost of 
                                                        
136 For example Lloyd’s Bank Ltd v. Chartered Bank of India etc. [1929] 1 K.B. 40. For many 
other cases see note 98 at page 228, N.E. Palmer, “Bailment”, 2nd Edition. 
137 Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Tort, 21st Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, at page 115. 
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replacing the token itself”. Based on these authorities, it is possible to suggest 
that, if an issuer of unsolicited credit cards succeeded in proving the recipient’s 
act constitutes conversion, it may be entitled to recover damages beyond the 
production cost of the plastic. 
 
The limitation of the approach based on conversion is that “there can only be 
conversion of a chattel, and not of an intangible thing” 138. The tort of conversion 
does not apply to virtual card. The adaptation of the tort of conversion to cover 
misuse not of the physical card, but of the information contained in it is doubtful. 
As suggested by Professor Palmer, the preferred alternative is to construct the 
issuer’s liability on the terms of the bailment under which the card was delivered 
and to base the card-recipient’s liability for loss sustained by the issuer on breach 
of that bailment instead of conversion. We will look at the recipient’s obligations 
as a bailee in the next sections. 
 
 (c) Bailment 
 
A recipient of an unsolicited card should be categorized as an involuntary bailee 
for no reward. The standards of care expected from an involuntary bailee appear 
to be lower than that of a voluntary bailee. The dicta in Hiort v. Bott 139 suggested 
that an involuntary bailee for no reward would be liable for gross negligence or 
deliberate injury, but would not be liable for mere negligence. Generally, gross 
negligence has been said to be no more than negligence with a vituperative 
epithet140. The involuntary bailee is not entitled to turn the property to the street, 
                                                        
138 R. v. Handsford (1974) 8 S.A.S.R. 164 at 169, per Bray C.J. 
139 (1874) L.R. 9 Ex. 86 
140 Wilson v. Brett (1843) 11 M.&W. 113 per Rolfe B. at 115. The determination of fixed 
standards of care for different types of case (similar to principle of diligentia quam suis rebus 
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but he needs not warehouse the goods received. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the 
cardholder is under an obligation to keep the unsolicited card under lock and key. 
In Elvin & Power Ltd v. Plummer Roddis Ltd it was held that “If persons were 
involuntary bailees and had done everything reasonable they were not liable to 
pay damages if something which they did resulted in the loss of the property” 141. 
A person who has received an unsolicited card is not required to make sure the 
card is not lost. He may not be held liable even if the card was lost or damage was 
caused to the issuer, if he has done everything reasonable without being put to 
unreasonable expenses and trouble. It seems that keeping the unsolicited card in 
an unlocked drawer or sending it by post instead of registered mail or courier 
should satisfy the standard of care of an involuntary bailee. 
 
Therefore, to succeed in an action against a recipient of unsolicited recipient the 
card issuer needs to prove that the recipient was grossly negligent or deliberately 
caused damage to the issuer. If the recipient gave the card to a third party, he may 




In case a recipient of an unsolicited card gave the card to a third party, he may be 
liable for the tort of conspiracy in appropriate circumstances. As the predominant 
purpose of using the card would be for the benefit of the cardholder and/or the 
party to whom the card was given, not to injure the issuer, the circumstance 
seems to fit in the category of ‘conspiracy to use unlawful means’ rather than 
                                                                                                                                                               
in Roman law) is no longer a technique used by English law, see Houghland v. R.R. Low 
(Luxury Coaches) Ltd. [1962] 1 Q.B. 694 per Ormerod L. J. at 698. 
141 (1933) 50 T.L.R. 158 per Bramwell J. at 90. 
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‘conspiracy to injure’142. The tort of conspiracy requires the ‘combination’ 
between the conspirators with a common intention. Thus if the cardholder gave 
the card to another person asking the person to keep the card for him a 
conspiracy would not arise. If the cardholder and the other person agree with 
each other to use the card in some ways, a ‘combination’ may be said to exist. The 
usage of the card needs to constitute an ‘unlawful means’ to enable the action in 
conspiracy. Cases in respect of the tort of conspiracy suggest that an act, which a 
defendant is not at liberty to commit, such as breach of contract or intentional 
misuse of confidential information, would constitute an ‘unlawful means’143. The 
act of allowing a third party to use the card to make payment, thus causing 
financial loss to the issuer seems to satisfy the requirement of unlawful means. 
The onus of proof for the combination of the alleged conspirators is on the 
plaintiff. In case of unsolicited credit card, it seems very difficult for an issuer to 
prove both the unlawful acts and the combination between the card-recipient and 
the party that used the card. Where the plaintiff can prove that the unlawful acts 
were done in a conspiracy, the burden of justifying the acts would pass to the 
defendant144. If it is necessary to base on a breach of a penal statute as ‘unlawful 
means’, it is necessary to show that the statute, on its proper construction afford 
the plaintiff a civil action145. The tort of conspiracy is an alternative to hold the 
recipient of unsolicited card liable for use of the card by third party that seems 
more difficult to use. Where it is not possible to prove a combination, the issuer 
may fall back to conversion or breach of duty of an involuntary bailee.  
 
                                                        
142 We follow the classification of conspiracy adopted in Clerk & Lindsell on Tort, 17th Edition, 
Sweet & Maxwell 1995 at 23-76, page 1267. 
143 Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd v. Cousins [1969] 2 Ch. 106, per Lord Denning at 139. Rookes v. 
Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, House of Lords. 
144 Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. Ltd. v. Veitch [1942] A.C. 435. 
145 Lornho Ltd v. Shell Petroleum Co. (No. 2) 1982 A.C. 173, House of Lord per Lord Diplock 
and Metall und Rohstoff A.G. v. Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc [1990] 1 Q.B. 391, Court of 
Appeal. See detail discussion in “Clerk & Lindsel on Tort”, 17th Ed., 1995 at para 23-81.  
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3.2 Solicited card 
 
Where an issuer sends a card to a person in response to his application for a 
credit, debit or charge card, the card is a solicited card. As soon as the card is 
delivered to the card applicant, he becomes a bailee of the card. Where the card 
are lost or stolen or the card particulars were used by a third party to cause losses 
to the issuer, the issuer’s claim against the cardholder may theoretically base on:- 
 
(i) The cardholder’s breach of an express or implied term of the contract of 
bailment between them; 
 
(ii) The cardholder’s breach of a duty of care imposed on a bailee; or 
 
(iii) The cardholder’s committing the tort of conversion or conspiracy. 
 
As discussed in section 1.1(d) in chapter I, the issuer’s act of sending the card in 
response to the request contained in the card application may constitute either an 
offer or an acceptance of the applicant’s offer. In the latter case, a contract is 
formed even if the card never reaches the applicant. Even if the issuance of the 
card only constitutes an offer, when the card is delivered to the applicant it is 
likely that a contract will be formed between them. The application for the card 
lends weight to the argument that imposes on the card-applicant a duty to speak 
if he no longer wishes to continue with a contractual relationship with the issuer. 
The card-applicant’s act of keeping the card, even without any confirmation with 
the issuer would constitute acceptance resulting in the standard cardholder 
agreement becoming binding upon him.  
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As discussed in section 3.1(b) above, to hold the cardholder liable for more than 
the production costs of the card based on the tort of conversion, it seems 
necessary to establish that either the cardholder deliberately used the card or its 
particulars for his own benefits; or that the cardholder allowed a third party to 
possess the card or the card particular. If that can be proved, it would be more 
convenient and probably easier to construct the issuer’s claim based on the terms 
of the cardholder agreement. The analysis in section 2 above shows that based on 
principles of agency the cardholder would be liable where the card is used by 
himself or a third party with his consent. Similarly, to hold the cardholder liable 
for the tort of conspiracy it is necessary to establish elements of combination to 
use unlawful means. While that is possible, since giving the card or its particular 
to a third party to use may be prohibited under the terms of the cardholder 
agreement, something the cardholder is not at liberty to do, it appears more 
convenient to base the issuer’s claim on contract rather than tort in this case. The 
tort of conspiracy and conversion, therefore, is not practically applicable to the 
situation of unauthorized use of solicited cards. 
 
The contract between the issuer and the cardholder is not primarily a contract of 
bailment. The cardholder is liable to the issuer for unauthorized transactions 
under this contract in more than one way. For example, by the application of 
apparent authority doctrine, as seen in section 2 above or by the effect of a risk 
shifting clause, which we will look at in section 5 below. Here, we are concerned 
with the cardholder’s liability as a contractual bailee of the card. 
 
The bailment should be categorized as a gratuitous bailment because the 
cardholder receives no reward for keeping the card. The cardholder agreement 
usually stipulates that (i) the card remains the property of the issuer and must be 
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returned upon demand by the issuer; (ii) the cardholder must sign the card 
immediately upon receipt unless he wishes to return the card to the issuer; (iii) 
the cardholder must not give the card to a third party; and (iv) the cardholder 
must inform the issuer immediately after the card is lost or stolen. If the 
cardholder is in breach of any of these express terms, the issuer will certainly be 
entitled to sue in contract. However, unauthorized transactions and 
consequential loss to the issuer may still occur even if the cardholder is not in 
breach of any express terms. For example, the cardholder may be careless in 
keeping the card and, as a result, the card or the card particulars were stolen and 
used to effect an unauthorized transaction. In this case, the issuer’s claim, if any, 
may be based on a duty of care owed by the cardholder either by an implied term 
of the bailment contract or a general duty imposed on a bailee. 
 
Principles of bailment law require that a bailee must take reasonable care of the 
bailed goods. If the goods is damaged, lost or stolen, the onus of proof is on the 
bailee to show that he was not negligent in his care of the bailed goods. The 
problem is that in case of credit card the issuer is not interested in damage made 
to the card, but the loss caused by the unauthorized use of the card or its 
particulars. It is, therefore, important to ascertain the standard of care imposed 
on the cardholder. 
 
The standard of care generally depends on the circumstances. The fact that the 
bailment is gratuitous is a relevant circumstance, but the standard of care 
expected from a gratuitous bailee is not necessarily lower than that imposed on a 
bailee for rewards146. The standard of care is usually said to depend on two 
factors, the nature of the bailed goods and the manner in which the bailee keeps 
                                                        
146 Houghland v. R. R. Low (Luxury Coaches) Ltd [1962] 1 Q.B. 694, 698.  
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his own things. If the cardholder keeps the card together with his other payment 
cards, he should be considered taking adequate care of the card. In the normal 
practice of using credit cards, the cards are usually given to the merchants and 
their servants and the particulars may be given across telephone conversation or 
internet. During this process, the card particulars are entirely visible to all and 
may be recorded easily by others without the cardholder’s knowledge or consent. 
Therefore, the duty of care of the cardholder should not include protecting the 
card particulars in a way so that it will not be revealed to any other person. In any 
event, the cardholder duty of care should end as soon as his notice that the card 
was lost, or that he no longer wishes to use the card reaches the issuer. The 
reason is that the issuer has the option, by technological power to disable the 
usability of any card for purpose of making payment almost instantly upon a 
notice by the cardholder.  
 
It is, therefore, submitted that, if the issuer claim is based on the terms of the 
contract of bailment, whether expressed or implied, the cardholder’s liability 
should be limited to (i) the production costs of the card, if it is destroyed, lost or 
stolen and no unauthorized transaction occurred before the cardholder notice of 
lost card reached the issuer; or (ii) consequential loss due to unauthorized 
transaction occurred before the cardholder notice of lost card reached the issuer 
or if the cardholder gave the card to others.  
 
If the issuer claim is based on the tort of negligence, the issuer has more chance of 
success where the card is lost and the cardholder failed to give prompt notice to 
the issuer of such loss. The damage caused to the issuer in this case is economic 
loss consequential upon the loss of physical property, namely the card, a head of 
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damage recoverable in the tort of negligence147. In case the card is not lost but the 
card particulars are stolen and used to effect unauthorized transactions, it is 
submitted that the issuer is not likely to succeed because (i) the loss is a pure 
economic loss not directly inflicted by the cardholder or immediately caused by 
the loss of the card (the card was not lost); and (ii) the cardholder may not owe 
the issuer a duty of care to protect the card particulars. We will come back to the 
issue of cardholder liability in negligence and the recoverability of economic loss 




The analysis in this section 3 shows that by characterizing the cardholder as a 
bailee of the physical card, it is possible to apply certain rules of law protecting 
personal chattel to clarify the question of cardholder’s liability. The application of 
these rules appears most useful in case of unsolicited cards that were not accepted 
by recipients. The application of the bailment characterization, however, is 
dependent upon the cardholder having possession of the card. It fails to apply to 
the case where the card get lost before reaching the cardholder (for both solicited 
and unsolicited cards) and where the card was not lost but the particulars was 







                                                        




4.1 The doctrines of estoppel 
 
Although estoppel is generally regarded as an evidentiary doctrine that does not 
create substantive rights148, it is relevant to the analysis of liability for 
unauthorized card transaction. In previous parts of this paper, we have 
mentioned the doctrines of estoppel several times in the analysis on liability for 
unauthorized card transaction. In respect of the making of the contract between 
the issuer and the cardholder, certain circumstances may give rise to a duty to 
speak of the card-applicant and his silence after receiving a card may constitute a 
representation that estops him from denying the state of fact that a contract has 
been formed149. In respect of a transaction effected by an agent of the cardholder 
with apparent authority it was argued that certain acts of the cardholder may 
constitute a representation to the issuer that later estops him from denying the 
existence of an agency relationship between him and the carduser. The doctrine 
of apparent authority so closely resembles estoppel that it was said to be a form of 
estoppel150. We have even come across the notion of agency by estoppel in section 
2.3 above, where it was said that agency by estoppel is not agency but a form of 
estoppel. Therefore, it is thought that a more systematic analysis of the possible 
application of the doctrines of estoppel may be helpful.  
 
Estoppel may be raised in various circumstances in a dispute between an issuer 
and a cardholder on the issue of liability for an unauthorized transaction, whether 
                                                        
148 We adopt the definitions and classification of estoppel by Sean Wilken and Theresa Villiers 
in  “Waiver, Variation and Estoppel”, New York, J. Wiley 1998. 
149 See Section 1.1(d) of chapter I above. 
150 See section 2.2(a) of chapter III above. 
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the card is a credit, debit or charge card. As with debit cards, a transaction, 
whether authorized or unauthorized may only occur if there is money standing to 
the credit of the card account. A cardholder may allege that a certain transaction 
was not authorized by him and because of that the issuer is not entitled to deduct 
the card account and the cardholder may sue the issuer to get his money back. In 
case of credit or charge card, the cardholder’s liability to reimburse the issuer 
only arises when the card statement is delivered to the cardholder. If the 
cardholder denies liability for certain alleged unauthorized transaction, the issuer 
may have to sue the cardholder to enforce his right under the cardholder 
agreement. In either case, the issuer may rely on estoppel to prevent the 
cardholder from denying his liability in respect of a card transaction. The 
cardholder may also rely on estoppel to prevent the issuer from charging a 
transaction to the card account in contradiction with a card statement previously 
issued to the cardholder. The first question is which of the species of estoppel 
applies here. 
 
Historically, estoppel was divided into three categories151: (i) estoppel by record, 
which covers the principles of res judicata which determines when parties will be 
bound by judgments in previous proceedings between them; (ii) estoppel by deed 
which operates to estop a party from adducing evidence contradicting a statement 
in a deed he executed and (iii) estoppel in pais. Estoppel in pais may be further 
divided into estoppel by convention, which originated in common law; and 
estoppel by representation, which originated in equity and subsequently 
recognized in common law. Estoppel in pais is now commonly regarded as 
including the equitable doctrines of promissory estoppel and proprietary 
                                                        
151 We adopt the classification of estoppel by Sean Wilken and Theresa Villiers, “Waiver, 
Variation and Estoppel”, 1998, Chapter 8, Section 8.002 to 8.006 at page 104-105. 
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estoppel. Estoppel in pais generally operates to prevent a party (‘the estopped 
party’) from denying: (i) the existence of a state of fact contradicting his previous 
representation (estoppel by representation);  (ii) the existence of an assumption 
of fact or of law shared between the parties (estoppel by convention); (iii) the 
truth of a belief that the estopped party’s legal rights will not be enforced, which 
belief was formed or fortified by a conduct of the estopped party (promissory 
estoppel); or (iv) the truth of a belief that the party seeking to raise estoppel has 
or will obtain an interest or right over the property of the estopped party, which 
belief was formed or fortified by a conduct of the estopped party (proprietary 
estoppel or estoppel by acquiescence). From this brief description, it appears 
that, among the various species of estoppel, estoppel by record, estoppel by deed, 
promissory estoppel and proprietary estoppel are not relevant in the analysis of 
liability for unauthorized credit transaction. The only two doctrines that may be 
relevant are estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention, the 
application of which we will consider below. 
 
4.2 Estoppel by convention 
 
To apply the doctrine of estoppel by convention there are two requirements, the 
first of which is that there must be a shared assumption. “When the parties have 
acted in their transaction upon the agreed assumption that a given state of facts 
is to be accepted between them as true, then as regards that transaction each 
will be estopped against the other from questioning the truth of the statement of 
facts so assumed.”152. The conduct of the estopped party which creates a belief or 
expectation in the mind of the other party must be a “mutually manifest 
                                                        
152 Spencer Bower and Turner, Estoppel by Representation, 3rd ed. (1977), p. 157. 
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conduct”153, which if it is not the formation of contract must be “something very 
close to it”154. Estoppel by convention can arise out of conduct or silence155. The 
second requirement of estoppel by convention is that it must be unconscionable 
to allow one party to resile from the shared assumption156. 
 
The above requirement may be satisfied in the situations where a cardholder 
failed to inform the issuer of unauthorized transaction, the details of which were 
disclosed in a periodical statement of the card account, or where the cardholder 
failed to notify the issuer after the card was lost or stolen. In both situations, 
estoppel by convention may arise out of the cardholder’s silence based on the 
shared assumption that (i) all card transactions reflected in the statement were 
genuine if the cardholder did not raise a dispute after a period of time sufficient 
for him to find out about any fraudulent transactions; or that (i) the assumption 
that the card remains in the cardholder’s possession as long as no notice of its loss 
was received by the issuer. The cardholder’s silence led the issuer to believe that 
all the transactions are genuine. If the issuer relied on such assumption to act to 
its detriment, i.e. to make payment to the merchant, and/or caused the issuer to 
lose the opportunity to lodge a chargeback claim within prescribed time limit 
                                                        
153 K Lokumal & Sons (London) Ltd v Lotte Shipping Co Pte Ltd, The August Leonhardt 
[1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep 28, per Kerr LJ at 34-35: “... in cases of so-called estoppels by 
convention, there must be some mutually manifest conduct by the parties which is based on 
a common but mistaken assumption.”. The requirement has been accepted as correct by 
Bingham LJ in The Vistafjord [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 343 at 351. 
154 The Indian Endurance (No 2) Republic of India and another v India Steamship Co Ltd 
[1996] 3 All ER 641, per Staughton LJ at 652e: “It appears to us to be the very least that can 
be required to constitute convention, which in this context must mean agreement or 
something very close to it.” 
155 The Indian Endurance (No 2) Republic of India and another v India Steamship Co Ltd 
[1996] 3 All ER 641, per Staughton LJ at 652e: “In our judgment it is essential that the 
assumption be agreed for there to be an estoppel by convention; but agreement need not be 
express and may be inferred from conduct, or even from silence.” 
156 Furness Withy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Metal Distributors (UK) Ltd, The Amazonia [1990] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 236 at per Dillon LJ at 251: “The modern formulation of the question to be asked 
where there is a question of estoppel by convention is that the Court should ask whether in 
the particular circumstances it would be unconscionable for a party to be permitted to deny 
that which knowingly or unknowingly he has allowed or encouraged another to assume to 
his detriment.” 
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(usually 6 months), then it would be unconscionable to allow the cardholder to 
deny liability to repay the issuer for the card transaction. The fact that estoppel by 
convention may apply where the terms of a contract signed between the parties is 
replaced by a subsequent shared assumption157 does not prevent estoppel by 
convention to apply in the case where the parties do not deviate from the 
contract, as in the case of credit card considered here. 
 
4.3 Estoppel by representation 
 
To establish an estoppel by representation it is necessary to show that a 
representation was made by the party sought to be estopped. There is authority 
supporting this requirement: “… estoppel normally depends upon the existence of 
a representation by one party, in reliance upon which the representee has so 
changed his position that it is inequitable for the representor to go back upon his 
representation.”158 It has also been held that the representation must be clear and 
unequivocal159 or alternatively that the representation must be clear, unqualified, 
precise and unambiguous160. The requirement as to the content of a 
representation was further refined by the House of Lord in Woodhouse AC Israel 
Cocoa Ltd v. Nigerian Produce Marketing Co Ltd, where it was held that it was 
not necessary to show that the representation was capable of only one possible 
                                                        
157 Amalgamated Investment & Property Co. Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Texas Commerce 
International Bank Ltd [1982] QB 84, Per Lord Denning M.R. at: “When the parties to a 
contract are both under a common mistake as to the meaning or effect of it - and thereafter 
embark on a course of dealing on the footing of that mistake - thereby replacing the original 
terms of the contract by a conventional basis on which they both conduct their affairs, then 
the original contract is replaced by the conventional basis. The parties are bound by the 
conventional basis. Either party can sue or be sued upon it just as if it had been expressly 
agreed between them.” 
158 Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 AC 548 per Lord Goff at 578. 
159 Sidney Bolsom Investment Trust Ltd. v. E. Karmios & Co. (London) Ltd [1956] 1 QB 529, 
CA per Denning L.J. at 540; Lowe v. Lombank [1960] 1 WLR 196, CA per Diplock J. at 205. 
160 Canada and Dominion Sugar Company, Limited v. Canadian National (West Indies) 
Steamships, Limited [1947] AC 46 at 56.  
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interpretation161. It was sufficient if any interpretation, other than that formed by 
the representee was far fetched and strained162. The representation had to be 
sufficiently clear to justify the representee’s having no doubt what the words 
meant what it took them to mean163.  
 
The issuer may succeed to estop the cardholder from denying the liability for 
unauthorized card transaction based on the cardholder’s failure to dispute a 
certain transaction or to inform the issuer of lost or stolen card if it can show that 
the cardholder has made a representation to it by words or conduct. This may be 
an alternative to the doctrines of implied or apparent authority discussed in 
section 2 above. The problem remains in cases where it is impossible or difficult 
to prove the existence of a representation. In this case, the issuer may have to 
establish a representation either by silence or by negligence. 
 
Cases in which a representation may be deemed to have been made by passive 
conduct or silence are often referred to as estoppel by silence or estoppel by 
acquiescence. The term estoppel by acquiescence is usually used to denote a 
proprietary estoppel case, which is not relevant to our analysis of unauthorized 
transaction. What we are concerned with here is when an estoppel by 
representation case can be made out of a party’s silence. In the case of Moorgate 
Mercantile Co Ltd v Twitchings, Lord Wilberforce held that: “In order that 
silence or inaction may acquire a positive content it is usually said that there 
must be a duty to speak or to act in a particular way, owed to the 
person prejudiced ... What I think we are looking for here is an answer to the 
question whether, having regard to the situation in which the relevant 
                                                        
161 [1972] AC 741, per Lord Salmon at 771. 
162 Per Lord Hailsham L.C. at 756. 
163 Per Lord Cross at 768. 
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transaction occurred, as known to both parties, a reasonable man, in the 
position of the "acquirer" of the property, would expect the "owner" acting 
honestly and responsibly, if he claimed any title in the property, to take steps to 
make that claim known to, and discoverable by, the ‘acquirer’ and whether, in 
the face of an omission to do so, the ‘acquirer’ could reasonably assume that no 
such title was claimed.”164 
 
In Pacol Ltd v Trade Lines Ltd (The Henrik Sif)165, the dictum of Lord 
Wilberforce was further refined into the following formula: “… the duty necessary 
to raise an estoppel by silence or acquiescence arise where a reasonable man 
would expect person against whom the estoppel is raised, acting honestly and 
responsibly to bring the true facts to the attention of the other party known 
by him to be under a mistake as to their respective rights.” The Pacol test was 
approved in subsequent decisions and has been generally accepted as a correct 
statement of the law166.  
 
Applying the Pacol test to the situation of unauthorized card transaction, the duty 
to speak of the cardholder may be inferred from the circumstances of the case and 
the relationship of the parties but not necessary from a pre-existing duty in tort or 
contract. However, it is necessary to show that the cardholder knew or suspected 
of a mistake in the belief of the issuer. In other words, the cardholder must have 
known or suspected that the unauthorized transaction occurred or that the card 
was lost or its particulars stolen. As the test seems to refer to actual, not 
constructive knowledge, if the cardholder was actually unaware of the fact that 
                                                        
164 [1976] 2 All ER 641 at 645-646, [1977] AC 890 at 903. 
165 [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep 456, per Webster J. 
166 The Stolt Loyalty [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 281, The Indian Endurance (No 2) Republic of 
India and another v India Steamship Co Ltd [1996] 3 All ER 641. See also Wilken & Villiers, 
“Waiver, Variation and Estoppel”, 1998, at section 8.061. 
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the unauthorized transaction occurred or the card was stolen, it is not possible to 
impose on him a duty to speak in order to establish estoppel by representation. 
 
There have been a number of cases in which a representation was inferred from 
negligence. Such cases are usually referred to as estoppel by negligence. We will 
consider this doctrine in the next section. 
 
4.4 Estoppel by negligence 
 
To establish estoppel by neglicence it is necessary to show that: (i) the representor 
owes a duty of care to the representee; (ii) the representor negligently failed to 
perform the duty167; (iii) the representor’s negligence has led the representee to 
believe a state of facts168; and (iv) the negligence was the proximate cause of loss 
to the representee. Where estoppel by negligence is established the representor 
will be estopped from denying the state of facts that the representee was led to 
believe. Some authorities suggest that only duty-breach-damage will suffice169. To 
apply estoppel by negligence the most difficult task is to determine when a duty of 
care will be imposed in the absence of any established principle to do so. 
 
The doctrine of estoppel by negligence has been applied in the context of banking 
law in the case of London Joint Stock Bank v. Macmillan170. The House of Lords 
held that a customer owed a duty to his bank to exercise reasonable care in 
drawing a cheque to prevent the bank being misled. If the customer’s negligence 
in drawing the cheque led the bank to believe the instruction contained in the 
                                                        
167 The requirements (i), (ii) and (iv) was laid down in Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v. 
Twitchings [1977] AC 890 per Lord Fraser at 924 and per Lord Salmon at 912. 
168 Dixon v. Kennaway & Co [1900] 1 Ch 833 per Farwell J. at 238. 
169 Mercantile Credit v. Hamblin [1965] 2 Q.B. 242, per Pearson L.J. at 271. 
170 [1918] AC 777. 
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cheque was valid, which result in the bank’s loss, the customer would be estopped 
from denying the validity of the payment instructions and the liability incurred 
after it. This suggests that estoppel by negligence is potentially applicable to the 
situation of unauthorized credit card transactions.  
 
Whether a cardholder owes a duty of care to the issuer remains a question. In 
section 5 below we will consider the possibility of establishing such a duty of care 
in connection with the tort of negligence. What we are concerned with here is 
whether it is necessary or useful to use the doctrine of estoppel by negligence to 
determine the question of liability for unauthorized transaction. We suspect that 
that is not the case. 
 
Estoppel by negligence itself is a controversial concept that has caused 
considerable difficulty. In Greenwood v. Martins Bank Ltd, Greer L.J. has said, 
“Estoppel by negligence is representation of fact by conduct, and if it is right to 
infer representation from conduct, it must have the same effect as 
representation by direct statement.” 171 According to this analysis, estoppel by 
negligence may be considered a variant of estoppel by representation. However, 
the analysis by Greer L.J. is not conclusive because the application of estoppel by 
negligence does not seem to fit with the framework of either estoppel in general 
or estoppel by representation in particular. Wilken and Villiers172 commented that 
“estoppel by negligence is neither a valid legal principle nor one that falls within 
the law of estoppel or of estoppel by representation”. The reasons for this 
comments is that it is difficult to find neither any representation made or belief 
induced nor any intention or knowledge of the estopped party that the other 
                                                        
171 [1932] 1 KB 371, Court of Appeal per Greer L.J. at 388, the case was later confirmed by the 
House of Lords reported at [1933] AC 51. 
172 Wilken and Villiers, Waiver, Variation and Estoppel, 1998, at page 114. 
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party would act on its representation from the duty-breach-damage formula of 
estoppel by negligence. There is also difficulty ascertaining the content of the 
representation, necessary to establish estoppel. Furthermore, Wilken and 
Villiers173 also suggested another practical reason that “most, and probably all of 
the so-called estoppel by negligence cases are better explained by other legal 
principles”. According to this analysis, a case of estoppel by negligence in the 
context of banking law such as London Joint Stock Bank v. Macmillan may be 
interpreted in ways other than estoppel by negligence. Instead of establishing 
estoppel to prevent the customer from raising its claim against the bank for 
breach of the banking mandate, a better alternative is to hold that the bank has a 
claim for damages of the same amount arise from the customer’s breach of duty 
in contract or tort, hence the customer’s claim fails for circuity of action174. 
Another alternative is to hold that the bank was entitled to an indemnity under 
the mandatory relationship with the customer, which would operate to protect 
the bank in case the customer was in breach of his duty. The indemnity would 
equal and defeat the customer’s claim in the same way as circuity does.  
 
Several arguments against the above suggestion have been canvassed175. The most 
relevant of such arguments is that, it may be difficult to imply into the banking 
mandate a duty of the customer sufficient to create a cause of action in contract 
because of the more restrictive interpretation of the banking mandate under 
English law where customers are not obliged to examine bank statement176. 
However, a duty of care may exist in tort. If a duty of care can be established for 
the purposes of applying estoppel by negligence, it could be used as a basis in 
                                                        
173 Wilken and Villiers, Waiver, Variation and Estoppel, 1998, at page 114. 
174 The alternative view was taken by Lord Finlay at 811, [1918] AC 777. 
175 See page 436 – 438, Wilken and Villiers, Waiver, Variation and Estoppel, 1998. 
176 Tai Hing Cotton Mill v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80 per Lord Scarman at 
106E-7A 
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actionable negligence as well. The formula for estoppel by negligence is almost 
indistinguishable from actionable negligence. It has been suggested that, because 
negligent misstatement was recognized as a possible basis for estoppel long 
before it was recognized as a basis for actionable tort, perhaps, the duty of care 
required for estoppel is more limited than in tort177. This is, however, only a 
suggestion and there is no authority defining the difference in the extent of duty 
of care required for each doctrine. 
 
For the purposes of our analysis relating to unauthorized card transaction, it is 
submitted that the analysis of duty-breach-damage formula should better be 





The requirements for establishing the issuer’s cause of action against the 
cardholder in the tort of negligence is not much different to the requirements for 
estoppel by negligence (if any). The formula includes three basic elements of duty 
of care, negligent conduct, and proximate loss sustained by the issuer. Additional 
attention is also required as to the question whether the issuer’s loss, which is 
likely a pure economic loss, is a recoverable head of damage. 
 
5.1 Duty of care of the cardholder 
 
To hold the cardholder liable for negligence it is necessary to establish a duty of 
care to the issuer first. To determine whether the cardholder has a duty of care 
                                                        
177 C.Y. Lee, Law of Consumer Credit, 1990 at page 91. 
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and the  extent of such duty it is necessary to look at who he is or what the law 
consider him to be in the relationship with the issuer. The most tempting analogy 
to establish the cardholder’s duty of care is found in banking law. 
 
(a)  Duty of care by analogy with banking law  
 
It has been suggested in a book on credit card law that, in the absence of any 
authority exactly on the point, the duty of care of the credit cardholder can be 
established by analogy with the relationship between banks and customers178. 
Cases in respect of banking law have established that the duty of a bank’s 
customer includes (i) the duty to exercise reasonable care in drawing cheques to 
prevent the banker from being misled179; (ii) the duty to notify the bank when 
suspicious circumstances arise180. The duty to prevent forgery has been held to 
include not leaving unusual blank spaces in cheques181 and giving reasonable 
assistance for the bank to recover against forgers182. However, the customer’s 
duty is not extended to verifying all bank statements unless he is bound by 
contractual terms to do so183. 
 
If an analogy can be validly drawn here, the cardholder would have a duty not to 
behave in such a way as to facilitate forgery; to sign new card upon receipt from 
                                                        
178 Peter E. Sayer, “Credit Cards and The Law, an Introduction” (1988). 
179 London Joint Stock Bank Ltd v. Macmillan and Arthur [1918] AC 777 which approved and 
applied Young v. Grote (1827) 4 Bing. 253, 130 ER 764 
180 Greenwood v. Martins Bank Ltd [1932] 1 KB 371, CA. 
181 London Joint Stock Bank Ltd v. Macmillan and Arthur [1918] AC 777 per Lord Finlay at 
810. But, if the cheque was properly drawn except for one space there may be no breach, per 
Viscount Haldane at 814-815. 
182 Fung Kai Sun v Chan Fui Hing [1951] AC 489, PC at 506. Customer will be in breach of his 
duty of care if his silence gives the forger the chance to escape provided the customer was 
aware of the potential forgery. 
183 Tai Hing Cotton Mill v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80 per Lord Scarman at 
106E-7A. But, according to Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v. Bank of Montreal (1981) 122 DLR 
(3d) 519, if the customer is a sophisticated commercial entity that is expected to monitor its 
finances strictly, it is under a duty to do so, per Mongomery J. at 532. 
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the issuer; to inform the issuer if he knew or suspect that unauthorized 
transactions occurs; and to give the issuer reasonable assistance to recover 
against unauthorized card users; but not necessarily to be obliged to check card 
statements. If the cardholder is in breach of any of these duties, he may be liable 
for the loss sustained by the issuer.  
 
However, there is no authority suggesting that an analogy can be validly drawn 
between the duty of a cheque book holder and a credit cardholder. Reasonable 
doubt has been raised as to the validity of such an analogy for the main reason 
that the nature of relationship between the parties is significantly different184. 
Therefore, we need to look into the reasons behind the duty of care of a cheque 
book holder to find an answer. In Young v. Grote185, a case decided nearly 200 
years ago, a customer was held liable to the bank for gross negligence in issuing 
cheque in a manner that facilitated forgery. In Scholfield v. The Earl of 
Londesborough186, the House of Lords carefully distinguished the duty of an 
acceptor of a bill of exchange to take precautions against fraudulent alterations in 
the bill after acceptance and the duty of care owed by a customer to his bank in 
drawing cheque. Lord Davey expressed his entire agreement with Lord Watson’s 
judgment, and said: "I only desire to say that, in my opinion, our judgment in 
this case is outside the case of Young v Grote (1). The doctrine of that case was 
one arising out of the relation of mandant and mandatory, which does 
                                                        
184 C.Y. Lee, “Law on Consumer Credit” (1990) at page 91-92. 
185 Court of Common Pleas, (1827) 4 Bing. 253, 130 ER 764. In this case, when leaving the 
home for a few days, Mr Young left with his wife five blank cheques signed by him. Mrs. 
Young delivered one cheque to her clerk, Worcester who filled up the amount of 50 pounds 2s 
3d. Worcester filled the cheque up with several blank spaces allowing him to later insert 
numbers and letters to increase the amount to 350 pounds 2s 3d. Best CJ. (at 259, Park J. 
Burrough J. and Gaselle J. agreed with Best CJ’s judgment) found that Mrs. Young was 
grossly negligent in the manner in which she had the cheque filled up. Her neglection of 
ordinary precautions induces the bankers to pay. Therefore, Mr. Young was liable to the 
banker for the loss. 
186 [1896] A.C.514(H.L.). 
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not exist in the pass of the acceptor and holder of a bill of exchange." In the more 
recent case of London Joint Stock Bank Ltd v. Macmillan and Arthur187, the 
House of Lords, again, placed heavy emphasis on the mandate as the sole basis of 
the bank’s customer’s duty of care. Lord Finlay LC. Cited the above passage of 
Lord Davey’s judgment and said: “The relation between banker and customer is 
that of debtor and creditor, with a superadded obligation on the part of the 
banker to honour the customer's cheques if the account is in credit. A cheque 
drawn by a customer is in point of law a mandate to the banker to pay the 
amount according to the tenor of the cheque. It is beyond dispute that the 
customer is bound to exercise reasonable care in drawing the cheque to prevent 
the banker being misled. If he draws the cheque in a manner which facilitates 
fraud, he is guilty of a breach of duty as between himself and the banker, and he 
will be responsible to the banker for any loss sustained by the banker as a 
natural and direct consequence of this breach of duty”. From these authorities, it 
is safe to conclude that the customer’s duty of care in drawing cheques stemmed 
from the special mandant-mandatory relationship between the customer and the 
bank, not from a duty of general care at law. 
 
The nature of the relationship between a holder of credit, debit or charge card 
does not appear to be mandant-mandatory. In a typical swipe card transaction, 
the cardholder signs a transaction receipt which usually says ‘I hereby authorized 
you to charge the above transaction to my card account’. As discussed in chapter 
II, the transaction receipt is distinguishable from a cheque or negotiable 
instrument. When signing the transaction receipt the cardholder does not give 
any mandate to the issuer or the merchant. As most card transaction requires an 
‘approval’ from the issuer via the card network, neither the issuer nor the 
                                                        
187 [1918] AC 777. 
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merchant is bound to honor the card when presented by the cardholder. If a 
mandate is to exist at all, it is the mandate from the issuer to the merchant to 
honor the cards for the payment transaction that has been approved through the 
card network.  
 
Furthermore, as found in the Scholfield case, even the mandant-mandatory 
relationship between banker and customer does not give rise to a duty to keep the  
cheque book safe similar to the duty of an acceptor to safeguard a bill of 
exchange. It seems that the extent of the duty of a holder of a cheque book should 
be higher than the duty of the holder of a credit card, because a cheque may be a 
negotiable instrument when the credit card may not. A cheque requires the 
account holder’s real signature, it is not issued by a customer in case of forgery.  
In contrast, credit card transactions do not always require the cardholder’s 
signature. If a holder of a cheque book is not under a duty to safeguard the book, 
why should a cardholder have a duty to safeguard the card? 
 
In conclusion, while the authorities relating to bank’s customer’s duty of care may 
be a strong suggestion that there exists a duty of care by the cardholder towards 
the issuer, it is difficult to infer or ascertain the extent of the cardholder’s duty of 
care by analogy with the duty of a holder’s of bank’s chequebook. 
 
(b) Duty of care by analogy with travelers cheques and circular 
notes 
 
Because the analogy between the cardholder-issuer relationship and that of 
banker-customer is doubtful, it may be necessary to determine the extent of the 
cardholder’s duty of care by analogy with other instruments having similar 
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features. It has been suggested that the closest analogy with credit card is the 
travelers letter of credit but there is a dearth of authority in respect of the duty of 
care of holders of travelers letter of credit. The types of instruments having 
features most similar to the credit cards for which judicial decisions have been 
made in respect of their holder’s duty of care are circular notes and travelers 
cheque.  
 
It has been suggested that circular note is an interesting parallel to the credit 
card188. We will look into this suggestion even though the instrument has become 
obsolete. Similar to credit cards, circular notes are non-negotiable instruments 
issued by banks to travelers, which allow the holders to draw money from one of 
the correspondent banks by signing a draft printed on the back of the notes. The 
correspondent banks usually compare signature on the draft with the signature 
on the letter of indication, which is usually dispatched separately from the notes. 
To prevent forgery the holders of circular notes are required to affix signature on 
the letter of indication immediately after its issuance and before setting out 
abroad and keep the letter separate from the notes. The several authorities in 
respect of circular notes held that the holder’s breach of these requirements 
would estop the holder from a claim against the bank for loss arising from such a 
breach189. It was said that the requirements indicates certain duty of care of the 
holder implied in the contract between him and the issuer. 
 
The authorities on circular notes were not concerned with the duty of care of the 
holder to prevent loss or theft of the notes or whether the bank has a claim in 
negligence. In this respect, the analogy with traveler cheques seems to be more 
                                                        
188 C.Y. Lee, Law of Consumer Credit, 1990, page 92. 
189 Rhodes v. London and County Bank (1880) 1 Legal Decisions Affecting Bankers; Hume-
Dick v. Herries, Farquhar & Co (1888) 4 T.L.R. 541. 
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helpful. The term ‘travelers cheque’ is a misnomer because it is neither a cheque 
nor a negotiable instrument. Traveler cheques, issued by banks to travelers, 
essentially contain a conditional undertaking by the issuer to pay the specified 
amount to the holder if the signature affixed by the holder when he purchased the 
travelers cheques tally with the countersignature he executed when he cashes it. 
Because the issuer’s undertaking is conditional, the traveler cheques should not 
be considered a bill of exchange, a cheque or a promissory note, even though 
there is an American authority suggesting that the travelers cheques are to be 
regarded as negotiable instruments190. There are two English authorities on 
travelers cheques that are relevant to our enquiry herein, both authorities 
concerned with the issuer’s liability to give a refund to the holders for travelers 
cheques lost before the countersignature was affixed. In Braithwaite v Thomas 
Cook Travellers Cheques Ltd 191 the court gave effect to an express terms in the 
issuer-holder contract which made the holder’s rights to reimbursement 
conditional upon his exercise of the duty to “properly safeguard the cheques 
against loss or theft”. Schiemann J. refused the suggestion by the plaintiff’s 
counsel to base the analysis on the causal link between a failure to safeguard and 
the consequential loss. He instead considered that the conduct and behavior of 
the holder as a whole constitutes carelessness and based his judgment on a 
foreseeability test. In the subsequent case of El Awadi v Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International S.A. Ltd192 it was held that there were express or 
implied terms in the contract between the issuer and the holder of travelers 
cheques that obliges the bank to refund the value of lost or stolen travelers 
cheques. It was further found that, in the absence of an express term in the 
                                                        
190 Emerson v American Express Company, Municipal Court of Appeals of District of 
Columbia (United States of America), 6 Legal Decisions Affecting Bankers 337, per Cayton 
C.J. at 340. 
191 [1989] 1 QB 553, [1989] 1 All ER 235. 
192 [1989] 1 All ER 242. 
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contract, the holder was not liable for loss resulted from his negligence in 
safeguarding the cheques193. This ruling suggests that, generally, the holders of 
travelers cheques owe no duty to safeguard the instruments against loss or theft 
and a term to impose such duty of care may not be implied into the contract. 
 
The similarity between travelers cheques and credit card cannot be ignored. Both 
of them are not negotiable instruments and both contain an undertaking by the 
issuer to make payment to a third party, who honoured the instruments. The 
arrangement of both requires the holder to affix the specimen signature on the 
instrument immediately upon issuance and the payment by both instruments 
requires the countersignature to tally with the specimen signature. The difference 
that traveler cheques are paid in cash while credit card are generally used to pay 
for goods and services is not relevant for the purposes of our enquiry. If an 
analogy is to be drawn between travelers cheques and credit cards, the cardholder 
would not owe a duty to safeguard the card against loss or theft. The only duties 
that may be imposed on the cardholder, by analogy to both circular notes and 
travelers cheques, are to sign the new card immediately upon its issuance and to 
inform the issuer after the card is lost or stolen.  
 
(c) Duty of care as an agent for the issuer 
 
As discussed in chapter II, at the point of each card transaction there are three 
bilateral contracts made between the issuer, the cardholder and the merchant. 
                                                        
193 [1990] 1 QB 606 per Hutchison J. said “I consider that the contract contained an express 
term obliging the bank to refund the value of lost or stolen cheques”, and shortly after that he 
said: “If I am wrong in holding that there was an express term entitling the purchaser to a 
refund, I hold that there was an implied term. That term is subject to the same qualifications 
afforded by the discretionary right to resist a refund”, and “neither the fact of want of care 
or recklessness nor the bank's belief in their existence, offered the bank grounds for refusing, 
in its discretion, to make refunds” 
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The analysis at the beginning of this chapter have focused only on the 
relationship between the issuer and the cardholder. In respect of the issuer-
merchant relationship, our analysis in section 4.1. in chapter II showed that there 
were no contract between them before the cardholder presents the card to the 
merchant194. At the point of the card transaction a contract is made whereby the 
issuer undertakes to pay the merchant the transaction amount (less a certain 
discount) and in return the merchant provides goods or services to the 
cardholder. The issuer’s undertaking may be made in two different ways. In an 
‘online’ transaction, which is more common, the merchant sends a request from 
his computer or electronic data capture terminal to the issuer tagged with the 
card particulars and the transaction amount. The transaction can be effected only 
after an ‘approval’ signal for the specific transaction is received from the issuer 
via the electronic communication linkage. In this case, it is possible to infer from 
the circumstances that, by sending the approval signal, the issuer makes an 
undertaking directly to the merchant in respect of the particular card transaction. 
In variations of the ‘online’ method, where the merchant does not have a direct 
communication link with the acquirer, but he obtains the approval via telephone 
from the acquirer, the issuer’s undertaking is made via the acquirer who acts as 
an agent of the merchant. In contrast, where the transaction amount is below the 
merchant’s floor limit or it is impracticable to obtain approval from the issuer, 
‘offline’ method (e.g. imprinter) may be used. In this case, the issuer’s 
undertaking can be made only if the cardholder is considered an agent of the 
issuer in the dealing with the merchant. Unlike travelers cheques, which specifies 
                                                        
194 A contractual relationship may be established between the issuer and the acquirer because 
they are both submitted to the rules of the card association by analogy with the approach 
taken by English courts as to clubs in cases such as The Satanita [1895] P. 248 and Clarke v. 
Dunraven (Earl) [1897] A.C. 59. However, there is no pre-existing contractual link between 
the issuer and the merchant. 
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the amount on its face and an undertaking to pay, the card alone is not sufficient 
to constitute an undertaking without an act of the cardholder. 
 
Accordingly, the issuance of a credit, debit or charge card constitutes an 
appointment of the cardholder as an agent of the issuer authorized to make 
undertakings that, in appropriate circumstances (e.g. offline transactions), would 
become binding upon the issuer. Authorities in respect of a gratuitous agent 
impose on him the duty “that which may be reasonably expected of him in all the 
circumstances”195. Generally, factors relevant to determine the standard of care 
for a gratuitous agent are the skills and experience which he has or represented 
himself as having.  
 
While there is no authority to support the suggestion to determine the duty of the 
cardholder based on the characterization as an agent for the issuer, the suggestion 
remains a possible option. If the cardholder’s duty of care is to be founded on the 
basis that he is a gratuitous agent of the issuer, it might include the duty not to 
exceed the authority granted with the card and the duty to stop using the card and 
return it to the issuer upon request. When the cardholder exceeds his authority or 
continue to use the card in contravene with the issuer’s instructions or in breach 
of his duty he may be liable for any loss or damage suffered by the issuer. The 
liability may exist both in contract and in tort. There is an American authority 
suggesting that the cardholder must be liable for card transaction intentionally 
effected by him after he has given notice to terminate the use of the card and the 
issuer has demanded the return of the card196. In the English case of R.v. 
                                                        
195 Chaudhry v. Prabakhar [1989] 1 W.L.R. 29, Court of Appeal, per Stuart-Smith L.J. at 34 
and Stoker L.J. at 37. 
196 Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 P2d 73 (Utah 1983). The basis for the decision in 
the case was that the intentional use of the card constitutes a representation of apparent 
authority giving rise to authorized transaction for which the cardholder is fully liable pursuant 
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Lambie197, the House of Lords held that a cardholder who exceeded the credit 
limit and ignored the issuer’s demand to stop using the card was liable criminally 
for falsely representing to the merchant that she has authority to use the card.  
 
Where the cardholder gives the card or its particulars to a carduser, the carduser 
may be considered as a sub-agent of the issuer. In the absence of any notice to the 
issuer, the authority of the carduser as sub-agent) may be established by the 
application of apparent authority doctrine. The only difference is that, in this case 
the carduser’s apparent authority is created not by a representation by the 
principal (the issuer), but by an authorized agent (the cardholder). The apparent 
authority doctrine does not require that the person making the representation 
must be the principal as long as that person is “authorized in accordance with the 
law of agency.” However, an agent with apparent authority cannot, by his 
conduct give rise to apparent authority in a sub-agent198. Therefore, a carduser 
with apparent authority may not create apparent authority in a third party.  
 
Another alternative in establishing the cardholder’s duty of care, which has been 
explored in section 3.2 above, is by characterizing him as a bailee. It has been 
suggested that the cardholder, as a bailee, may be liable for loss resulting from his 
failure to give timely notice to the issuer when the card was lost or stolen. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
to the Consumer Credit Protection Act of the United States. However, it is submitted that had 
the decision been made in the absence of such a legislation, it could have been based on 
principle of agency.  
197 (1982). In this case the House of Lord applied Metropolitan Police Commissioner v. 
Charles (1977) to hold that Ms. Lambie has by conduct induced the deception that she was an 
agent of the issuer, Barclays Bank, authorized by them to enter into contract with the 
merchant’s on the bank’s behalf. 
198 Crabtree-Vickers Pty. Ltd. v. Australian Direct Mail Advertising and Addressing Co. Pty. 
Ltd (1975) 133 C.L.R. Chitty on Contract, 29th Edition, Volume 2, 31-056 at note 317. 
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(d)  Conclusion 
 
The above analysis is an attempt to establish the existence and extent of the duty 
of care owed by the holder to the issuer of credit card. In the absence of authority 
directly on the point, it is submitted that following duty may be imposed on the 
cardholder based on the above analysis: 
 
(i) The duty to sign the card immediately upon receipt from the issuer. This 
duty may be based on express contract term found in the cardholder 
agreement or as an implied term by analogy with circular notes and 
travelers cheques; 
 
(ii) The duty to inform the issuer within a reasonable period of time after the 
card is lost or stolen or when the cardholder knew or suspected that 
unauthorized transactions have occurred. This duty may be founded on 
the analogy with travelers cheques; 
 
(iii) The duty to not to exceed the card credit limit, to stop using the card and 
return it upon the issuer’s demand. This duty is founded on the 
characterization of the cardholder as a gratuitous agent for the issuer in 
the dealing with the merchant; and 
 
(iv) The duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent loss or theft of the card. 
This duty is based on the characterization of the cardholder as a gratuitous 
bailee of the card. 
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However, the cardholder’s standard of care should not extend to examining and 
verifying card statements and preventing the card particulars from being revealed 
to others, unless he is contractually bound to do so.  
 
5.2 Proximate loss and recovery of economic loss 
 
Our next enquiry relates to the loss suffered by the issuer and comprises three 
questions: (i) when the loss is caused to the issuer (ii) whether the loss can be said 
to be proximately caused by the cardholder’s breach of duty, and (iii) whether the 
issuer’s pure economic loss is recoverable. 
 
(a) Loss to the issuer 
 
There are two kinds of loss that may be suffered by the issuer, the production cost 
of the card and the financial loss due to the liability to pay or actual payment of 
money to the merchant. The loss attributed to the replacement of the card is very 
nominal. Recent technology advances allow issuers to manufacture a smart card 
for fractions of a dollar. In practice, after a cardholder terminates the use of a 
card verbally or in writing and the use of the card was deactivated from the 
computer system of the issuer the card is generally treated as a worthless piece of 
plastic. Some issuers require the cardholder to return the card cut in half while 
others only ask the cardholder to destroy the card. However, in case a card is lost 
or stolen and the cardholder failed to inform the issuer, it is arguable that the 
issuer suffers both loss of a property, namely the card, and economic loss 
consequent upon the loss of property. This argument may be used to avoid the 




The financial loss may be incurred by the issuer only when he makes payment to 
the merchant or was under a binding and irreversible obligation to make such 
payment. In practice, the charge-back rules of the credit card networks generally 
require (i) the issuer, upon receiving the cardholder’s complaint of unauthorized 
transaction, to credit the transaction amount back to the card account pending 
further investigation, and (ii) allows the acquirer to recover the amount 
previously credited in the merchant’s bank account in respect of the alleged 
unauthorized transaction. Usually the time limit to raise a charge-back is as long 
as 6 months, allowing the issuer very reliable option to avoid financial loss. 
Currently, the rules of the major credit card networks split the risk of 
unauthorized transaction between the issuer and the acquirer on the basis of the 
presence of the card and signature in the transaction. The issuer is usually bound 
to pay if the card was present and the signature on the transaction receipt 
corresponds with the cardholder’s signature on the card. The acquirer takes the 
risk for unauthorized card transactions where the card was not present, such as 
transaction by telephone or internet.  
 
Where the issuer was not bound to pay the merchant or was entitled to the 
reimbursement of the amount paid, as in the case of remote card transaction, it 
may suffer no loss. Therefore, it cannot succeed to claim for damages in tort199. 
 
(b) Causal link 
 
                                                        
199 It is submitted here that the principle of res inter alios acta does not apply because the 
situation is not an arrangement between the issuer and a third party (merchant/acquirer) to 
cover the loss but that the issuer’s liability toward the merchant/acquirer never arise in 
respect of unauthorized transactions. 
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The next question is whether the cardholder’s carelessness of safeguarding the 
card or failure to give the issuer timely notice in respect of lost card or known 
unauthorized transaction can be said to have caused the issuer the loss. There are 
powerful authorities suggesting that this causal link may not exist. In Scholfield v. 
The Earl of Londesborough200, Lord Halsbury L.C. and Lord Watson in the 
House of Lords cited the following analysis of Bovill C.J. in Societé Générale v. 
Metropolitant Bank201 with approval: "Persons are not to be supposed to commit 
forgery, and the protection against such a crime is the law of the land, not the 
vigilance of parties in excluding all possibility of committing it". The analysis 
was again approved by Viscount Haldane in London Joint Stock Bank Ltd v. 
Macmillan and Arthur 202. According to these authorities, the proximate cause of 
the loss to the issuer seems to be the crime of fraud, but not the negligence of the 
cardholder. However, Lord Finlay L.C. in the latter case also said (at 811): “… the 
fact that a crime has to intervene to cause the loss does not make it too remote. 
Indeed, forgery is the very thing against which the customer is bound to take 
reasonable precaution.” This appears to suggest the opposite view that the 
cardholder’s negligence may be considered a not-too-remote or proximate cause 
of the issuer’s financial loss. 
 
In view of the expanding purchasing power of the credit card on the internet and 
the increase of credit card fraud, it is submitted that the view of Lord Finlay L.C. 
is to be preferred. An isolated momentary inadvertence by the cardholder may 
not appear to be the direct cause of a fraudulent card transaction, but his overall 
carelessness may be a foreseeable proximate cause of loss to the issuer. 
 
                                                        
200 [1896] A.C.514(H.L.). 
201 27 L.T. 849. 
202 London Joint Stock Bank Ltd v. Macmillan and Arthur [1918] AC 777. 
 173
(c) Recovery of economic loss 
 
Assuming there was a negligent breach of duty by the cardholder in the 
relationship with the issuer, our next enquiry is whether the issuer’s loss, as a 
primarily economic loss, may be a recoverable head of damages. As suggested 
above, a distinction may be made between (i) the case where the card was lost and 
the cardholder failed to give prompt notice to the issuer of such loss and (ii) the 
case where the card was not lost but the card particulars were intercepted and 
used to effect unauthorized transactions. In the first case, it can be said that the 
issuer’s economic loss is consequential upon the loss of property in which it has 
an interest. In this case the economic loss is more likely to be recoverable than the 
case of pure economic loss in the second case203. Arguments can be made against 
this distinction. The carelessness of the cardholder in keeping the card only 
caused the issuer the loss of the plastic card and it may not be the main cause of 
the financial loss of the issuer. The main cause of the financial loss is the failure to 
inform the issuer promptly thus allowing the thief more time to use the card to 
effect unauthorized transaction. The economic loss of the issuer in this case may 
not be the immediate consequence of the physical loss or negligent missing of its 
property.  
 
The principles governing liability for pure economic loss was first established in 
the landmark decision of the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & 
                                                        
203 Wimpey Construction (UK) Limited (and others) v. Martin Black & Co (Wire Ropes) 
Limited (1982) SLT 239. There were 2 plaintiffs who were engaged in a joint venture for a 
construction of a tanker terminal. They used a crane, which belonged to the 2nd plaintiff, 
which was negligently damaged by the defendant. Both plaintiff suffered substantial losses 
due to the 86 days delay of the project. The second plaintiff’s claim succeeded but the 1st 
plaintiff’s claim failed because it has no interest in the property that was damaged. This has 
been considered a clear statement of the general rule of recovery of economic loss. See also 
Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd v. Martin & Co (Contractor) Ltd [1973] 1 QB 27 where Lord 
Denning refused economic loss suffered independently of physical damage. 
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Partners Ltd204 (‘Hedley Byrne’). The statements made by the law Lords in this 
case, although expressed in slightly different ways, demonstrate that the basis of a 
duty of care in the circumstances of the case (negligent misstatement) is actual or 
imputed knowledge or foreseeability by the defendant that a particular person or 
a class of persons would most probably place reliance on the defendant’s 
statement, advice or services rendered without making further enquiries. In other 
words there must be an assumption of responsibility by the defendant when 
making the representation205. In Smith v. Eric S. Bush206, assumption of 
responsibility was identified by Lord Templeman as the criterion for determining 
whether a duty of care arose. However, the criterion was doubted by 
Lord Griffiths in the same decision. His lordship formulated the threefold test of 
‘foreseeability’, ‘proximity’ and ‘fairness’. 
 
In the subsequent case of Caparo Industries plc v Dickman207, Lord Grififth’s 
threefold test was approved by the House of Lords. In addition, it was held that 
the liability for economic loss due to negligent misstatement was confined to 
cases where the statement or advice is given to a known or direct recipient for a 
specific purpose which was made known to the author of the statement or advice 
and upon which the recipient relies upon and acts to his detriment208. However, 
in the same case, Lord Bridge doubted that the criteria of ‘proximity’ and 
‘fairness’ are “susceptible of any such precise definition as would be necessary to 
                                                        
204 [1964] AC 465. 
205 Lord Reid (at 486) said that the duty of care would arise “where it is plain that the party 
seeking information or advice was trusting the other to exercise such a degree of care as the 
circumstances required, where it was reasonable for him to do that, and where the other 
gave the information or advice when he knew or ought to have known that the inquirer was 
relying on him”. Lord Morris, (at 502) said that “it should now be regarded as settled that if 
someone possessed of a special skill undertakes, quite irrespective of contract, to apply that 
skill for the assistance of another person who relies upon such skill, a duty of care will arise”. 
Lord Devlin, (at 530) placed emphasis on the inquiry “whether there is an express or implied 
undertaking of responsibility” (emphasis added). 
206 [1990] 1 AC 831. 
207 [1990] 2 AC 605. 
208 Per Lord Oliver at 638. This is often referred to as Lord Oliver’s four-stage test. 
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give them utility as practical tests”209. Therefore, his Lordship supported a third 
alternative, to use the traditional incremental approach to develop normal 
categories of negligence incrementally and by analogy with established categories, 
when he said: “We must now, I think, recognise the wisdom of the words of 
Brennan J. in the High Court of Australia in Sutherland Shire Council v. 
Heyman (1985) 60 A.L.R. 1, 43-44, where he said: "It is preferable, in my view, 
that the law should develop novel categories of negligence incrementally and by 
analogy with established categories, rather than by a massive extension of a 
prima facie duty of care restrained only by indefinable considerations which 
ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of 
person to whom it is owed.”” 
 
However, in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd210, a case that extended the 
Hedley Byrne principle from provision of information and advice to performance 
of other services, ‘assumption of responsibility’ and ‘reliance’ resurfaced as the 
main criteria on which duty of care may be founded in exclusion of Lord Griffith 
threefold test. Lord Goff, said (at 181) “… if a person assumes responsibility to 
another in respect of certain services, there is no reason why he should not be 
liable in damages for that other in respect of economic loss which flows from the 
negligent performance of those services. It follows that, once the case is 
identified as falling within the Hedley Byrne principle, there should be no need 
to embark upon any further enquiry whether it is “fair, just and reasonable” to 
impose liability for economic loss”. 
 
                                                        
209 [1990] 2 AC 605 per Lord Bridge. 
210 [1995] 2 AC 145. 
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A brief recall of the history of development of the principles governing the issue of 
liability for pure economic loss for negligence in Britain shows that there have 
been 3 different approaches that takes turn in different cases: (i) Lord Griffith’s 
threefold test of ‘foreseeability’, ‘proximity’ and ‘fairness’; (ii) the Hedley Byrne 
‘assumption of responsibility’ test; and (iii) the incremental approach proposed 
by Lord Bridge. In more recent cases the courts in Britain have chosen to apply all 
these tests in turn. In Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) 
Ltd v Price Waterhouse (No 2), Sir Brian Neill applied all three tests and 
suggested that “it may be useful to look at any new set of facts by using each of 
the three approaches in turn”211. This approach was approved by the Court of 
Appeal in 2005212 and accepted in standard textbooks213. This should be accepted 
as the law of Britain at present. 
 
The courts of Singapore, however, have refused to follow the approach taken by 
the English courts, which was regarded as too uncertain. The principles governing 
liability for pure economic loss were comprehensively analysed and considered 
settled in the landmark case of RSP Architects Planners & Engineers v MCST 
Plan No 1075. In this case, L .P. Thean J.A. conducted thorough analysis of the 
authorities in England and other Commonwealth jurisdictions and concluded 
that214: 
 
                                                        
211 [1998] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 85 at [7.19]. He also commented that “if the facts are properly 
analysed and the policy considerations correctly evaluated the several approaches will yield 
the same result” 
212 Commissioners for Customs and Excise v Barclays Bank Plc [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 165, 
[2005] All E.R. 789. Three-test approach was approved by the Court of Appeal. Lindsay J. 
explained at [52] the inter-relationship between the 3 tests: “In a case such as the one at 
hand, where the debate concerns an area in which a duty of care has not previously been 
found, each of the tests is best regarded as a check on the conclusion provisionally reached 
upon the application of the other two. It is only when one test has been verified as correctly 
conducted by the finding that it leads to the same conclusion as do the others that it can 
safely be taken to be reliable” 
213 Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, Sweet & Maxwell, 19th Ed, 2006, at 8-90, 8-91. 
214 [1999] 2 SLR 449 at [31]. 
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“Stripped of the verbiage, the crux of such approach is no more than this: the 
court first examines and considers the facts and factors to determine whether 
there is sufficient degree of proximity in the relationship between the party 
who has sustained the loss and the party who is said to have caused the loss 
which would give rise to a duty of care on the part of the latter to avoid the kind 
of loss sustained by the former. This court in Ocean Front said at p 139: “… the 
approach of the court has been to examine a particular circumstance to 
determine whether there exists that degree of proximity between the plaintiff 
and the defendant as would give rise to a duty of care by the latter to the former 
with respect to the damage sustained by the former. Such proximity is the 
‘determinant’ of the duty of care and also the scope of such duty”. 
Next, having found such degree of proximity, the court next considers whether 
there is any material factor or policy which precludes such duty from arising. 
Both on principle and on authority, we do not see why such an approach should 
not be taken in Ocean Front and in a case such as the one before us.” 
 
The conclusion by L. P. Thean JA has been regarded in subsequent decisions as a 
restatement of the principles governing liability for pure economic loss caused by 
negligence to be applied in Singapore. The formula which has been simplified to 
two elements of ‘proximity’ and ‘policy’ should be distinguished from the two-
stage test in Anns v Merton London Borough Council215 which had been 
deprecated by subsequent decisions in Britain. The difference lies in that Lord 
Wilberforce’s two-stage test focused entirely on ‘foreseeability’ as the sole 
requirement to determine ‘proximity’. The concept of ‘proximity’ propounded by 
                                                        
215 [1978] AC 728. 
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L.P. Thean J.A. encompasses elements of assumption of duty, reliance on the 
skills of the defendant and relationship between the parties, in addition to 
foreseeability but without listing out the factors in an all-inclusive list, as noted at 
paragraph 42 of his judgment: 
 
“It is important to understand that the concept of ‘economic loss’, just like the 
concept of ‘reliance’ does not run uniformly through the law of negligence. It 
may not be considered in abstraction, but must be considered together 
with all the other ‘labels’ of liability, such as ‘foreseeability’, ‘reliance’, and 
‘reasonability’. Thus, where the loss is economic in nature, different 
requirements are necessary – depending on the nature of the negligent act or 
omission – to give rise to liability. As this court emphasised in Ocean Front [RSP 
Architects Planners & Engineers v Ocean Front Pte Ltd [1996] 1 SLR 113], the 
question is not whether a duty was owed by A to B, but whether a duty was 
owed by A to B to avoid the loss incurred by B.” 
 
In the recent case of United Project Consultants Pte Ltd v Leong Kwok Onn the 
Singapore Court of Appeal has approved the two-element test of ‘proximity’ and 
‘policy’ as the law of Singapore by stating that: 
 
“It becomes apparent that this court has regarded the touchstone for liability to 
be “proximity”. In essence, before liability may be imposed upon a defendant 
for pure economic loss, a court must be satisfied that all the circumstances of the 
case give rise to a relationship whereby the defendant owes a duty to the 
plaintiff to avoid the particular loss suffered by the plaintiff. In doing so, the 
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court must likewise be satisfied that there are no policy reasons why such a 
duty ought not to be imposed.” 216 
 
Applying the principle as it stands in Singapore to the situation of liability for 
unauthorized credit card transaction, it seems likely that the economic loss of the 
issuer in this case is recoverable as all the elements required for ‘proximity’ 
appears to be present. The cardholder carelessness in keeping the card or failure 
to sign the card upon issuance or to inform the issuer of lost card is a foreseeable 
cause of the issuer’s loss. The issuer appears to rely on the care of the cardholder 
when issuing the card and when making payment to the merchant. The 
cardholder seems to assume the responsibility towards the issuer when keeping 
and using the card. There seems to be little or no policy reason not to impose 
such duty of care on the cardholder, given the purchasing power that 
accompanies the card. 
 
The most important impact that the consumer credit protection legislations in 
Britain and America have made on the issue of liability for unauthorized card 
transaction is the confirmation that the cardholder has no liability for 
unauthorized transactions other than that provided in the Acts217. In this respect, 
the situation in Singapore is the opposite. In the absence of any legislation on the 
issue of liability for unauthorized card transaction, as shown above, the card 
issuer’s claim may be based on the principles of apparent authority, bailment, 
estoppel or negligence. In the next section, we will consider the last, but most 
                                                        
216 Singapore Court of Appeal, [2005] 4 SLR 214; [2005] SGCA 38, per Chief Justice Yong 
Pung How at [35], emphasis added. 
217 For example, sub-section (d) of §1643 of Consumer Credit Protection Act (Chapter 41) of 
the United States provides that “Except as provided in this section, a cardholder incurs no 
liability from the unauthorized use of a credit card”. 
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frequently used means by which the Singapore issuers place the burden of fraud 
loss to the cardholder, namely risk-shifting contractual terms. 
 
6.  RISK-SHIFTING TERMS IN THE CARDHOLDER AGREEMENT 
 
Risk-shifting terms are contractual provisions inserted by the issuer in the 
cardholder agreement to make the cardholder liable for unauthorized 
transactions. In this section we will analyze some of the standard terms used by 
the three biggest local banks (DBS, UOB and OCBC) and two major foreign banks 
(Citibank and Standard Chartered) as at 29th September 2006, which place the 
liability for unauthorized card transactions on the cardholder or prevent the 
cardholder from holding the issuer liable for unauthorized transactions. The focus 
of our attention is whether some of aspects of the risk-shifting terms should be 
considered as excluding or restricting the issuer’s liability, and whether the Unfair 
Contract Term Act (UCTA) imported from England218 may be invoked to restrain 
the final effect of such terms. Generally, it is likely that the UCTA applies because 
the cardholder deals as a consumer in the relationship with the bank because the 
situation satisfies the criteria set out in section 12.1. of the UCTA. The cardholder 
“neither makes the contract in the course of a business nor holds himself out as 
doing so”; the issuer “does make the contract in the course of a business”; and 
the dealing was based on the issuer’s standard terms of business. Our discussion 
will start with the main terms that may be seen as directly exclude or restrict the 
issuer’s liability. After that, we will consider other terms that may create the same 
effect of excluding liability by indirectly making it difficult or impossible for the 
cardholder to win in a conflict with the issuer. 
                                                        
218 The English Unfair Contract Term Act 1977 was made part of Singapore law from 12th 
November 1993 by Application of English Law Act (Cap 7A). 
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6.1 Terms that directly exclude or restrict the issuer’s liability 
 
In the bilateral contractual relationship between the cardholder and the issuer, 
there are two ways to achieve the same result of making the cardholder liable for 
unauthorized transaction. The first is to exclude the issuer’s liability and the 
second is to make the cardholder liable. 
 
(a) Exclusion of liability clause 
 
This first type of clause may fall within the scope of the UCTA more easily because 
of the label that is used. All cardholder agreements contain extensive exclusion of 
liability clauses that seek to absolve the issuer’s liability in various situations such 
as: (i) the merchant’s breach or non-performance of the sale contract with the 
cardholder; (ii) the merchant’s refusal to accept the card for payment; and (iii) 
issuer’s inability or failure to perform contractual obligation due to machines, 
computers or telecommunication malfunctioning, loss of data stored in 
computers and devices and other events beyond the control of the issuer. These 
excluded situations will be considered in chapter V. What we are concerned with 
here is the clauses that exclude the issuer’s liability for unauthorized transaction. 
Example of such a clause is found in the standard terms of both local and foreign 
banks issuing credit, debit, or charge cards in Singapore. For example, the 
standard terms of Standard Chartered contains two clauses, one to exclude the 
bank’s responsibility relating to any use of the card and the other to prevent the 
cardholders from holding the bank responsible for unauthorized transactions219. 
                                                        
219 Standard Chartered standard terms, Clause 13.5: “The Bank is not responsible in respect of 
any loss arising directly or indirectly out of the use of the Card in any manner whether or 
not as a result of any malfunction of an ATM.” Clause 13.7: “The Cardmember and the 
Company shall not hold the Bank responsible in any way for any loss arising directly or 
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The Citibank’s Visa-MasterCard Cardmember’s Agreement, uses one clause to 
exclude the bank’s liability for loss, damage, cost or expenses arising in 
connection with the card account or with the agreement, coupled with another 
clause to exclude the bank’s liability for the negligence or willful default by any 
agents or contractors engaged by the bank220. The standard ‘Terms and 
Conditions Governing Card Account’ used by OCBC, one of the 3 biggest local 
banks also excludes the bank’s liability for loss, theft, use of misuse of the card. 
The terms also disclaim the bank’s liability for any fraud or forgery perpetrated 
on the bank or any merchants, including the situation where the card particulars 
or cardholder’s information is intercepted221. 
 
These clauses fall well within the scope of the UCTA because the banks seek to 
exclude liabilities in various situations ranging from breach of contract by the 
bank to negligent conduct and even include situations of willful default by the 
bank’s agents or contractors. Section 2.2 of the UCTA requires that the contract 
terms seeking to exclude or restrict a party’s liability other than death or personal 
injury resulting from negligence must satisfy the reasonableness test of the UCTA. 
Section 3. 2 of the UCTA also applies to require the terms that allow a party to 
                                                                                                                                                               
indirectly out of any Card Transaction and the utilisation of any facilities in connection with 
the Card and/or the Card Account effected by a person not entitled to do so.” 
220 Citibank’s standard terms: Clause 16.3:  “Loss/damage in connection with your card 
account: Notwithstanding any other terms and conditions of this agreement, we are not 
liable to you for any loss, damage, inconvenience, embarrassment, cost and expense of any 
nature which in any way may be suffered or incurred by you or by any other person in 
respect of or in connection with your card account and/or this agreement”. Clause 16.5 “Act 
or default of agents/contractors: You agree that we have the absolute discretion to use such 
agents, contractors or correspondents as we deem fit to carry out or procure any of the 
matters or transactions governed by or contemplated in this agreement, and we are not 
liable to you for any act, omission, neglect or wilful default on the part of such agents, 
contractors and/or correspondents.” 
221 OCBC’ standard terms: “10.1 We are not liable in any way: …. e. (i) for any loss, theft, use 
or misuse of the Card or disclosure of your PIN and/or any breach of this Agreement (ii) for 
any fraud and/or forgery perpetrated on us or any merchant, … f. for the interception by or 
disclosure to any person (whether unlawful or otherwise) of any data or information 
relating to you, any Card Transaction or your Card Account transmitted through or stored 
in any electronic system or medium, howsoever caused” 
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render a contractual performance substantially different from a reasonable 
expectation, or terms that exclude a party’s liability when he himself is in breach 
of a contract to satisfy the reasonableness test. 
 
(b) Clauses making cardholder liable for unauthorized 
transactions 
 
Concurrent with the use of the exclusion of liability clauses above, all banks in 
Singapore use express terms in the standard cardholder agreement to impose 
liability on the cardholder for both authorized and unauthorized card 
transactions that occur before the notice of lost or stolen card reaches the bank. A 
typical example of this clause is found in the DBS Card Agreement at its clause 
3.3 “Liability For Lost/Stolen Cards: You shall not be liable for any transactions 
carried out after we have been notified of the loss/theft/disclosure. However we 
shall debit the relevant Card Account for all transactions carried out before we 
are notified of the loss/theft/disclosure, even if such transactions were carried 
out without your authorization.” 
 
OCBC uses similar provisions at clauses 3.3 and 4.3 of its standard terms, which 
states that the bank “may charge and debit the relevant Card Account (whether 
before or after the termination of the use of any or all Cards) the amount of each 
and every Card Transaction made or effected, whether by you or any other 
person (whether with or without your knowledge or authority)” but “no amount 
shall be debited to the Card Account in respect of any Card Transaction effected 
without your knowledge or authority after notice of the loss or theft of that Card 
or the disclosure of the PIN of that Card has been given by you and received and 
acted upon by us”.  
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Standard Chartered uses similar terms at clause 11.3 of its standard terms, which 
provide that “the Cardmember and/or the Company shall remain liable for all 
unauthorised Card Transactions effected before the Bank receives written 
confirmation of such loss, theft or disclosure”. The cardholder may not be liable 
for unauthorized transaction effected after the notification has been received by 
the bank only if the bank is satisfied that the cardholder has given written 
notification, and lodged a police report in respect of the lost card. Citibank’s 
terms, at its clause 9.3, on the other hand, impose liability on the cardholder for 
“all unauthorized card transactions effected following such loss, theft or 
disclosure, whether they are effected as a result of the unauthorized use of the 
card” while retaining the bank’s “absolute discretion” to charge the amount of the 
unauthorized transaction effected even after the bank’s receipt of the cardholder’s 
notification of lost card.  
 
It may be more difficult to apply the UCTA to the above clauses because they do 
not appear to exclude the bank’s liability. The same effect is achieved without 
using the exclusion of liability language. However, it is arguable that these clauses 
also fall within the scope of the last paragraph of UCTA Section 13, which reads 
“To the extent that this Part prevents the exclusion or restriction of any liability 
…  sections 2 and 5 to 7 also prevent excluding or restricting liability by 
reference to terms and notices which exclude or restrict the relevant obligation 
or duty.” 
 
The effect of Section 13 seems to extend the scope of the UCTA to terms that take 
the form of a definition of the obligation. The drafting technique used in the 
above contractual clauses avoids using the form of an ‘exclusion of liability clause’ 
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by disguising the terms in a ‘definition of the cardholder’s liability’ to achieve the 
same effect in substance. Therefore, it is submitted that the clauses are also 
subject to the reasonableness test of the UCTA. 
 
(c) Clause allowing the issuer to rely on instructions without 
verification: 
 
All major banks in Singapore include in their standard cardholder agreements a 
clause giving the bank the right to rely on any request, instructions or 
communications that the banks believe was made by the cardholder, whether 
orally, by telephone, fax, email, etc, without verifying the authenticity of the 
instructions, and yet incurring no responsibility towards the cardholder222. If 
these clauses are interpreted as wide as they appear to be, an unauthorized card 
                                                        
222 DBS’ Clause 15.4: “We may choose to accept any instruction from you made through 
electronic mail, facsimile transmission and in the case of the telephone, such instruction that 
we believe is given by you even if you had not actually given such instructions. Any non-
written instructions shall be given to us at your risk and we shall not be responsible for any 
loss or damage that you may suffer.” UOB’s clause 19.7: “We may rely and act on any 
communication or instructions which we believe originates from you (whether orally or in 
writing and whether in person or over the telephone or by facsimile or other means of 
telecommunication and whether genuine or with or without your consent or authority), and 
any action taken by us in reliance on this shall bind you and we shall not be liable to you for 
any loss or damage incurred or suffered by you as a result of such action. We shall not be 
under any duty to verify the identity of any person communicating purportedly as you or on 
your behalf.” Standard Chartered clause 21.10: “the Bank is authorised to act on any 
telecommunication instructions which the Bank in its sole discretion believes emanate from 
the Cardmember or the Company and the Bank shall not be liable to the Cardmember and 
the Company for any loss or damage arising out of the negligence or fraud of any party or 
in the event that such telecommunication instructions emanate from unauthorised 
individuals.” OCBC Clause 18.3: “we may but shall not be obliged to accept and act on any 
instruction or request by telex, facsimile transmission or through the telephone which is 
believed by our officer or employee attending to such instruction or request to have been 
given or made or authorised by any cardmember. Notwithstanding that such instruction or 
request may not have been given or made or authorised by such cardmember and 
notwithstanding any fraud that may exist in relation thereto, we shall not be liable for any 
loss or damage suffered as a consequence of its acting on or acceding to any such instruction 
or request.” Citibank’s clause 14.3(b): “Notwithstanding the aforesaid, we are entitled in our 
absolute discretion to rely and act on any communication, requests or instructions which we 
in our sole discretion believe to have been given, made or authorized by you, whether or not 
given with your consent or authority and whether it is given or made orally (whether in 
person or over the telephone and whether or not via TBS); or by facsimile transmission or 
telex or cable; or by other means of communication; and any act on our part pursuant to 
such communication, requests or instructions will be binding on you notwithstanding that it 
may not have been given by you or with your consent or authority.” 
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transaction whether by swipe-card or by mail, telephone, facsimile or internet 
methods may be considered a request, instruction or communication to the bank 
under these clauses. Therefore, the clauses may also be effective to exclude the 
bank’s liability for unauthorized transaction.  
 
Two major foreign banks went further to avoid any ambiguity in the 
interpretation of the usual ‘reliance without verification clause’ by expressly 
providing in their standard terms another clause making the cardholder liable for 
all unauthorized transactions made by remote methods such as mail, telephone, 
facsimile or internet. Standard Chartered Bank’s clause 21.9 reads: “A request by 
mail, telephone, facsimile transmission or other means of communication to a 
merchant for the supply of goods and/or services to be charged to the Card 
Account, whether or not made or authorised by the Cardmember and whether a 
sales draft, voucher or document is signed by the Cardmember, is a valid Card 
Transaction and the Bank will debit the Card Account with such Card 
Transaction”. Citibank’s clause 4.3 provides that: “A request via mail, telephone, 
facsimile, internet or other means of  communication to a merchant for the 
supply of goods and/or services to be charged to the card account, whether 
made or authorized by you and whether a sales draft, voucher or document is 
signed by you, is a valid card transaction and we will debit your card account 
with such card transaction.” 
 
The statistics in section 7.2(d) below shows that unauthorized card transaction 
may be occasioned not only by the cardholder’s fault but also by the bank’s 
negligence or failure to protect their customer’s information. Therefore, it is 
submitted that, to the extent that the above clauses seek to exclude the bank’s 
liability for its own negligence the clauses fall within the scope of the UCTA. 
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(d) Indemnity clause 
 
In the dealing with consumers, it is not uncommon that the banks insist on an 
indemnity clause making the consumer liable for the costs of the legal actions 
taken by the banks to enforce their rights under the contract with the consumer. 
We will look into the issue of legal costs further in chapter V. Here, we are 
concerned with indemnity clauses that were drafted so wide as to impose an 
obligation on the cardholder to indemnify the bank against any loss arising out of 
or in connection with the card, the contract, or the card account. Not all 
Singapore banks use this form of indemnity clauses but examples can be found in 
the terms of several foreign and local banks. 
 
Clause 21.7 of the Standard Chartered Bank’s standard terms provides that “The 
Cardmember and/or the Company must indemnify and keep the Bank fully 
indemnified against all claims, demands, actions and proceedings which may be 
made against the Bank and all damage, liability, loss, cost and expense 
(including legal costs on a full indemnity basis) which the Bank may incur, 
sustain or suffer, directly or indirectly, arising from or in connection with the 
use or misuse of the Card, the PIN and/or the PIW with or without the 
Cardmember or the Company’ knowledge or authority; and/or the negligence, 
misconduct or breach of any term and  condition of this Agreement on the 
Cardmember or the Company part; and/or otherwise arising out of or in 
connection with this Agreement.” Citibank’s clause 17.1 provides that “You will 
fully indemnify us and hold us harmless against any loss, damage, liability, cost 
and expense (including legal costs on a full indemnity basis) which we may 
incur or suffer as a result of or in connection with your card account and/or this 
agreement”. UOB’s clause 19.9 provides that “ You [the cardholder] must 
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indemnify and keep indemnified us [UOB] against all claims, demands, action, 
proceedings, losses and damages of any nature suffered, incurred or sustained 
by us directly or indirectly, by reason of or in connection with this Agreement” 
 
Although using different language the above clauses seek to do the same thing. 
The clauses enable the bank to recover damage, loss and expenses that the banks 
may suffer due to unauthorized transaction. On top of that, the banks are entitled 
to recover the same for other reasons directly or indirectly connected with the 
card, the account or the cardholder agreement, which may include situations of 
breach or negligence by themselves. Pursuant to Section 4 of the UCTA, to the 
extent that a consumer is made to indemnify the banks for their own negligence 
or breach of contract, the clause must also meet the requirement of 
reasonableness under the UCTA. 
 
(e) The reasonableness test 
 
The above analysis shows that all four categories of terms mentioned come under 
the reasonableness test of the UCTA. Section 11.1 of the act provides that: “In 
relation to a contract term, the requirement of reasonableness for the purposes 
of this Part … is that the term shall have been a fair and reasonable one to be 
included having regard to the circumstances which were, or ought reasonably to 
have been, known to or in the contemplation of the parties when the contract 
was made”.   
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In ‘Modern Banking Law’223 it was suggested that “It is, of course, clear that the 
honouring of an instruction issued by an impostor is a performance not 
contemplated by the parties to the card transaction. The American authorities 
support the view that a term which excuses such a performance is not 
reasonable, as it frees the issuer from the underlying duty of care. However, it 
has to be conceded that a term which exonerates the issuer from the liability 
where the cardholder fails to report the loss of the card is justifiable on the basis 
that forgeries are hard to detect.” While we submit that this suggestion is correct, 
we are interested to see how the Singapore courts apply the reasonableness test to 
the circumstances surrounding the issuer-cardholder relationship or the 
contemplation of the parties in making the cardholder agreement. In the dearth 
of authority directly on the point, it is necessary to consider recent decisions 
where the Singapore courts have applied the reasonableness test to the exclusion 
of liability clauses in the contracts between banks and their customers. 
 
In Ri Jong Son v Development Bank of Singapore Ltd224(Ri Jong Son), a 
customer having a fixed deposit account with DBS Bank suffered loss due to a 
fraudulent funds transfer of ¥100 million out of his account. He then sued the 
bank for breach of the banking mandate. The High Court upheld the following 
exclusion of liability clause in the standard terms: “The bank shall not be liable 
for any loss damage or expense suffered or incurred by the customer (whether 
as a result of computer breakdown, forgery of signatory’s signature, material 
alteration of withdrawal/requests or other reasons of any kind whatsoever) 
through no fault of the bank”. Kan Ting Chiu J. decided that this clause meets the 
reasonableness test of the UCTA because it “did not seek to restrict the bank’s 
                                                        
223 E. P. Ellinger, E. Lomnicka, R.J.A Hooley, 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press 2002 at 
536. 
224 [1998] 3 SLR 64. 
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liability for negligence.” He went on to hold that even if the clause “seek to 
exclude the bank’s liability for its own negligence”, it “was reasonable within the 
context of a bank-customer relationship”.  
 
Even though it was proven beyond doubt that the signature was forged and the 
bank’s officers failed to see the discrepancy between the forged signature and the 
customer’s specimen signature, it was held that the customer failed to prove the 
bank’s fault. This seems to set a very low standard of care on the bank’s practice 
of dealing with customer’s instructions. As long as the bank’s employee did make 
the comparison of the signature, the bank is not at fault no matter how much 
different the signatures may be.  
 
It seems possible that the above case will be applied to the situation of 
unauthorized card transaction because most cardholders are bank’s customers 
and the issues concern with authority of instructions given to the bank. If that is 
the case, the exclusion of liability clause discussed in section (a) above would be 
upheld because in a bank-customer relationship it is reasonable for the bank to 
exclude liability, even for their own negligence. However, in the comparison with 
the exclusion of liability in a banking context, there are less convincing reasons to 
uphold the exclusion of liability clauses in credit card agreement for several 
reasons. First, in many instances of credit card usage, no signature is required. 
Even if it is, the bank is not the party verifying the signature on the payment slip. 
A cardholder may arguably be in a better position compared with other bank’s 




In a more recent case of Khoo Tian Hock & Anor v Oversea-Chinese Banking 
Corporation Limited225 (Khoo Tian Hock), the tendency of the Singapore courts 
to favor the banks over their customers reached another height. In that case, two 
customers sued OCBC for wrongfully paying on five cheques amounting to 
$730,088.58, in which their signatures had been forged by their son. Woo J.C. 
decided to depart from the authority well established by the English courts and 
the Privy Council decision in Tai Hing Cotton Mill v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd226 
and held that the duty of care that a customer owed to a bank included the duty to 
prevent the forgery of his signature. The customers in the case were considered to 
be in breach of such a duty by allowing their son access to their blank cheque 
books. Woo J.C. said (at 707): “To draw a distinction between the drawing of 
cheques on the one hand and other steps or omissions on the other hand is to 
create an artificial and unrealistic distinction. After all, fraud is not facilitated 
by the careless drawing of cheques alone.”  
 
The above decision was criticized by Professor Poh Chu Chai227 as follows: “With 
due respect to the learned judicial commissioner, there is indeed an obvious 
distinction between the material alteration of the instructions given by a 
customer and the forgery of his signature. The alteration of a customer's 
instructions may not be easily detected by the bank if the customer has been 
careless in drawing up his cheque. The bank is therefore entitled to require the 
customer to exercise care in writing out his instructions. The forgery of a 
customer's signature stands on an entirely different footing. A banker is 
expected to recognise the signature of a customer. An inability or a reluctance 
                                                        
225 [2000] 4 SLR 673. 
226 [1986] AC 80. 
227 Poh Chu Chai, Annual review of Singapore cases 1-2000, Banking Law. 
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by a bank to verify a customer's signature constitutes a serious breach of 
contract by the bank as the customer's signature constitutes the sole key to his 
bank account. One would be unduly favouring the banks if the banks are 
excused from carrying out this fundamental obligation merely because the 
customer has not taken steps to prevent the forgery of his signature. It would 
also undermine the confidence a customer has in the banking system if a banker 
is excused from carrying out the basic duty of recognising his own customer's 
signature.” Notwithstanding the criticism, which we submit was accurate, the 
decision in Khoo Tian Hock remains valid authority as it has not been overruled 
in any subsequent decision.  
 
The Khoo Tian Hock ruling may be applied to unauthorized credit card in two 
aspects. First, the cardholder who is also a bank’s customer may owe the duty to 
prevent unauthorized use of the card, similar to the duty to prevent forgery of 
cheques by safeguarding blank chequebooks. If the cardholder allows somebody 
access to the card or its particulars, the cardholder may be in breach of his duty, 
and therefore he may be made liable for unauthorized transactions. Secondly, just 
as the bank is excused from the basic duty of recognizing a customer’s signature 
because the cardholder has failed to safeguard the blank chequebook, the bank 
may also be excused from verifying the authenticity of a card transaction because 
if the transaction was not authorized, the cardholder must have failed to 
safeguard the card, or its particulars. 
While Ri Jong Son and Khoo Tian Hock were not directly concerned with liability 
for unauthorized card transaction, they are powerful authorities to show the 
tendency in the Singapore courts to uphold exclusion of liability clauses in the 
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contracts between bankers and customers. It may, therefore, be anticipated that if 
a case concerning unauthorized credit card transaction come to the courts, the 
results would be similar. As long as the exclusion of liability clauses are drafted in 
clear and unambiguous manner, as it appears in the samples taken, it is likely that 
the cardholder will be made contractually bound to be liable for all the 
unauthorized card transactions. Our analysis of the standard terms of 3 biggest 
local banks and 2 major foreign banks shows that there is hardly any alternative 
means by which a cardholder can obtain a credit, debit or charge card in 
Singapore without accepting these sorts of exclusion of liability clauses. The 
strength of the bargaining positions between a bank and its customer is obviously 
imbalanced and the cardholders usually receive inducement to apply for new card 
by way of reward points for certain usage of the cards. This seems to satisfy 
paragraph (a) and (b) of the Guidelines for Application of Reasonableness Test in 
the Second Schedule of the UCTA. However, the Guidelines only apply for the 
purposes of section 6(3), 7(3) and 7 (4), which only concerns with sale, hire 
purchase and miscellaneous contract under which goods pass. In other words, the 
UCTA is not an effective means to restrict the power of the standard terms for the 
banks’ interests in the dealing with their customers.  
6.2 Terms with indirect effect of excluding or restricting the 
issuer’s liability 
 
Section 13(1) of the UCTA provides that: 
“To the extent that this Part prevents the exclusion or restriction of any liability 
it also prevents — 
(a) making the liability or its enforcement subject to restrictive or 
onerous conditions; 
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(b) excluding or restricting any right or remedy in respect of the liability, 
or subjecting a person to any prejudice in consequence of his pursuing 
any such right or remedy; 
(c) excluding or restricting rules of evidence or procedure” 
 
Accordingly, there are two other types of clauses that may be subject to the UCTA, 
including: 
 
(a)  Clause limiting time to raise dispute 
 
There is recognized English authority holding that a bank’s customer does not 
owe a duty to verify all bank statements unless he is bound by contractual terms 
to do so228. Because of that, the standard terms used by banks invariably impose a 
duty on the cardholder to examine the card account statement and inform the 
issuer of any unauthorized transaction within a certain time limit. If the customer 
fails to do so, he will be held liable for the unauthorized transactions. This seems 
very normal until one look at the period that a cardholder is given to read the 
statement. When this period is too short, the cardholder’s right to challenge an 
erroneous items or unauthorized transaction in the statement would almost 
diminish. For example, DBS Bank requires its cardholder to report errors, 
inaccuracies, or unauthorized transactions within 7 days from receiving the 
statement229. Citibank sets similar time limit at 10 days230. UOB sets it at 14 
days231 from the date of the statement. 
                                                        
228 Tai Hing Cotton Mill v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80 per Lord Scarman at 
106E-7A.  
229 DBS Card Agreement, Clause 9: “You shall also notify us if you discover any errors or 
inaccuracies in any Card Account statement. If you fail to inform us of any error or 
inaccuracy in the Card Account statement within seven (7) days from your receiving it, the 
contents of the Card Account statement shall be conclusive and binding on you.” 
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The above clauses may fall within the scope of Section 13 (a) and (c) of the UCTA 
for making the enforcement of the cardholder’s right subject to restrictive 
condition or restricting rules of procedure. There have been several authorities in 
Britain holding that a contractual clauses limiting the time for a consumer to 
make notification of a breach232 or limiting the time for a consumer to make a 
claim233 fall within the scope of the UCTA and are subject to the reasonableness 
test. The length of the period allowed for the cardholder may be a relevant factor 
to determine whether the clause satisfies the reasonableness test, which we will 
consider further below. 
 
(b) Conclusive evidence clause: 
 
In the standard terms of Singapore banks, the clauses discussed in (a) above are 
usually used together with a conclusive evidence clause, which seeks to make all 
the bank’s records (as may be certified by any bank’s officer) final and conclusive 
evidence binding upon the cardholder for all matters relating to the card account. 
The same clause also prevents the cardholder from challenging the accuracy of 
the bank’s records, after the expiry of the short period allowed for the cardholder 
to dispute the accuracy of the records.  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
230 Citibank Clause 5.2 “You must inspect and examine the statement of account and notify us 
of any irregularity or error in the statement of account within 10 days from the date of the 
statement of account, failing which the statement of account is conclusive evidence of your 
liability in respect of the amounts stated therein, provided that we are entitled, at any time 
and without liability, to rectify any irregularity or error in the statement of account.” 
231 UOB’s clause 19.4: “Please check the Statement sent to you. If we do not receive any 
objection in writing from you within fourteen (14) days from the date of the Statement the 
contents of the Statement shall be taken as correct and conclusive unless we ourselves rectify 
it.” 
232 Thomas Witter Ltd v. TBP Industries Ltd (1994) 12 Tr LR 145. 
233 Edmund Murray Ltd v. BSP International Foundation Ltd (1992) 33 Con LR 1. 
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The conclusive evidence clause that is found in the standard terms of all bank-
issuers of credit, debit or charge card234 would clearly fall within sub-section (a) 
of Section 13 (1) of the UCTA as it seeks to exclude or restrict rules of evidence. If 
the clause is upheld, the bank’s records would be deemed final, conclusive and 
binding upon the cardholder for any purposes whatsoever. If a record of an 
erroneous or unauthorized transaction is shown as an authorized transaction in 
the statement, and the cardholder is conclusively bound by that record, the end 
result would be that the cardholder being liable for the transaction. Alternatively, 
the conclusive evidence clause may fall within sub-section (a) of Section 13 of the 
UCTA as it prohibits the cardholder from enforcing their contractual rights. 
 
There are English authorities that may be used to support the argument that the 
conclusive evidence clause is subject to the UCTA. In Fred Chappell Ltd v 
National Car Parks Ltd235, a clause reversing the burden of proof was held to fall 
within the scope of the UCTA. In Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd236, a 
clause preventing a party from enforcing a right (right to set-off) was held to 
come within the UCTA. Therefore, it is submitted that the conclusive evidence 
clause should be subject to the reasonableness test of the UCTA. 
 
(c) The reasonableness test 
 
The application of the reasonableness test to conclusive evidence clause 
(including clauses limiting time to raise a dispute) has attracted a fair amount of 
the local judicial attention. Consmat Singapore (Pte) Ltd v Bank of America 
                                                        
234 Citibank’s clause 5.2; DBS’s clause 9; UOB’s clause 19.1, 19.3 and 19.4, which also prohibits 
the cardholder to challenge the accuracy of the bank’s record for any purposes; Standard 
Chartered clause 21.1; OCBC clause 12.1. 
235 The Times 22 May 1987, (Transcript:IV Gilbert). 
236 [1992]  All E.R. 257. 
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National Trust & Savings Association237 (Consmat) was the first reported case in 
the Singapore High Court concerning the duty to verify account statements by 
customers of banks and reasonableness of the conclusive evidence clause. In that 
case, a customer took action against the Bank of America to recover payment by 
the bank for 15 forged cheques amounting to over S$94,000. The bank’s standard 
terms contained the customer’s undertaking to verify the statement and report 
discrepancy, omission or in accuracy within 7 days from the date of receipt. 
Although it was held that the Bills of Exchange Act was applicable to the case 
instead of the UCTA, L.P. Thean J. held [at 836H) that “even if the UCTA applied” 
the clause 3(c) (which contains the relevant customer’s undertaking) “satisfies the 
test of reasonableness as laid down in s 11 of that Act”. The customer obligations 
imposed by the clause 3(c) was considered “fair and reasonable having regard to 
the circumstances which were, or ought reasonably to have been, known to or in 
the contemplation of the parties when the general agreement was entered into” 
for several reasons. First, “forgeries of cheques are extremely difficult for a bank 
to detect.” Secondly, the bank had “adopted a practice of returning to their 
customers monthly the original cheques drawn or purported to have been 
drawn by their customers which have been cleared and paid and these are sent 
together with the monthly statements of accounts of the previous month.” The 
court also rejected the submission on behalf of the plaintiffs that the period of 
seven days prescribed was unreasonably short because the customer in the case 
were “commercial organization and have the resources and means of verifying 
the statements and the cheques and notifying the defendants promptly and in 
time of any wrong debit or other error in their account”. 
 
                                                        
237 [1992] 2 SLR 828. 
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The Consmat case may be considered a landmark decision in this area as 
subsequent decisions have consistently applied and adapted its reasoning to other 
situations. In Stephan Machinery Singapore Pte Ltd v Overseas-Chinese 
Banking Corp Ltd238 (Stephan) a conclusive evidence clause, which prevented the 
customer from disputing the bank’s records after 14 days from the date of the 
monthly statement, was held to be reasonable. In Elis Tjoa v United Overseas 
Bank239 (Elis), UOB bank’s standard term, which required individual customers 
to verify statements and report inaccuracies within 14 days from the date of the 
statement, was considered reasonable for purposes of the UCTA. In response to 
the submission that the period of 14 days was unreasonably short, given the 
evidence that some statement may not be delivered to the post office until the 5th 
day of next month, Woo Bih Li J.C. suggested [at 92] that UOB should consider 
revising the period to 21 days. However, the judicial commissioner did not hold 
the 14 days period as unreasonable on grounds that the plaintiff did not attempt 
to inform the bank of any inaccuracies. This seems to suggest that 21 days may be 
considered by the Singapore courts as reasonable.  
 
The conclusive evidence clause has been criticized by Professor Poh Chu Chai240 
for its misleading form. He commented that just by reading the clause, it is 
difficult for a customer to realize that his right to raise the issue of forgery is 
effectively being taken away. Therefore, if a bank wishes to prevent its customers 
from raising a claim to recover loss due to fraudulent transaction if they fail to 
notify it of any discrepancies in their statements within a fixed time, the bank 
should insert an express term to that effect instead of a conclusive evidence 
                                                        
238 [2000] 2 SLR 191. 
239 [2003] SGHC 1 [2003] 1 SLR 747. 
240 Professor Poh Chu Chai Law of Banker and Customer, Lexis Nexis, 5th Ed, 2004 at pages 
897-907, 921. 
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clause. It has also been suggested that the Consmat case was so decided because 
the bank in the case had adopted the practice of returning the cheques paid by the 
bank to the customer in order for the customer to verify the signatures. Therefore, 
it was contended that in cases where no such practice was adopted there may be 
room for argument that a term requiring a customer to verify whether there has 
been forgery may be both unreasonable and unfair241. 
 
However, in the most recent case of Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v Credit 
Suisse (Pertamina) where the bank acted upon a forged charge and forged 
ratification resolution of a corporate customer, the Singapore Court of Appeal 
accepted that a conclusive evidence clause come within the UCTA. However, the 
courts rejected both the suggestions that such a clause is misleading or that the 
absence of the practice of returning paid cheques to customers for verification of 
signatures creates any possibility to suspect the reasonableness or fairness of the 
clause242. The decision seems to suggest [at 60] that the rule in Consmat is only 
directly applicable to the context of corporate customers. It suggests that the 
decision in Pertamina does not apply to individual customers, as it was held at 
[61]: “we are not required to express a general opinion as to the reasonableness 
of conclusive evidence clauses as and when applied to individuals and non-
corporate customers since the issue does not arise in the present context.” 
 
The above cases shows the tendency of the Singapore courts to uphold conclusive 
evidence clauses which are tied with a period for the customer to verify monthly 
statement as short as 7 days from the date of receipt or 14 days from the date of 
the statement as satisfying the reasonableness test of the UCTA. However, it 
                                                        
241 Ibid at page 922. 
242 [2006] SGCA 27 at [58-60]. 
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should be noted that, the cases occurred so far only concerned with forged 
instructions. The fact that in some of these cases the customer shows no intention 
to verify the statement was contributory to the judges’ decision. There is 
indication in one of the cases that the conclusive evidence clause may not hold as 
strong if a wrong debit was made without any purported instructions: “However, 
this is not to say that if UOB had inadvertently and unilaterally made a wrong 
debit without any purported instruction whatsoever, it would still be entitled to 
rely on cl 13. In such a situation, it may be against public policy or may be 
unreasonable to allow UOB to rely on cl 13”243  
 
This means the current conclusive evidence clause may not be strong enough to 
hold the customer liable for computational errors. Extending towards this 
direction, if an unauthorized card transaction just occurs without the loss of a 
card, it may be impossible to prove who was at fault (whether it was the customer 
that did not use proper anti-spyware or the bank’s computers were hacked). As a 
card transaction does not constitute an instruction to the bank, it might 
conversely be categorized as an error. Therefore, in this area the customer may be 
able to further arguments to succeed. 
 
7.  SUGGESTIONS FOR A REFORM 
 
7.1 Risk-shifting practice in Singapore 
 
The analysis in section 6 above shows that there are currently 5 types of risk 
shifting clauses used in the cardholder agreements of major banks in Singapore, 
                                                        
243 Elis Tjoa v United Overseas Bank [2003] SGHC 1 [2003] 1 SLR 747 per Woo Bih Li JC at 
[96]. 
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of which 4 types have the effect of making the cardholder liable for all 
unauthorized card transactions regardless of the situation in which it was 
effected: 
 
(i) Exclusion of liability clause that disclaims all the bank’s liabilities for any 
use of misuse of the card; 
 
(ii) A clause that allows the bank to rely on instructions purported to emanate 
from the cardholder without any verification; 
 
(iii) A conclusive evidence clause that makes all the bank’s records final and 
conclusive evidence binding upon the cardholder for all matters relating to 
the card or the card account and the cardholder’s undertaking not to 
challenge the accuracy of the bank’s records in any event; and 
 
(iv) An indemnity clause whereby the cardholder indemnify and hold the bank 
harmless against any loss, damage, liability, cost and expense (including 
legal costs on a full indemnity basis) which the bank may incur or suffer as 
a result of or in connection with the card account, the cardholder 
agreement or any use of misuse of the card. 
 
In section 6, it has also been found that the UCTA has little effect to limit the 
above clauses. Any of the 4 types of clauses would effectively shift the entire 
burden of loss due to unauthorized card transactions to the cardholder if enforced 
to the full extent of their wording. However, there are 2 situations where the 
effect of the above clauses may be restricted: 
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(i) Where the bank’s records were erroneous resulting in a deduction in the 
card-account not occasioned by any purported transaction. There is 
indication in one local authority that the cardholder should not be liable 
for erroneous entry; and 
 
(ii) Where the unauthorized transaction occurred after the bank has received 
the notice by the cardholder that the card was lost or stolen. Most major 
banks in Singapore (except for Citibank) recognize in their standard terms 
that the cardholder is not liable in this situation. Therefore, even if the 
above 4 clauses make the cardholder liable for all unauthorized 
transaction regardless of any notice of loss or stolen card, their actual 
effect may be limited to the extend that they conflict with the clause that 
define the cardholder’s liability for unauthorized transaction. 
 
In Singapore, there is no law or regulation on the issue of cardholder’s liability for 
use of credit card, charge card or debit card by a third party. The issue of 
unauthorized card transactions is left to be determined by the standard terms 
drafted by the issuers. The analysis of the risk shifting terms used by Singapore 
banks shows that the cardholders are currently liable for all unauthorized 
transactions that occur before the issuers have been notified that the cards have 
been lost or stolen. The issuers are only liable in the very unlikely case that a 
transaction was effected after the notice of lost or stolen card have been received 
by them.  
 
The allocation of fraud loss under the standard terms of Singapore banks appears 
to be imbalanced by the cardholder taking too much risk and the issuers taking 
negligible risk. In the next section, we will look at the allocation of fraud loss 
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under the statutes and regulations in Britain and America and under the 
chargeback rules of a major card association to explore areas where some 
adjustments can be made to the allocation of credit card fraud loss in Singapore. 
 
7.2 Allocation of fraud loss according to card possession and 
methods of effecting transaction 
 
Credit card transactions can be categorized into card-present and card-absent 
depending on whether or not the plastic card was presented to the merchant. 
Because the credit and charge card was originally designed for use in card-present 
situation, the criteria of card possession has been reflected in the laws and 
practices as an important factor to determine liability for card transactions. 
Unauthorized transaction may occur: (i) while the card is lost or stolen after the 
cardholder’s acceptance; (ii) while the card remains in the possession of the 
cardholder or his authorized agent; or (iii) when the card is lost or stolen in the 
mail either before reaching the cardholder or after being sent back to the issuer 
for cancellation. 
 
(a) Card lost or stolen after cardholder’s acceptance 
 
In any jurisdiction, the cardholder is responsible either under the terms of the 
cardholder agreement or applicable statutes or both to inform the issuer when the 
card is lost or stolen to prevent loss due to fraudulent transaction. The notice by 




For practical reasons, after the notice reaches the issuer, it is very unlikely that a 
card transaction may be effected. An ‘approval’ from the issuer is required for all 
card-absent transactions as the merchant’s floor limit is zero. Even in card-
present transaction where the merchant’s floor limit is higher than zero, most 
merchant still obtain the ‘approval’ because the process of swiping the card is 
quick, simple, and effective to prevent chargeback. Upon the cardholder’s notice 
of a lost card, it is very easy for the issuer to disable the use of the card instantly 
by an entry in the database stored in the issuer’s computer systems. After the card 
has been invalidated, no ‘approval’ will be given by the issuer for any transaction, 
regardless of the method of communication. Under the current chargeback rules 
of Visa and MasterCard, if the cardholder alleged that the transaction was 
unauthorized and no ‘approval’ was obtained from the issuer, the merchant must 
accept the chargeback and bear the loss even if goods or services have been 
delivered. As the only case where the issuer is to bear the loss is a malfunction of 
its computer system resulting in an ‘approval’ being given for an invalidated card, 
the risk that the issuer has to take is near zero. This explains why the majority of 
Singapore card issuers are willing to take this risk in their standard terms. 
 
After the card was lost but before the issuer is informed that the card was lost, it 
is likely that an ‘approval’ would be given to fraudulent card transactions 
attempted if all the conditions required during card acceptance were satisfied. 
For card-present transaction, besides the issuer’s ‘approval’, the remaining 
requirements seem quite easy to be satisfied. The Visa’s rules only require that, in 
card-present transaction, either the card was swiped through a card reader 
terminal; or an imprint of the card was taken on the transaction receipt together 
with the signature of the card-bearer. The signature only needs to be spelled in 
the same way as the surname embossed on the card. For card-absent transaction, 
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the merchant would have the right to make a ‘representment’ (i.e. to resist a 
chargeback) if the card verification code (known as CVV2 in Visa’s system) was 
verified when the card transaction was effected. The CVV2 is a 3-digit number 
printed on the back of all Visa cards but not recorded in the magnetic or smart 
chip memory as a measure to verify that the person attempting to effect the 
transaction was actually in possession of the card. However, the CVV2 is not a 
foolproof measure because it is visible to anyone looking at the back of the card. 
The CVV2 can also be copied from the bank’s database or the merchant’s records. 
Therefore, CVV2 verification does not guarantee the merchant a success in 
defending a chargeback claim. The merchant would have a better chance to resist 
a chargeback if a billing address verification (known as AVS in Visa’s system) was 
conducted during card acceptance. AVS verification is another method used by 
Visa to reduce chargeback whereby the street address and postal code of the 
cardholder submitted by the merchant is verified against his billing address in the 
issuer’s records. The merchant would have a guaranteed success only if he can 
provide proof of delivery of physical goods to the billing address of the 
cardholder. This rule coincides with the requirement under US Code §1602(o) 
that the cardholder must not benefit from unauthorized use of the card. 
 
In America, there is an absolute ceiling of $50 for the cardholder’s liability for any 
card transaction effected without the cardholder’s express, implied or apparent 
authority and from which the cardholder receives no benefit244. To make the 
cardholder liable for up to $50 the issuer must satisfy various requirements 
including providing a method whereby the cardholder can be identified as the 
                                                        
244 Title 15 US Code §1643 applicable to credit card 
(http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00001643----000-.html)  
and  Title 15 US Code §1693g applicable to debit card 
(http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00001693---g000-.html). 
For a definition of ‘unauthorized use’ please refer to Title 15 US Code § 1602(o) 
(http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00001602----000-.html)  
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person authorized to use the card, giving adequate notice of potential liability, 
providing the cardholder with a description of a means by which the issuer may 
be notified of loss or theft of the card, proving the cardholder has accepted the 
card and that the unauthorized use occurs after the cardholder has accepted the 
card but before the cardholder has notified the issuer of the loss or theft of the 
card. 
 
In Britain, Section 83 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 stipulates that cardholders 
are not liable for any unauthorized transaction, subject to 2 exceptions specified 
in Section 84. If the card was obtained with the cardholder’s ‘consent’, he will be 
liable for the entire transaction under Section 84(2), even if no cardholder’s 
authority of any form exist. If the transaction occurred when the card was not in 
the possession of an ‘authorized person’ (i.e. the issuer, the cardholder or his 
authorized agent) the card -holder will be liable under Section 84(1) for not more 
than £50.  
 
Although structured differently both of the American and the British acts render 
similar results. If the card was lost or stolen (i.e. not voluntarily given by the 
cardholder), the cardholders in America and Britain would be liable for not more 
than $50 or £50 (respectively) per card issued245. Because the $50 or £50 limits 
are absolute ceiling, the cardholder would not be liable for more than that 
amounts even if he knew that the card was lost or stolen and failed to notify the 
issuer246. 
 
                                                        
245 Section 84(8) of the British Consumer Credit Act provides that the 50 limitation applies 
per credit token issued. The American Act was not specific on this but it seems that the $50 
also apply per each card issued. 
246 Except for the liability for the cardholder’s failure to verify card statements, which issue 
will be discussed in section 4 below. 
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To sum up, where a lost or stolen card is used fraudulently in card-present 
transaction of amount larger than the statutory limit, the card issuer in America 
and Britain would bear the loss of the transactions amount less the $50 or £50 to 
be paid by the cardholder. In the same situation, the cardholder in Singapore 
would be liable for the entire transaction amount.  
 
If, on the other hand, the lost or stolen card were used in card-absent transaction, 
the card issuer would be required to pay the merchant only if the merchant can 
prove that physical goods purchased were delivered to the billing address of the 
cardholder. This situation rarely occurs since fraudsters are not likely to order 
goods to be delivered to the billing address of the cardholder. Where no AVS 
verification is conducted or the goods or services are intangible (e.g. software, 
internet telephony services, digital music, etc) the result of a dispute would 
depend on the evaluation of facts and evidence by the card association on a case-
by-case basis. However, as the Singapore cardholders are liable for all 
unauthorized transaction effected before the notice of lost card reached the 
issuer, it seems that the Singapore issuers would have little incentive to pursue 
the chargeback for the benefit of the cardholder. In America or Britain, the card 
issuers would likely be more active in pursuing chargeback claim because it may 
be harder for them to satisfactorily prove that the transaction was authorized by 
the cardholder, in order to shift the fraud loss to the cardholder.  
 
(b) Card in the possession of the cardholder 
 
Even when the card is not lost, unauthorized transactions may occur in both 
forms of card-present and card-absent. A fraudulent card-present transaction 
may occur by counterfeit cards. A counterfeit card may be made by fraudsters 
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from the data extracted from a genuine card by a reader device or stolen from the 
database of the issuers or the merchants. The current chargeback rules of Visa 
place the fraud loss occasioned by counterfeit cards squarely on the merchants 
(chargeback reasons code 62). Because the issuer is entitled to chargeback the 
transaction amount to the merchant, the question of cardholder’s liability should 
not arise in this case. Fraudulent transactions seem more likely to occur in card-
absent form because it does not require usage of any special tools or devices to 
fabricate counterfeit cards. A fraudster that managed to copy the card particulars 
including the CVV2 number of any card would have no problem to effect card 
transactions by card-absent methods. As discussed above, as far as the Visa 
chargeback rules are concerned, where card-absent transaction is effected with 
both issuer’s ‘approval’ and CVV2 verification the result of a chargeback dispute 
depends on the evaluation of facts and evidence by the card association on a case-
by-case basis.  
 
Where the card remains in the possession of the cardholder, the situation does 
not fit perfectly within the frame of ‘transaction occurred before notice of lost 
card’ because the issue of notice does not arise if the card was not lost. Therefore, 
the notice should not be a relevant factor to determine questions of liability for 
unauthorized transaction. This point appears quite clear in the British Consumer 
Credit Act. The £50 ceiling under section 84(1) only applies if the card was not in 
the possession of the issuer, the cardholder, or other person authorized by the 
cardholder. Sub-sections 3A, 3B and 3C, added to section 84 in 2000 and 2004 
further clarify that sub-section (1) and (2) of section 84 do not apply to ‘distance 
contract’ as defined in the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 
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2000247 and the Financial Services (Distance Marketing) Regulations 2004248. 
Therefore, if card particulars were stolen and used to effect a card-absent 
transactions while the card remains in the possession of the cardholders, 
questions of liability would be determined solely under section 83. As the section 
83 is a reconfirmation of the general principles of agency law, the result of its 
application is that the cardholder would not be liable unless the issuer 
satisfactorily proved that the transaction was effected with the cardholder’s 
express, implied, or apparent authority. The American Act does not distinguish 
between card-present and card-absent transactions. Neither did it touch upon the 
situation of unauthorized transaction without loss of card. However, similar 
results would be achieved by the application of the provisions of §1643 and 
§1693(g). 
 
As usual, the situation in Singapore is the opposite to the above with all of the 
banks using risk shifting clauses to place the loss of all unauthorized card 
transactions that occur before the notice of lost card on the cardholder. 
Furthermore, 2 major foreign banks (Citibank and Standard Chartered) use 
additional clauses to specifically make the cardholder liable for all unauthorized 
card-absent transactions249. As these contractual terms are likely to be fully 
enforceable, the Singapore cardholders are at a great disadvantage when 
compared to other countries. 
                                                        
247 ““distance contract” means any contract concerning goods or services concluded between 
a supplier and a consumer under an organised distance sales or service provision scheme 
run by the supplier who, for the purpose of the contract, makes exclusive use of one or more 
means of distance communication up to and including the moment at which the contract is 
concluded”. (http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2000/20002334.htm). 
248 ““distance contract” means any contract concerning one or more financial services 
concluded between a supplier and a consumer under an organised distance sales or service-
provision scheme run by the supplier or by an intermediary, who, for the purpose of that 
contract, makes exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and 
including the time at which the contract is concluded”. 
(http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2005/20050689.htm) 
249 Please refer to section 6.1(c) in chapter III for the contents of these clauses. 
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(c) Card lost or stolen in the mail 
 
A credit, debit, or charge card may be lost or stolen after the issuer sent it to the 
cardholder but before the card-applicant’s receipt or acceptance of the card. The 
analysis in section 3.3 of chapter II shows that, in the majority of cases the 
agreement between the cardholder and the issuer has not been formed before the 
applicant’s receipt of the card. Therefore, the card-applicant may not be made 
liable for card transactions effected with the card that was lost or stolen before he 
has received the card under the cardholder agreement. However, the analysis also 
shows that, the card-applicant may be made liable by virtue of an undertaking in 
the application form. The standard application forms for credit and debit cards 
used by two biggest local banks of Singapore contain card-applicants undertaking 
to this effect. The DBS forms contain a declaration by the card-applicant that 
read: ‘I agree that the Card will be sent to me by mail to my mailing address at 
my risk’. The UOB forms contains similar declaration that ‘I/we authorize you to 
send the Card(s), personal identification number, all statements of account, and 
other communications to the Principal Card applicant by ordinary mail at his 
sole risk’. Therefore, if a card issued by DBS or UOB in response to an application 
was lost or stolen in the mail before reaching the card-applicant and subsequently 
used to effect a card transaction, the card-applicant would be liable for the fraud 
loss.  
 
The above clause in the card application seems to be enforceable because it 
neither seeks to absolve the issuer’s liability for its own fault nor fails the 
reasonableness test of the UCTA250. However, the clause should not be used 
because it is not necessary in practice. The majority of banks in Singapore adopt 
                                                        
250 For further information on the application of the UCTA, please refer to section 6 above. 
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the practice of validating a card for use only after having received the 
confirmation form returned by the cardholder after acceptance of the card. Before 
the cards needs validation, even if it was lost or stolen, it cannot be used to effect 
any transaction. This is a good practice to avoid fraud, which practice should be 
used by all card issuers. Using a clause in the application form to allow banks to 
send validated cards to cardholders at their own risk does give the banks some 
extra flexibility and save a little cost of one validation step but significantly 
reduces the security of the card issuing process and places unnecessary risk on 
the cardholder. 
 
In America, both US Code §1643 (credit card) and §1693(g) (debit card) make it a 
condition that the card must be accepted before any question of liability arise. In 
Britain, the same effect is achieved by including the ‘creditor’ in the definition of 
‘authorized person’ in Section 84 (7) and further confirming at Section 66 that the 
holder of credit token cannot be made liable until the token is accepted by him. It 
may be time to adopt the same approach in Singapore to abandon the practice of 
sending validated card on the card-applicant’s risk altogether. The change can be 
achieved at low cost to the banks while improving both the security of the card 
issuing process and avoiding unnecessary burden of risk on the cardholder. 
 
As discussed in section 3.3 in Chapter II, the standard cardholder agreement used 
by some banks (UOB in particular) requires the cardholder to give the issuer a 
written notice of termination together with the card cut in half to effect the 
termination of the agreement. In this case, if the cut card was lost or stolen in the 
mail and used to effect card-absent transaction (which is possible because two 
halves of the card still reveal all particulars needed to effect a transaction), the 
cardholder would be liable to the issuer for the unauthorized transaction. The 
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cardholder would be liable even if the postman was negligent, since the postman 
would be treated as the cardholder’s agent. The practice of requiring the return of 
the card cut in half should be abandoned because it is outdated and only adds 
unnecessary risk to the system. In practice, the cardholder could make a 
telephone call to the issuer’s call centre and the card would be invalidated within 
a few seconds. If this has been done, requiring the return of the card is simply a 
trouble for both the cardholder and the bank since the card could not be used in 
any transaction, even if it was lost in the mail. After the card has been invalidated 
by telephone, it would be retained if inserted into any ATM of the issuer or 
presented to any of their branches. Keeping the practice of returning cards cut in 
half would leave a chance for an unaware cardholder to use mail instead of the 
telephone and take the risk of its loss. Therefore, it is submitted that Singapore 
card issuers should adopt the practice of instructing cardholders to terminate 
card by telephone followed by returning the card to the issuer by inserting the 
card into the ATM or simply destroying the card.  
 
(d) Summary and suggestions 
 
The above analysis shows that, there are at least 3 situations where the card 
issuers in Singapore can assume liability for unauthorized transaction without 
incurring any significant loss. The first is where the card was lost or stolen and 
the cardholder has already informed the issuer of such loss. Because it is unlikely 
that an unauthorized transaction may occur, this risk is near zero. The majority of 
Singapore card issuers have already assumed this liability in their standard terms. 
The second situation is where a new card or renewal/replacement card was lost or 
stolen in the mail before reaching the card-applicant/cardholder. This risk is 
avoidable if the issuers only send cards that are invalidated (i.e. not ready for 
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immediate use) by mail, pending the recipient’s written confirmation. The third 
situation is where a card-present transaction occurs while the genuine card 
remains in the possession of the cardholder. This only happens when a 
counterfeit card was used and the chargeback rules of major card associations 
place the fraud loss on the merchant. The merchant should bear the loss if they 
fail to detect counterfeit cards. Because the issuers do not suffer any loss when a 
counterfeit transaction occurs, they should recognize that the cardholder is in no 
event liable for any counterfeit transaction. 
 
That leaves us with only 2 difficult situations (i) where the card was lost and 
unauthorized transaction occurs before the cardholder informed the issuer; and 
(ii) where the card was not lost, but unauthorized transaction still occurred by 
card-absent method, because the card particulars was intercepted from 
somewhere. Under American and British laws, the cardholder’s liability is limited 
to $50 and £50, respectively, in the prior case and zero in the latter. In Singapore, 
the cardholder is potentially liable for the entire amount of the unauthorized 
transaction under the banks’ standard terms. Under the typical chargeback rules 
of the card association (Visa, is taken as example), the loss fall on the issuer in the 
prior case, while in the latter, it depends on the method of verifying transaction. 
 
In the first case, there are more reasons to hold the cardholder liable. First, when 
the card was lost or stolen, the cardholder is under a duty to inform the issuer. 
Failure to fulfill the duty seems to be a good reason to make them liable. Even the 
most pro-consumer jurisdictions allow the issuer to claim for a certain amount, 
albeit quite small, to encourage the cardholder to give notice soon after the card 
was lost. Secondly, because the issuers have no means to protect themselves if 
they were not informed of the lost card, they should not bear the loss, which, 
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under the rules of card associations must fall on them or the cardholder. Thirdly, 
in terms of probability, the chance that a card gets lost without the cardholder 
knowing it is relatively small as most cardholders keep the card in their wallet 
together with cash and other important documents. An average cardholder will 
inform the issuer very soon after his card was lost or stolen. Considering the 
entire circumstances, it seems reasonable to make the cardholder liable for 
transaction occurring after the card was lost and before the notice was given to 
the issuer. A statutory limit to the amount of loss in Singapore, if one is to be 
enacted, may be set at a level higher than US$50. More importantly, the 
cardholder protection regulation should require the issuer to provide the 
cardholder with convenient means by which a notice of lost card can be given, 
most effectively by telephone followed by a written confirmation. 
 
In the second case, however, there are more reasons to hold the issuer liable for 
the loss. First, the card particulars can be stolen very easily in various situations. 
A staff of the merchant in any card-present transaction may copy all the visible 
particulars, including the card verification code (CVV2 in Visa cards), which fully 
enable him to effect card-absent transaction. The card particulars may also be 
stolen from the cardholder by key-logging spy software installed on the 
cardholder’s computer as a Trojan. Such a virus is capable of recording all the key 
strokes on the computer and sending the information to a hacker. The particulars 
may also be stolen from the database of the banks, the card associations, or the 
merchant. There have been many incidences where tens of millions of card 
particulars were reportedly stolen from banks or merchants251. The incidents 
                                                        
251. For example, in the issue dated 5th September 2005 of the Newsweek, 4 of such incidents 
were reported at page 42: (i) April 2005: DSW Shoe Warehouse, a merchant found its 
unencrypted database of 1.4 million credit and debit card transactions from its 108 stores in 
America was stolen by hackers; (ii) May 2004: CitiFinancial, a unit of Citigroup packed 
financial secrets of 3.9 million customers in boxes and put it in a mail truck, the boxes never 
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reported in one article may be only the tip of the iceberg. Because the loss of card 
particulars can be blamed on the issuers, the merchants, or the cardholders, it 
would be unreasonable to place the consequential loss solely on the cardholder. 
Secondly, even if the cardholder may have a duty to safeguard the card against 
loss there is no basis to impose on him a duty to protect the card particulars, 
either in contract or at law. Thirdly, under the current chargeback rules of the 
card associations, the issuer have much better chance to shift the loss back to the 
merchant, especially where the goods were not delivered to the billing address of 
the cardholder.  
 
To prevent fraud in internet transactions, two major card associations namely 
Visa and MasterCard have come up with two solutions known as ‘Verified by Visa’ 
and ‘MasterCard SecureCode’. Under these schemes, the cardholder may opt to 
use a PIN number to verify internet transactions. As the PIN is only known to the 
cardholder and far better protected than the visible CVV2 code or the billing 
address by encryption technologies, internet transaction verified with a PIN 
cannot be charged back by the usual ‘unauthorized transaction’ reason codes of 
the card associations. There are more reasons to hold the cardholder liable for 
internet transaction verified with a PIN. It is possible to impose a duty to protect 
the PIN in the same way as a holder of an ATM card protecting the PIN used for 
EFTPOS payments. If the encryption technology is sufficiently strong, the party 
most likely to be blamed when a PIN was stolen is the cardholder. The solution 
seems to be good as it helps to reduce internet credit card fraud. However, the 
                                                                                                                                                               
arrived; (iii) CardSystem, a U.S. based data possessing company which processes 
approximately 15 billion credit card transactions a year between merchant and banks, held 
credit cards information for ‘research’ purposes (in violation of agreement with Visa and 
MasterCard) and lost a database of about 40 millions credit cards issued in Japan, Hong 
Kong, Philippines and Australia; and (iv) April 2005: Michinoku Bank in Japan mistakenly 
threw out 3 CDs containing backup copies of the financial records of its entire customers base 
of 1.3 million. 
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solution would not be effective unless the PIN is designated as the only method to 
effect internet transactions after the cardholder has opted for it. If a card 
equipped with a PIN can still be used to effect transaction by using CVV2 or AVS, 
the risk of internet credit card is not reduced. While the Visa and MasterCard 
schemes are commendable as a method of preventing fraud, the solution has yet 
to be adopted by the banks in Singapore. A search in the MasterCard SecureCode 
directory252 shows that no Singapore bank has participated. The Verified by Visa 
directory253 shows only the name of Citibank Singapore.  
 
A regulation on internet credit card fraud, if one could be issued in Singapore, 
needs to strike the right balance of loss allocation between the cardholder and the 
issuer, while encouraging the deployment of solutions such as Verified by Visa 
and MasterCard SecureCode. Taking into account the entire circumstances, the 
issuers appear to be the most suitable candidate to be responsible for internet 
credit card fraud. The banks and financial institutions together with the card 
associations in which they are members are the only parties financially and 
technologically capable to tackle the problem of internet credit card fraud. 
Allowing them to shift the loss to the cardholder as they have been doing under 
their current standard terms would only give them an incentive to resist investing 
in new technologies and solutions to prevent fraud. Therefore, it is submitted that 
a reform in this area should make it a goal to re-allocate the burden of fraud loss 
due to internet credit card transaction to the issuer. 
 
The main argument against the idea of making the issuer liable for all 
unauthorized card-absent transaction where the card was not lost is that doing so 
                                                        
252 http://www.mastercard.com/us/personal/en/cardholderservices/securecode/index.html.  
253 http://www.visa-asia.com/ap/sea/cardholders/security/activate.jsp.  
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may create opportunity for dishonest cardholders to use the card fraudulently at 
the cost of the issuers. Therefore, it is arguable that, the banks’ standard terms 
were reasonable to make all cardholders liable for all unauthorized card-absent 
transactions so that dishonest cardholders should have no incentive to facilitate 
fraudulent use of the card, since they would be liable for the transaction anyway. 
This, however, may be a misleading argument. It is not reasonable to make the 
honest cardholders suffer losses to prevent fraudulent use of cards by dishonest 
cardholders. The prevention of fraudulent use of card by the cardholders should 
be done by criminal sanctions rather than by contractual means. The American 
legislation, while giving the cardholders the best protection against fraud losses 
also imposes heavy criminal penalties against fraudulent use of card by the 
cardholder. US Code §1644254 imposes fined of up to $10,000 and imprisonment 
terms of up to 10 years or both on various activities relating to fraudulent use of 
cards. 
 
7.3  Allocation of fraud loss according to type of cards and purposes 
of usage 
 
The questions of fraud loss allocation may be determined according to the type of 
cards used (credit, debit or charge card) to effect the unauthorized transaction 









(a) Debit vs. credit card 
Originally, the statutory confirmation that a cardholder is not liable for 
transactions other than those effected with his express, implied or apparent 
authority and the ceiling limit of his liability for unauthorized transaction in 
America and Britain only applies to credit cards. In America §1643255 applicable 
to credit card was introduced first in Sub-chapter I of Chapter 41, Title 15. 
§1693(g)256 applicable to debit card was enacted later in Sub-chapter VI of the 
same chapter. Currently, the same level of protection is afforded to both credit 
and debit card. In Britain, statutory protection is only afforded to holders of 
credit cards by virtue of sections 83 and 84 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. The 
recent amendments by Consumer Credit Act 2006 did not make any change to 
these two sections. Because the Consumer Credit Act is only concerned with 
extension of credit, the protection measure under the Act could not be extended 
to cover debit card and charge card. However, similar protection has been 
achieved by the Banking Code issued by British Bankers’ Association. While the 
Code is voluntary by nature, it has afforded the holders of debit and charge card 
the same practical protection. Currently Section 12.11 of the Banking Code 
2005257 provides that a bank’s customers will be responsible for losses to his 
account only if the customers act fraudulently or without reasonable care (e.g. 
keep written records of PIN and security information; give the card or security 
information to other; or fail to take reasonable steps to protect the card and 
security information, under Section 12.5). Under Section 12.12, unless the bank 
can show that the customer have acted fraudulently or without reasonable care, 
the customer’s liability for the misuse of  his card will be limited to £50 if 





257 http://www.bba.org.uk/content/1/c4/52/27/BankingCode2005.pdf.  
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someone else uses the card before the bank is informed that the card or PIN has 
been lost or stolen. If someone else uses the card particulars without the 
cardholder’s permission and the card has not been lost or stolen, the cardholder 
will not have to pay anything. If the card is used before the cardholder has 
received it, he will not be liable.  
 
(b) Consumer vs. business purposes 
 
The measures of protection against fraud loss afforded by the American 
legislations are available to both consumer and corporate credit cards. US Code 
§1645258 provides that §1643259 is applicable to credit cards issued to business and 
organizations. In case the same issuer issues 10 or more cards to the employees of 
a business or organization, §1645 allows the business or organization to contract 
out of the protection of §1643. The effect of contracting out is limited to the 
business or organization taking on liability for unauthorized transaction but not 
to impose any liability upon any employee with respect to unauthorized use of 
such a credit card in contravention with §1643. 
 
The British Consumer Credit Act 1974 only applies to consumer credit cards. 
Under section 189, the word ‘debtor’ was clearly defined as ‘the individual 
receiving credit under a consumer credit agreement’. However, the same level of 
protection has been extended to cards issued to businesses by virtue of the 
Business Banking Code. The current version of 2005 of the code260 provides at 
section 12.11 and 12.12 exactly the same protection afforded to individual 
customers of banks.  
                                                        
258 http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00001645----000-.html.  
259 http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00001643----000-.html  
260 http://www.bba.org.uk/content/1/c4/52/26/BusinessBankingCode2005.pdf.  
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Therefore, it is submitted that, as far as unauthorized card transaction is 
concerned, the same level of protection should be afforded to the holders of 
credit, debit, and charge cards issued to individual, business, or organization 
without distinguishing between type of card or the purposes of usage. 
 
The measures of cardholder’s protection that shift fraud losses to the issuer 
should be balanced with some responsibility on the part of the cardholder. The 
cardholder should be responsible to verify card account statements and inform 
the issuer of fraudulent use of card to enable the issuer to minimize its loss. We 




DISPUTES RELATING TO THE SALE CONTRACT 
 
1. DISPUTES BETWEEN THE CARDHOLDER AND THE MERCHANT 
 
1.1 Situations of disputes 
 
In chapter III we have dealt with the issue of liability for payment transactions 
effected by a third party that lack the authority of the cardholder. In this chapter, 
we are concerned with the disputes between the cardholder and the merchant 
arising from the sale contract. Generally, the disputes between the cardholders 
and the merchant may be divided into 3 categories: 
 
The first category includes disputes based on the merchant’s misrepresentation of 
goods or services, breach of express or implied warranties, breach or non-
performance of terms and conditions of the sale contract. Situations leading to 
this type of disputes generally relates to either an alleged deficiency in the quality 
of goods or services or merchant’s total failure to perform the sale contract. For 
example the goods or services purchased did not conform with the merchant’s 
description (whether made verbally in face-to-face or telephone transaction or 
presented to the cardholder via the internet website); the goods delivered to the 
cardholder was damaged or defective; or the goods or services were not delivered 
to the cardholder at all. In most cases of this category the cardholder only claims 
for a full refund of the purchase price but it is possible that he claims for other 
loss or damage consequential upon the merchant’s misrepresentation or breach 
warranties or conditions either in contract or in tort. 
 222
 
The second category includes disputes arising from an alleged wrongful or 
erroneous charge to the cardholder account attempted by the merchant. This 
category includes situations where: (i) the merchant effects multiple payment 
transactions for one sale transaction (which may be either an honest mistake to 
effect the same transaction more than one time or a dishonest attempt of the 
merchant to charge the cardholder for more than the sale transaction amount); 
(ii) the payment is a recurring transaction that has been cancelled by the 
cardholder; (iii) the charges that the merchant attempts to claim from the 
acquirer are of an amount different to the amount of the sale transaction (which 
may be made by an alteration of amount in a card-present transaction or input of 
wrong amount in card-absent transaction); or (iv) the card-transaction was 
attempted only as a security for payment (e.g. to book for hotel rooms or airfares) 
the actual payment for which has been made by other means but the merchant 
still effects the payment by credit card. In the first 2 situations the cardholder 
disputes the existence of the sale contract while in the last 2 situations the 
cardholder disputes the merchant’s adherence to the payment term of the sale 
contract. 
 
The last category relates to the cardholder’s right to repudiate the sale contract in 
case the goods or services were not satisfactory. The cardholder’s right may be a 
statutory right under the proper law of the sale contract or otherwise made 
available to him by an express term of the sale contract. Merchants supplying 
goods in card-present transaction usually state their refund policy clearly on the 
sale invoice near the cardholder signature. Such a policy might give customers 
rights to full refund within a certain period from date of delivery, no refund or 
return, in-store credit only, exchange only and may also includes special 
 223
circumstances such as the customer is allowed to return the goods but must bear 
the shipping costs. Merchants supplying goods and services over the telephone 
and internet increasingly have a policy that allows customer to cancel the services 
or return the goods within periods as long as 30 to 60 days to obtain a full refund. 
Normally, if the customers exercise the right to return goods or cancel services 
within the time limit allowed, the merchant is obliged to give a refund. The 
merchant’s failure to do so would result in a dispute with the cardholder. 
 
1.2 The cardholder’s claim against the merchant 
 
(a) Conflict of law question 
 
When a dispute arises between the cardholder and the merchant, the first 
question to be addressed is which law applies and which court has jurisdiction 
over the dispute. The conflict of law is a very large topic and we will only attempt 
to outline here the major conflict of law rules that may be applied where the 
dispute is resolved in Singapore courts. 
 
If the merchant and the cardholder are both domiciled in Singapore, the conflict 
of law issues may not arise. If the transaction was effected over the internet, the 
standard terms of the sale contract presented by a Singapore merchant would 
most likely select Singapore law. Even if no express choice of law were made (e.g. 
in a card-present transaction where no written contract was made), Singapore law 
would still apply as the system of law that has the closest and most real 
connection with the contract because all the connecting factors such as place of 
making contract, place of performance, place of residence of the parties and place 
of the forum points to Singapore. In terms of jurisdiction, the Singapore courts 
 224
certainly have jurisdiction to resolve the dispute because court documents can be 
served on both the merchant and the cardholder as both of them domiciles in 
Singapore261.   
 
The conflict of law questions arise where: (i) a foreign system of law was expressly 
selected to govern the contract between two Singapore parties; (ii) a foreign 
cardholder purchases goods or services from a merchant located in Singapore 
either through the internet or while he travels to Singapore, or (iii) a Singapore 
cardholder purchases goods or services from a merchant located overseas either 
through the internet or while he travels abroad.  
 
The first case seems quite rare but it is likely that the choice will be upheld subject 
to the qualifications that the application of the foreign law should not be contrary 
to public policy, and the choice should be bona fide and legal262. 
 
In the second case, the foreign cardholder may sue the merchant in Singapore 
courts. Singapore law may apply in the majority of cases either as the governing 
law of choice in the contract or as the law of the place of performance263 (if the 
goods or services were supplied in Singapore); the law of the place of making the 
contract (if the sale was made while the cardholder was in Singapore); or the law 
of the forum. In the unusual case where the contract was made via internet and 
no governing law was chosen, it is not certain that Singapore law would apply. If 
physical goods were to be shipped to the cardholder’s residential address after 
payment, it seems likely that the law of the place of performance, which is also the 
                                                        
261 Singapore Court of Judicature Act, chapter 322, Section 16(1). 
262 Rule 180 Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Law, Vita Food Products Incorporated v. 
Unus Shipping Company Ltd [1939] AC 277, Privy Council per Lord Wright. The Vita Food 
rule has been applied in the Singapore case of Peh Teck Quee v Bayerische Landesbank 
Girozentrale [2000] 1 SLR 148; [1999] SGCA 79. 
263 Charternay v Brazillian Submarine Telegraph Co [1891] 1 QB 79. 
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cardholder’s place of residence, would apply264. If the goods were intangible (e.g. 
software, digital music or internet telephony services), the result is not certain as 
the place of making of the contract or the place of performance can be either 
Singapore or the cardholder’s place of residence. In view of the lack of consumer 
protection in Singapore, a cardholder from a pro-consumer jurisdiction like 
Britain or America would probably prefer to sue the merchant in their own 
country and plead for application of the law of their residence to the contract. 
However, if Singapore courts have been expressly chosen under the contract, the 
Singapore merchant may apply for an anti-suit injunction to prevent future 
recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment in Singapore. 
 
In the third case, the Singapore cardholder may sue the foreign merchant in 
Singapore only if service of process may be made on the merchant while he was in 
Singapore or if the cardholder was granted leave to service outside jurisdiction265. 
Although difficult, such a leave may possibly be granted under Order 11, Rule 1 of 
the Rules of Court. Where the cardholder’s claim was in contract, it is arguable 
that the sale contract was made as a result of an essential step taken by the 
cardholder in Singapore266. Where the claim was in tort the damage may be 
suffered in Singapore or the tort was constituted in part by an act of omission 
occurring in Singapore267. As discussed above, bona fide and legal express choice 
                                                        
264 The same position is confirmed under the Brussel Regulation (European Council 
Regulation 44/2001) Article 5(1)(b). 
265 Section  16(1)(a)(ii) of the Singapore Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322). 
266 Rules of Court, Order 11, Rule 1, 1 (d)(i): “service of an originating process out of 
Singapore is permissible with the leave of the Court if in the action … Where the claim is 
brought to enforce, rescind, dissolve, annul or otherwise affect a contract, or to recover 
damages or obtain other relief in respect of the breach of a contract, being (in either case) a 
contract which was made in Singapore, or was made as a result of an essential step being 
taken in Singapore”. The cardholder’s act of clicking the mouse on a computer in Singapore 
to signify his acceptance of the contract may be considered an essential step in the making of 
the contract. 
267 Rules of Court, Order 11, Rule 1, 1 (d): “service of an originating process out of Singapore 
is permissible with the leave of the Court if in the action … the claim is founded on a tort, 
wherever committed, which is constituted, at least in part, by an act or omission occurring 
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of law would likely be upheld in Singapore court unless contrary to Singapore 
public policy.  
 
Where the subject matter of the dispute is not of the performance of the sale 
contract but its formation (e.g. whether the sale contract has been formed 
between the cardholder and the merchant), the governing law will be the putative 
proper law of the alleged contract268.  
 
In the rare case where the cardholder’s claim is not in contract but in tort (e.g. a 
Singapore cardholder purchased defective goods which caused injury for which 
the cardholder seek damages in tort), the double actionability rule would apply269. 
According to this rule, the alleged wrong must be actionable if committed in 
Singapore and it must not have been justifiable by the law of the location where 
the tort occurred. If the action were taken in Singapore, Singapore law as lex fori 
would apply to determine where in substance the tort occurred270. 
 
(b) The cardholder’s claim against the merchant under Singapore 
law 
 
Assuming that a dispute between the cardholder and the merchant is resolved in 
a Singapore court and Singapore law applies, the cardholder may have a cause of 
action in both tort and contract.  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
in Singapore; or (ii) the claim is wholly or partly founded on, or is for the recovery of 
damages in respect of, damage suffered in Singapore caused by a tortious act or omission 
wherever occurring”. If the goods were defective causing damage to the cardholder or if the 
goods were not delivered to the cardholder in Singapore one of these criteria may be satisfied. 
268 Re Bonacina [1912] 2 Ch 394,  
269 The double-actionability rule of Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 has been confirmed to be 
applied in Singapore, Parno v SC Marine Pte Ltd [1999] 4 SLR 579. 
270 Metall und Rohstoff v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc [1990] 1 QB 391. 
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The cardholder may claim for damages if he suffers injury or damages as a result 
of a defect in the goods or services purchased. If the cardholder himself uses the 
card to make payment for a contract of sale, the cardholder may sue the merchant 
for breach of contract or breach of express or implied warranty when the product 
was defective or if the merchant was otherwise in breach of a condition of the sale 
contract. As discussed in chapter II, the sale contract between the cardholder and 
the merchant should be characterized in the same way as a sale paid by cash. 
Therefore, in addition to the general principles of ordinary contract law, the 
cardholder may also rely on the implied warranty imposed by the Sale of Good 
Act or the Supply of Services Act. Such warranty include (i) the seller has the right 
to sell the goods, free from encumbrances; (ii) the goods correspond with their 
description; (iii) the goods are of merchantable quality except for defect that the 
buyer ought to have known before the contract; and (iv) the goods supplied are 
reasonably fit for their purposes.  
 
Where the cardholder did not use the card himself but authorized a carduser to 
use the card, the contract of sale is made between carduser and the merchant. The 
same remedy available to the cardholder in both contract and tort would be 
available to the carduser. In this case, because there is no contract between the 
cardholder and the merchant, the cardholder may not sue the merchant under the 
sale contract unless (i) the carduser represented to the merchant that he make the 
purchase as an agent on behalf of the cardholder or (ii) if the device of 
undisclosed principal is used, in which case it would be necessary to prove that 
the carduser intended to make the purchase on behalf of the cardholder and the 




1.3 Resolution of disputes via the issuer and card association 
 
Resolution of merchant-cardholder dispute across different jurisdictions in a 
court of law is a challenging and expensive task. A Singapore cardholder in a 
dispute with a foreign merchant faces many difficulties. If he wishes to sue the 
merchant in the foreign country, he needs to incur the cost of hiring foreign 
lawyers and probably travel to the foreign country. If he wishes to sue in 
Singapore, he has to apply for leave to serve process outside jurisdiction, which is 
not an easy task. Even after a judgment has been granted in his favor the task of 
getting it recognized and enforced against the merchant is daunting, if not 
prohibitive. The process is not less challenging and expensive for a foreign 
cardholder to pursue action against a Singapore merchant, whether in foreign or 
Singapore courts. Even where both the cardholder and the merchant domicile in 
Singapore, disputes between them rarely come to court. In practice, the majority 
of disputes between cardholder and merchant, regardless of where they are 
located are resolved via the issuer, the acquirer, and the card association in which 
they are members.  
 
Therefore, the chargeback rules of the card associations are relevant for our 
analysis. Traditionally all the rules and regulations of card associations are 
treated as confidential documents not publicly available, that makes it difficult to 
conduct analysis of card acceptance and resolution of disputes. Fortunately, 
recently Visa has disclosed several parts of its rules and regulations to the public. 
The relevant chargeback rules of Visa are now published on the internet website 
of Visa271 as part of the “Rules for Visa Merchants Card Acceptance and 




Chargeback Management Guidelines” to entice merchants to join Visa card 
acceptance programs. Through this document, we can find out more about the 
practical aspects of disputes resolution within the Visa system. The MasterCard 
chargeback rules have also been disclosed in part272. However, we chose to 
analyze the Visa rules as they appear to be more systematic and comprehensible. 
 
(a) Chargeback reason codes 
 
Under the current Visa chargeback rules, the various disputes between the 
cardholders and the merchant in respect of both the sale (except tort claim) are 
categorized into ‘reason codes’ with corresponding procedure for resolution. 
 
(i)  In the first category of disputes which arise from quality of goods or 
services or non-performance of the contract of sale there are 2 reason codes 
applicable. Reason code 53 allows the issuer to chargeback the transaction 
amount if the merchandise was defective or not as described. Code 53 is 
applicable to a wide range of situations such as: where the goods purchased from 
the internet were not as described in the sale receipt or other documentation 
presented to the cardholder at the time of the transaction; where the goods were 
not the same as the merchant’s verbal description for telephone transaction; and 
where the goods shipped to the cardholder and received but were damaged or 
defective. In all these cases, the cardholder is required to return the alleged 
defective, misrepresented, or damaged goods to the merchant before the 
chargeback claim can be submitted. The merchant is required to accept the 
chargeback if it has received the returned goods or if the cardholder’s claim was 




considered by Visa as valid. In case of defective merchandise, the chargeback 
claim may include the shipping fee of the returned merchandise in addition to the 
amount of the sale transaction. Reason code 30 is applicable to the situation of 
merchant’s non-performance of the sale contract. Under this code, the issuer may 
chargeback the transaction amount if services were not provided or merchandise 
were not received at the specified expected date of delivery or after 30 days from 
the date of the transaction. To resist the chargeback claim the merchant has to 
submit evidence of specified date of delivery if one has been indicated in the sale 
invoice, proof of delivery of goods or services, or evidence that it has informed the 
cardholder of delayed delivery. Merchant’s failure to provide sufficient evidence 
will result in the chargeback claim being resolved in favour of the cardholder. 
 
(ii)  The second category of disputes arises from an alleged wrongful or 
erroneous charge to the cardholder account attempted by the merchant. Where 
the merchant effects multiple payment transactions for one sale transaction, two 
reason codes apply. Code 57 (fraudulent multiple transaction) applies to alleged 
dishonest attempt of the merchant to charge the cardholder for more than the 
sale transaction amount and code 82 (duplicate transaction) applies to resolve 
honest mistakes to effect the same transaction more than one time. Where the 
payment was a recurring transaction that has been cancelled by the cardholder, 
reason code 41 (cancelled recurring) applies. Where the charges that the 
merchant attempts to claim from the acquirer is of an amount different to the 
amount of the sale transaction (which may be made by an alteration of amount in 
a card-present transaction or input of wrong amount in card-absent transaction), 
reason code 80 (wrong or altered amount) applies. Where the card-transaction 
was attempted only as a security for payment (e.g. to book for hotel rooms or 
airfares), the actual payment for which has been made by other means but the 
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merchant still effects the payment by credit card, reason code 86 (paid by other 
means) applies. In all the situations listed in this category, the merchant has to 
accept the chargeback claim and the amount of the transaction will be credited 
back into the account of the cardholder if the merchant fails to disprove the 
cardholder’s allegation. For example, if the cardholder claims for chargeback 
under reason code 57 or 82, the merchant is required to submit copies of invoices, 
delivery receipt and payment transaction receipt to prove that there were actually 
multiple sale transactions for which valid charges were made to resist the 
chargeback claim. 
 
(iii)  The third category relates to the cardholder’s right to repudiate the sale 
contract in case the goods or services were not satisfactory. The Visa rules require 
that the merchant must state its refund/cancellation policy clearly on the sale 
invoice near the cardholder’s signature and comply with such policy. The 
merchant is at liberty to fix its refund policy (e.g. full refund within a certain 
period from date of delivery, no refund or return, in-store credit only, exchange 
only, and special circumstances where the cardholder is allowed to return the 
goods but must bear the shipping costs, etc). If the cardholder cancels the services 
or returns the goods to the merchant within the period allowed for refund 
indicated in the sale invoice, the merchant is required to process a credit to return 
the transaction amount to the cardholder. If the merchant fails to process a credit, 
upon a request by the cardholder, the issuer is entitled to chargeback under either 
reason code 85 (credit not processed), or reason code 53 (returned merchandise 





(b) Disputes resolution cycle in a card association 
 
Typically, when a cardholder raises a dispute with a merchant, the issuer would 
make an enquiry into the nature of the dispute by asking the cardholder to fill in a 
standard form. The form is designed to clarify the nature of the dispute and 
categorize it in accordance with the applicable reason codes. The cardholder is 
usually required to provide documentary evidence to support his claim.  
 
If the issuer were convinced that cardholder’s claim was valid and supported by 
evidence, the issuer would accept the form and immediately credit the transaction 
amount back to the card account pending resolution of the dispute with the 
merchant. After that, the issuer would lodge a chargeback claim through the card 
association, giving the applicable reason code and details of the claim, 
information regarding the cardholder’s attempt to resolve the dispute with the 
merchant and supporting evidence. There is a time limit to submit a chargeback 
claim for each type of transaction, which is usually about 6 months from the date 
of the transaction. 
 
The issuer’s chargeback request sent to the card association will then go through a 
screening process. Requests that involve technical errors such as wrong reason 
codes, non-compliance with chargeback rules (e.g. chargeback beyond time limit) 
would be rejected automatically. Chargeback requests that pass the screening 
stage will be forwarded to the acquirer, who then forwards the request to the 
merchant. The acquirer would then work with the merchant to retrieve originals 
or copies of relevant transaction documents and other supporting documents 
(such as invoice, proof of delivery) that may be used to resist the chargeback. The 
information and documents provided by the merchant will be forwarded back to 
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the cardholder via the issuer. Most disputes would be resolved at the end of this 
cycle because the chargeback rule is rather straightforward.  
 
If the dispute is not resolved at the end of the first cycle, the issuer can make a 
second attempt to chargeback if further information and/or evidence can be 
deduced by the cardholder. If the parties fail to agree on a resolution of the 
dispute after the second cycle, the dispute will be finally resolved by an 
arbitration procedure within the card association. The arbitrator of the card 
association has authority under the association rules to resolve the dispute 
conclusively without going to courts.  
 
(c) Effect of disputes resolution by the card associations 
 
The decisions of the arbitrator are not binding on the cardholder and the 
merchant but it is binding between the issuer and the acquirer by virtue of the 
association’s bylaw and regulations. The effectiveness of the rules is further 
enhanced by the indemnity given by the association to each member, whereby the 
association undertakes to indemnify rules abiding members against loss if 
another member is unable or unwilling to pay. Because the monopoly power of 
the card association, there is hardly any chance any issuer or acquirer refusing to 
comply with the arbitration decisions.  
 
The effect of the dispute resolution mechanism on the cardholder and the 
merchant is indirect, but not less powerful. The issuer or acquirer that came out 
with a loss in a dispute may seek to recover the loss by charging it to the 
cardholder or the merchant respectively.  
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As shown in chapter II, a typical merchant agreement usually contains a lengthy 
chargeback clause which gives the acquirer the right to withhold payment to the 
merchant in respect of any transaction (or if it has been paid, to deduct the 
transaction amount from the account of the merchant), in case the cardholder 
refuses to pay based on the ground that the goods or services supplied were 
defective or that the merchant was in breach of the contract of sale. In addition to 
the chargeback clause that directly relates to disputes resolution, the merchant 
agreement usually states that the merchant is solely responsible to resolve any 
disputes with the cardholder without involving the acquirer; and that the 
merchant indemnifies the acquirer from any claim or liability relating to the sale. 
Acquirers specialize in serving electronic commerce merchants in Singapore such 
as eNets also have the practice of holding the funds received from internet 
transactions for 6 months before allowing the merchant to draw funds from the 
account. The practice guarantees the acquirer that funds are always available in 
the account even if all the transactions were charged-back. 
 
On the other hand, a typical cardholder agreement in Singapore minimizes 
chargeback by avoiding to give any cause for the cardholder to raise a dispute 
with the issuer based on a misrepresentation or default by the merchant. As will 
be shown in the next section below, all cardholder agreements in Singapore 
contains clauses that exclude all issuer’s liabilities in respect of any dispute 
between the cardholders and the merchants. Some cardholder agreements have 
additional clauses that make the cardholders liable for all internet transaction, 
whether or not authorized by the cardholder. Such clauses in the cardholder 
agreement have the effect of guaranteeing that the issuer will be entitled to charge 
the amount of the card transaction to the cardholder in the event the outcome of 
the dispute as resolution was in favor of the merchant.  
 235
 
The overall effect is that when dealing with the Singapore banks, whether as a 
cardholder or as a merchant, the customers are depending on the absolute 
discretion of the banks to resolve the dispute in any manner they think fit. The 
banks are granted wide flexibility at minimum risk possible. In terms of speed 
and costs, the disputes resolution mechanism under the card association is very 
efficient. Types of disputes are categorized systematically into comprehensive 
reason codes. Communication is faster with coded messages, which are often 
transmitted by electronic means. Processing of requests and documents is 
assisted by computer software to minimize invalid requests and errors. 
 
Because of the practical difficulties and high costs to resolve a merchant-
cardholder disputes in courts, the vast majority of such disputes are not resolved 
directly between the merchant and the cardholder but via the chargeback 
mechanism of the card associations. The problem with this is not about the 
fairness or efficiency of the card networks disputes resolution procedure but the 
bank’s willingness to assist their customers in the situations of disputes. The 
analysis in the next section seeks to demonstrate the degree in which banks in 
Singapore are accountable to cardholders for a dispute with the merchant, in 
comparison with the degree of banks’ accountability in other countries. 
 
2. ISSUER’S LIABILITY FOR CARDHOLDER’S CLAIM IN THE SALE CONTRACT. 
 
2.1  Issuer’s involvement in the sale contract 
 
The liability of an issuer of credit, debit, or charge cards to the cardholder for a 
claim the cardholder may have in the sale contract with the merchant depends on 
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the capacity in which the issuer is involved in the sale transaction and the degree 
of involvement. Generally, an issuer may be involved in the sale contract in 
several capacities. First, the issuer may be the same person as the merchant 
selling the goods or services to the cardholder. This situation is rare because the 
Singapore Banking Act prohibits banks from selling goods to customers. 
However, the situation may still arise if a subsidiary of the bank sells products 
such as an insurance policy to a cardholder, the payment for which is made by his 
card. Furthermore, a charge card issuer who is not licenced as a bank or financial 
institution is not prohibited from selling goods to customers. Secondly, the issuer 
may be involved as an advertiser who disseminates information on merchants 
and their products to entice cardholder to make purchases from the merchants by 
the card. This situation frequently occurs in Singapore. All Singapore banks send 
to their cardholders promotional booklets containing advertisements of hundreds 
of merchants who offer special discounts, free gifts or awards to cardholders of 
certain types of cards at least once a month together with the bank statements. 
Generally, banks only advertise for merchants who are also using the same bank 
as their acquirer. When a cardholder make purchase from such merchants, the 
banks earns the entire amount of the fee for processing the payment transaction 
collected from the merchant without having to share it with another bank. 
Thirdly, the issuers are involved as providers of credit who lend money for the 
cardholder to purchase the goods or services. This is applicable only if the holders 
of credit card do not settle in full the amount due under the monthly statements, 
or if the holders of debit card have an underlying overdraft facility available in the 
account linked with the card. Finally, the issuers are always involved as the 
providers of payment services by which the consideration for the sale contract is 
fulfilled regardless of the type of card used.   
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2.2 Issuer’s liability in contract 
 
The issuer’s liability towards the cardholder depends on the terms of the 
cardholder agreement. As discussed in chapter II, the liabilities of the issuer first 
depend on how the cardholder’s obligation to pay the issuer is characterized. If 
the card transaction is characterized as an assignment of book debts by the 
merchant, the issuer as assignee takes the debts subject to equities. The issuer’s 
claim against the cardholder is subject to all defence the cardholder may have 
under the sale contract including cross-claims and cardholder’s right to set off 
damages for merchant’s misrepresentation or breach of the sale contract. 
However, the analysis in chapter II shows that the better way to characterize the 
cardholder’s obligation is by direct obligation theory, which means the 
cardholder’s obligation to pay the issuer is direct, separate and independent of 
any claims that he may have against the merchant. The analysis in chapter III 
shows that all cardholder agreements in Singapore invariably impose upon the 
cardholder a direct obligation to pay the issuer the charges that appear in the 
monthly card statement rendered to him. Therefore, the assignment theory of 
characterization cannot be applied to make the issuer liable for any claim the 
cardholder may have against the merchant in the sale contract. 
 
As discussed earlier, cardholder agreements in Singapore were drafted to 
minimize the chance that a cardholder may have any cause of action or any basis 
to complaint to the issuers of any problems or disputes with any merchant. It is 
not possible to find the words ‘chargeback’, ‘countermand’ or ‘stop payment’ in 
any cardholder agreement. As far as a cardholder is concerned, once a card 
transaction is effected, the payment is complete and he is not entitled to ask the 
bank to stop payment, to re-credit the transaction amount to his card account or 
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to assist him in any dispute with the merchant. In addition, a typical Singapore 
cardholder agreement usually contains clauses that expressly disclaim issuer’s 
liability in respect of any disputes between cardholder and merchant. The 
exclusion of liability clauses used by Singapore banks have been considered in 
some length in chapter III in respect of unauthorized transaction. The effect of 
the same clause that we considered in section 6.1(a) in chapter III is also extended 
to cover the situation of cardholder-merchant disputes273. The standard terms 
used by major foreign banks contains similar clauses. Two of them went further 
to specifically deal with transactions made by remote methods such as mail, 
telephone, facsimile, or internet274.  
 
By the usage of the above standard clauses, the banks not only exclude their 
liability for any disputes with the merchant but further express their indifferent 
attitude in respect of card-absent transaction. From the letters of the standard 
                                                        
273 The clauses found in the cardholder agreements of 3 biggest Singapore local banks are as 
follows. UOB bank: “We are not responsible for the quality of any goods supplied and the 
performance of any services provided by any establishment with the use of the Card.” DBS 
bank: “We are not liable in any way should you encounter any problems with the goods and 
services that you obtain through the use of your Card nor are we responsible for any 
benefits, discounts or programmes of any merchant that we make available to you. In spite 
of the non-delivery or non-performance or defects in any such goods and services, you shall 
pay us the full amount shown in the Card Account statement.” OCBC bank: “The Bank shall 
not be responsible for the goods or services covered by any Card Transaction or the delivery 
quality or performance thereof or the privileges, benefits, discounts or programmes of any 
Merchant (whether or not made available or introduced to any Cardmember by the Bank or 
under any Programme). The Bank shall be entitled to charge the Card Account in respect of 
that Card Transaction notwithstanding the non-delivery or non-performance of or any 
defect in those goods or services or the failure of any Merchant to provide or make available 
to any Cardmember any of those privileges, benefits, discounts or programmes. All 
Cardmembers shall seek redress in respect of such goods, services, privileges, benefits, 
discounts and programmes from the Merchant directly.” 
274 The clauses we analyzed in section 6.1(c) in chapter III are included here for ease of 
reference: Standard Chartered Bank’s Clause 21.9: “A request by mail, telephone, 
facsimile transmission or other means of communication to a merchant for the supply of 
goods and/or services to be charged to the Card Account, whether or not made or authorised 
by the Cardmember and whether a sales draft, voucher or document is signed by the 
Cardmember, is a valid Card Transaction and the Bank will debit the Card Account with 
such Card Transaction”. Citibank’s clause 4.3: “A request via mail, telephone, facsimile, 
internet or other means of  communication to a merchant for the supply of goods and/or 
services to be charged to the card account, whether made or authorized by you and whether 
a sales draft, voucher or document is signed by you, is a valid card transaction and we will 
debit your card account with such card transaction.” 
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terms it appears that if a transaction is effected via card-absent methods the 
banks is entitled to charge the amount to the cardholder account. It does not 
matter to the bank whether or not the merchant was able to prove that the goods 
or services were supplied.  
 
Our analysis in chapter III of the application of the English Unfair Contract Term 
Act 1977 in Singapore shows that it is quite unlikely that the exclusion of liability 
clauses would fail the reasonableness test under the Act. If the clauses pass the 
test of reasonableness in the situation of unauthorized transaction, the same 
clause would be even more likely to pass the test in the circumstances of disputes 
with the merchant. If the bank was only involved as the provider of payment 
services or credit without publishing advertisement for the merchant, the loss 
caused to the cardholder due to the merchant’s misrepresentation or default of 
the sale contract cannot be said to have been caused by the bank’s negligence. A 
clause excluding the bank’s liability for damage not caused by its negligence 
would likely be considered reasonable under the Act. 
 
If the bank negligently included untrue information about the merchant’s 
products or services in the advertisement sent to the cardholder, which resulted 
in a loss to the cardholder there might be more reasons to make the bank liable. 
However, as reflected in several recent cases decided in the Singapore courts, a 
typical example is Ri Jong Son v Development Bank of Singapore Ltd275, clauses 
that exclude the bank’s liability for its own negligence were held to be reasonable 
                                                        
275 [1998] 3 SLR 64. This clause used by UOB “The bank shall not be liable for any loss 
damage or expense suffered or incurred by the customer (whether as a result of computer 
breakdown, forgery of signatory’s signature, material alteration of withdrawal/requests or 
other reasons of any kind whatsoever) through no fault of the bank” was held to be 
reasonable under the UCTA as it “did not seek to restrict the bank’s liability for negligence 
and even if it did, the clause was reasonable within the context of a bank-customer 
relationship”. 
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within the context of bank-customer relationship. Therefore, it is very likely that 
under the current terms of cardholder agreements in Singapore the cardholder 
would not have any claim in contract against the issuer in the case of merchant’s 
misrepresentation or breach of the sale contract.   
 
2.3 Issuer’s liability in tort 
 
The above analysis shows that a Singapore cardholder would not stand a chance 
to hold the issuer liable for the merchant’s non-performance or breach of the sale 
contract based on the cardholder agreement. Any available remedy has to be 
found in tort. Where the issuer makes no advertisement or representation of the 
merchant’s goods or services it is unlikely that the cardholder can establish any 
involvement of the issuer in the merchant’s conduct or foreseeability of damage to 
support his claim.  
 
If the issuer was also the acquirer of the merchant and the advertisement by the 
issuer of the goods or services supplied by the merchant constitutes a 
misrepresentation, the cardholder may establish a claim against the issuer in tort. 
There is no local authority on this point but there are some American authorities 
that held creditors liable in negligence for not supervising the affairs of a seller 
whom they financed. In Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Association276, 
the plaintiff was the owner of a home purchased from a developer financed by 
Great Western. Great Western was held liable for damage from structural defects 
due to the fault of the developer. If we follow the arguments in this case, a credit 
card issuer may be held liable for the merchant’s breach on the ground that the 
display of the issuer’s logo at the merchant’s premises or the advertisement of the 
                                                        
276 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969). 
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merchant’s goods or services on the issuer’s newsletter constitute a 
representation that the merchant has been selected by the issuer for 
dependability. The cardholder may contend that the issuer has a duty of care to 
investigate the merchants’ business to ensure they were reliable, and that the 
issuer could have reasonably foreseen the risk of harm to the cardholder if the 
merchant failed to perform the sale contract or if the products advertised were 
misrepresented. The degree of the duty of care of the issuer (if any) depends on 
the degree of the issuer’s involvement with the operation of the merchant and the 
foreseeability of damage caused to the cardholder. The dicta in Hedley Byrne & 
Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners277 seems to be applicable as the circumstances also 
arise between bank and customers. The issuer may be liable to the cardholder for 
economic loss resulting from the negligent misrepresentation made in their 
advertisements or correspondence with the cardholder. 
 
However, even if the cardholder succeeds in proving the issuer’s negligence the 
disclaimer of liability clauses in the cardholder agreement, as described in 
previous sections would operate to defeat the cardholder’s claim in tort. A court 
would not impose a duty in tort that is inconsistent with the terms of the contract 
between the cardholder and the issuer278. In Hedley Byrne itself, the customer 
also failed in the suit because of a disclaimer of liability in the relevant 





                                                        
277 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners [1963] 3 W.L.R. 101 (House of Lord). 
278 Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. V. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd  [1986] AC 80 PC. 
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2.4 Issuer’s liability in Britain and America 
 
The analysis in previous section shows that currently the Singapore cardholders 
have no right to assert any claim or defences against the issuer for any 
misrepresentation, default, or non-performance by the merchant, at either 
common law or contract. In order to propose a reform in this area, it is necessary 
to look at the relevant parts of the consumer credit protection legislations in 
Britain and America that deals with this issue. This analysis serves to show the 
deficiency in the regulatory regime of Singapore and to suggest desirable features 
if a reform may be attempted. 
 
(a) Issuer’s liabilities in America 
 
The §1666(i) of US Code279 grants credit cardholder the right to assert against the 
issuer claims (other than tort claims) or defenses arising out of the contract of 
sale with the merchant. According to §1666(i), the cardholder’s right to assert 
claims or defenses is subject to several limitations. First, under sub-section (a)(1), 
he must has made a good faith attempt to obtain satisfactory resolution of the 
disagreement or problem relative to the transaction from the merchant directly. 
Secondly, the amount of the transaction must exceed $50. The third limitation is 
that the place where the initial transaction occurred was in the same State as the 
mailing address previously provided by the cardholder or was within 100 miles 
from such address. The third limitation does not apply if the merchant was the 
same person as the card issuer, was controlled by the card issuer, was under 
direct or indirect common control with the card issuer, was a franchised dealer in 
                                                        
279 Title 15, Chapter 41, Sub-chapter I, Part D, 
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00001666---i000-.html.  
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the card issuer’s products or services, or has obtained the order for such 
transaction through a mail or publication made by or participated by the card 
issuer by which the cardholder was solicited to enter into such transaction by 
using the credit card issued by the card issuer. Furthermore, the issuer may be 
considered as having waived its right to rely on the third limitation if it has agreed 
to render assistance to the cardholder to resolve the dispute with a merchant 
located outside the state or the 100miles distance280. 
 
Under sub-section (b) of §1666(i), the amount of claims or defenses the 
cardholder may assert ‘may not exceed the amount of credit outstanding with 
respect to such transaction at the time the cardholder first notifies the card 
issuer or the person honoring the credit card of such claim or defense’. 
Therefore, the nature of the cardholder’s claim under §1666(i) is in effect a right 
to withhold payment, not a right to seek a refund or reimbursement. In other 
words, as soon as the cardholder makes payment of the credit card bill the 
amount of claims he is entitled to assert would reduced by the same amount of his 
payment. Therefore, the cardholder must find out about any defect in the 
merchandise and raise his claim before he makes payment of the credit card bill. 
The measure of protection under §1666(i) is only available to holders of credit 
cards, but not debit or charge cards. 
 
(b) Issuer’s liabilities in Britain and Europe 
 
The British Consumer Credit Act 1974 imposes liability upon the issuers of credit 
cards in respect of the sale transaction by two sections: section 75 and section 56. 
Section 75 provides that the cardholder will have the ‘like claims’ against the 
                                                        
280 Hyland v. First USA Bank, 1995 WL 595861 (E.D. PA.Sept.28,1995). 
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issuer as the claim he has against the merchant in respect of misrepresentation or 
breach of contract if (i) the agreement is a regulated debtor-creditor-supplier 
agreement281 (ii) the cardholder’s claim is in relation to a transaction financed by 
the debtor-creditor-supplier agreement and (iii) the claim in respect of one item 
has a cash price attached to it by the merchant from £100 to £30,000. Because of 
the ‘like claim’ formula, the cardholder’s claim is not limited to the value of the 
goods supplied. He may claim damages for breach of contract or 
misrepresentation such as loss of profit, consequential loss or injury caused by 
defective goods. The cardholder may also have a restitutionary claim against the 
issuer if he has the same claim against the merchant, which depends on whether 
the merchant has received the benefit of the payment transaction from the issuer. 
Sub-section (4) provides that the cardholder’s right is not affected even if, by 
entering into the transaction, he has exceeded the credit limit or otherwise 
contravened any terms of the agreement with the issuer. Sub-section (2) allows 
the issuer to recover from the merchant loss suffered by the issuer in satisfying 
his liability under section 75, including reasonable costs in defending the 
proceeding instituted by the cardholder. 
 
Section 56 of the British Act allows cardholder to recover damages from the issuer 
in respect of contractual misrepresentation made by the merchant. The effect of 
section 56 is achieved in a way similar to section 29 of the British Hire Purchase 
Act 1965 by providing that the merchant is deemed as an agent for the issuer in 
addition to being a principal in the sale contract. The statutory ‘deemed agency’ is 
not limited to the contract of sale. Hence, the issuer may be made liable for 
misrepresentation made by the merchant in respect of the credit agreement or 
even for tortuous or criminal liabilities. Unlike section 75, section 56 does not 
                                                        
281 Please refer to the discussion at page 246 below (footnote 283). 
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contain any monetary limits of the transaction amount nor does it confer upon 
the issuer any right to seek indemnification from the merchant. The application of 
section 56 requires that the goods sold forms the subject matter of a regulated 
debtor-supplier-creditor agreement. 
 
(c) Features of measures of protection 
 
The statutes in both America and Britain both grant the cardholders the right to 
assert against the issuers claims arising out of the contract of sale with the 
merchant. The right is only granted to holders of credit card, not debit or charge 
cards.  
 
In terms of the nature of the cardholder’s right the British Act appears to be the 
most generous by giving the cardholder the right to claim for consequential 
damages, which might be in tort or contract and restitutionary claims in addition 
to the amount of the sale transaction. In America, the cardholder’s claim in tort is 
excluded. In other part of Europe the Consumer Credit Directive only requires 
that member States give credit cardholders the right to pursue action against the 
creditor282 but did not specify that the debtors should be entitled to claim for 
consequential damages. As the nature of the claim is different, the amount of the 
claim the cardholder may have in Britain may be bigger than in other parts of 
Europe and America. In terms of claim amount, the British Act does not limit the 
claim amount, but only requires that each item in which the cardholder has a 
dispute must have a cash price attached to it from £100 to £30,000. The 
American statute only requires the amount of each transaction to exceed $50 
                                                        
282 Article 11, Consumer Credit Directive, Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986, 
Official Journal L 042 , 12/02/1987 P. 0048 – 0053. Please refer, also, to discussion at page 
253 below. 
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without any ceiling limit of claim. However, the total amount of the cardholder’s 
claim is limited to the amount of credit outstanding with respect to the same 
transaction at the time the cardholder first raise the dispute with the merchant or 
the issuer. 
 
Generally, the cardholder’s right to assert a claim or defence against the issuer in 
respect of the merchant’s breach or default in the sale contract has to depend on 
the degree at which the issuer participate in the sale transaction. As discussed in 
section 2.1 above, the issuer may be involved in the sale transaction as a seller, an 
advertiser, a creditor or merely as a provider of payment services. The degree of 
involvement by the issuer may be defined by various criteria such as (i) the nature 
of the agreement between the issuer and the cardholder; (ii) the relationship 
between the issuer and the merchant whether by ownership, control, franchise or 
joint promotion; and (iii) the method of effecting the card transaction whether 
card-absent or card-present, which is also related to the place where the 
transaction occurs. The legislation in Britain and America differ in the criteria 
selected as the basis to hold the issuer liable to the cardholder.  
 
The British statute emphasizes on two criteria: the creditor-debtor relationship 
between the issuer and the cardholder and a pre-existing arrangement between 
the issuer and the merchant. Section 75 only applies to card transaction financed 
by “a debtor-creditor-supplier agreement” which, by definition is “made by the 
creditor under pre-existing arrangement, or in contemplation of future 
arrangements, between himself and the supplier”283. The use of the word 
“arrangement” instead of “agreement” suggests that something short of a 
contractual relationship will suffice to render the issuer liable. Therefore, section 
                                                        
283 Consumer Credit Act 1974, Section 75(1) and Section 12(b). 
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75 applies not only to card-present transaction effected in Britain but also to 
credit card transactions that occur outside the country. This proposition has been 
suggested by Professor Goode284 and recently confirmed by the Court of Appeal in 
the case of Office of Fair Trading v. Lloyds TSB Bank plc and others285. Because 
of the English courts’ tendency to interpret the word ‘arrangement’ to include 
non-contractual relationship, there is little doubt that section 75 applies to 
internet credit card transaction in the same way as it applies to card-present 
transactions. The second criteria of issuer-merchant relationship has almost no 
real effect as it is only applied on the surface without taking into account location 
of the transaction, the merchant or method of effecting transaction.  
 
The American statute also considers the creditor-debtor relationship as essential 
but differs in the selection of the second criteria of the place of transaction with 
an exception where the issuer is involved with the merchant’s business by 
ownership, control, franchise, or joint-promotion activities. Because of the 
criteria of the place of transaction, the method of effecting card transactions 
(whether card-absent or card-present) seems to be a more relevant factor under 
the American law. While taking geographical location as a criteria seems to be 
more readily of application than an ambiguous word such as ‘arrangement’, the 
application of this criteria in practice also has some problems. In a card-absent 
transaction effected by mail, fax, telephone, or internet, it is difficult to determine 
the location of the transaction. Cases dealing with card-absent transaction have 
reached conflicting results with some cases considering the transaction takes 
place at the consumer’s location and some other held that the transaction takes 
place at the merchant’s place of business. 
                                                        
284 R.M. Goode “Consumer Credit Law and Practice” (Butterworth), Ic, para 33.185 and III 
para 5.145. 
285 [2006] EWCA Civ 268, [2006] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 629. 
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3. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
 
3.1 Basis for issuer’s liability  
 
The discussion in sections 1.1 and 1.2 above shows that it is very difficult for a 
cardholder in Singapore to pursue a legal action against the merchant even if the 
goods were defective or the merchant fails to deliver goods or services at all. 
Section 1.3 shows that there exists an effective mechanism of dispute resolution 
within the framework of the card associations rules and regulation, under which 
the cardholder can obtain a remedy at low costs. However, in section 2.2 and 2.3 
it is found that the banks in Singapore are not willing to help their customers in 
any disputes between the cardholder and the merchant, which is the opposite of 
the position in America and Britain. Looking at the entire picture, we can see that 
the need of a reform in this area of law in Singapore is clear. The banks should 
not exclude all responsibility in an area where the consumers need help the most 
while, in fact, the banks have the facilities to help customers without incurring 
substantial additional costs. The big difference in the cardholder’s rights in 
Singapore and other countries suggests that improvement can be made without 
adverse effect on the benefits of the banks. The main question here is why the 
issuer should be made liable for the merchant’s default? 
 
The analysis in section 2.4 above shows that in both America and Britain only 
holders of credit cards are given the right to assert against the issuer claims 
arising out of the contract of sale with the merchant. Therefore, creditor-debtor 
relationship was the most essential requirement. The second criteria relating to 
the issuer-merchant relationship adopted in the legislations were only secondary 
and reflecting part of this relationship. The criteria used by the American statute 
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relate to geographical proximity between the issuer and the merchant (e.g. 
location of transaction) while the British statute uses the vaguely defined 
‘arrangement’ between them. Both of the statutes concerned with the closeness 
business relationship between the issuer and the merchant or the issuer’s 
involvement with the business activities of the merchant. The only reason that an 
issuer gets involved in the merchant business is for a financial gain. Therefore, it 
can be said that the issuers in America and Britain are made liable for the 
merchant’s default because they derive profit from the sale transaction. The 
legislation in America and Britain may adopt different method and criteria of 
application but they were based on the same reasoning that if the issuers earn a 
profit from the sale transaction, they should be responsible to the cardholder to a 
certain extent in return for the revenue they earn. This conclusion is important to 
support the idea that the issuers in Singapore should be made responsible to the 
cardholder because they too derive revenue from the sale transaction. 
 
In viewing the question of issuers’ profit from a credit card transaction, the 
American and British legislations seem to take into account only one type of profit 
that is derived by the issuer from the sale transaction: the interest accumulated 
on the amount of credit extended to the cardholder. This is the only reason to 
explain why the right to assert a claim or defence is only available to holders of 
credit cards. As discussed in section 3.4 of chapter I, there is another source of 
revenue for the issuer besides interest for credit extended, namely the 
commission from the sale amount collected from the merchant. The issuer shares 
this commission with the acquirer by an ‘exchange fee’ fixed at a percentage of the 
transaction amount. The figures in chart 10 in chapter I shows that this exchange 
fee account for approximately 50% of the issuer’s average profit of US$40-60 
earned from each debit card and 15% of the issuer’s average profit of US$75-100 
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earned from each credit card in circulation worldwide. As the debit card is 
bypassing the credit card in both number and value of transactions, it can be 
envisaged that the exchange fee will become a major source of income for the 
issuers in the near future. If the revenue from exchange fee amounted to 50% or 
more of the issuers’ revenue from all credit, debit or charge card, because there 
are more debit or charge card than credit card and there are too few credit 
cardholder borrowing from the issuer, there would be compelling reasons to 
extend the same statutory protection to holders of debit and charge card.  
 
If the majority of credit cardholders only use the credit card as a convenient 
means of payment and always paying the card bill in full when due, the credit 
card works perfectly in the same way as a debit card. In this case, the issuers are 
held responsible to the cardholder for simply making a standing offer to extend 
credit, not for actually doing so. If the statutory protection in the American and 
British statutes is meant for credit protection only, then it is already misapplied to 
a considerable extent in reality.  
 
Therefore, it is arguable that, the only reason for the American and British 
statutes to impose measures of protection on credit cards while excluding debit 
and charge cards is that the measures were historically conceived as part of the 
consumer credit protection. In other words, because the measures of protection 
were historically introduced within consumer credit legislations, it is now difficult 
for these countries to extend the same measure to holders of debit or charge card. 
Such a structural obstacle does not exist in Singapore because the country has no 
consumer credit act in place.   
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The approach that distinguishes between credit and debit cards in the American 
and British statutes reflects the old concept of the credit card as mainly an 
arrangement to extend credit. The credit card system today is not the same as that 
which existed over 30 years ago. The analysis in section 3.3-3.4 in chapter I shows 
that the primary function of the credit card system has shifted from credit 
extension to electronic payment. Because of this evolution, measures of credit 
protection have become less necessary in the context of credit card and additional 
protection for holders of debit and charge cards is becoming more important. The 
analysis of the chargeback procedure in the card networks in section 1.3 above 
shows that a typical chargeback rules of a card association treats cardholder-
merchant disputes in a manner different to the treatment we find in the 
legislation currently effective in America and Britain. First, under the chargeback 
rules the relationship between the issuer and the merchant is not relevant, if not a 
matter of indifference. If the merchant is owned or controlled by the issuer in 
some ways (e.g. as a franchised dealer) or if the issuer chose to promote the 
merchant business in its advertisement accompanying monthly statements sent 
to the cardholder, it is likely that the issuer is also acting as the acquiring bank for 
the merchant. In this case, practically the resolution of disputes would be easier 
because the issuer is also the acquirer and the communication relating to the 
disputes does not have to go through the card association. The issuer would 
naturally have more power to procure the merchant’s compliance with the 
chargeback rules. Secondly, the chargeback rules do not treat credit and debit 
cards differently. As long as a card is a Visa card, the Visa chargeback rules 
applies regardless of any credit extension involved. Thirdly, the chargeback rules 
do not take into account any geographical limitation as that found in the 
American legislation. The chargeback rules of the credit card associations focus 
on the issue of whether the merchant makes disclosure and complies with its 
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contractual obligations to the cardholder, not on any relationship between the 
issuer and the merchant. Therefore, a regulatory regime that distinguishes 
between credit and debit cards will result in under utilization of the issuer’s 
capability to help cardholder to resolve disputes with the merchant under the 
card association’s chargeback rules. Such a regulatory regime would be 
inadequate or at least fragmented. 
 
There are three recommendations that may be drawn from the above analysis. 
Firstly, a reform in the area of issuers’ responsibility towards cardholders for 
merchant’s misrepresentation default should be separated from the reform of 
consumer credit protection. Secondly, the issuers’ responsibility should 
correspond with the degree of their involvement in the business activities of the 
merchant and revenue earned from such involvement. Thirdly, the measure of 
protection should be designed in harmony with the existing chargeback rules of 
the credit card associations to minimize the adverse impact on the issuers.  
 
In the next section, we will attempt to propose a suitable mechanism of protection 
for the cardholder in the situations of disputes with the merchant, keeping in 
mind the above recommendations as our guide. 
 
3.2   Proposed features of the measures of protection for the 
cardholder 
 




As discussed above, the issuers may be involved with the merchants’ business and 
the sale transaction in four different capacities. The issuers are always involved as 
a provider of payment services. They are frequently involved as an advertiser and 
sometimes involved as a provider of credit or even a seller of goods or services. 
The issuer’s liability towards the cardholder should correspond with the degree of 
involvement and the potential profit earned from the participation. If the issuer 
itself or its subsidiary sells goods or services to the cardholder, it would be liable 
to the cardholder for any misrepresentation or default in the sale contract 
because the issuer is also the merchant.  
 
If the relationship between the issuer and the merchant were so close that the 
merchant acts as a credit intermediary for the issuer to solicit their customer to 
not only purchase goods or services but also to pay for such purchase by a credit 
facility obtained from the issuer, the issuer’s position would be a connected 
lender. In this case, the issuer should be made jointly and severally liable to the 
cardholder for the misrepresentation or default by the merchant in the contract of 
sale. This has been accepted as a suitable treatment of connected lenders’ liability 
in many jurisdictions such as the majority of countries in the European Union. 
This fact is reflected in the recent plan of the European Commission to enact a 
new Directive on Consumer Credit, which proposes to harmonize the regulation 
of connected lender liabilities across Europe. In the first draft of the new 
Directive it was proposed that all member States enact provisions imposing joint 
and several liability on lenders only in circumstances where the supplier acts as 
credit intermediary286. If a consumer credit protection act is to be enacted in 
Singapore, it is suggested that the new act should contain a provision making 
                                                        
286 However, in the second draft it was proposed that the issue of creditor/supplier joint 
liability be left to the national legal systems, probably because of the resistance from Britain. 
COM(2005) 483 final, 7 October 2005, Para 5.11. 
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provider of credit jointly and severally liable for misrepresentation or default of 
the supplier if the supplier acts as a credit intermediary in connection with the 
sale transaction. However, before a new consumer credit act in Singapore is 
enacted (which does not seem likely to happen in the near future), a reform in 
this area may be contemplated by focusing on the issuer’s involvement in 
capacities other than a connected lender. 
 
If the issuer participates in soliciting its cardholders to make purchases from any 
merchants (which is most likely using its acquiring services), it is submitted that 
the issuer should not be allowed to exclude its liability for any misrepresentation 
in the mail solicitation by contractual terms in the cardholder agreement. If the 
issuer only acts as a provider of payment service without disseminating 
advertisement for the merchant, it is submitted that the issuer should be 
responsible to help the cardholder to resolve any disputes with the merchant 
relating to quality of goods or services or non-performance of the sale contract. It 
may be difficult to adopt the ‘like claim’ formula of British law in Singapore but it 
appears necessary to make the issuer responsible to a certain extent for several 
reasons. First, the issuer gained financially when any cardholder uses his card to 
make payment. The exchange fee has been mistakenly viewed as a cost borne by 
the merchant (e.g. in the case of Re Charge Card) but in fact this fee is jointly 
borne by the cardholder. Despite the rules of Visa and MasterCard prohibiting 
merchant from discriminating between customers paying in cash and by card, in 
reality the cardholder usually pays a higher price when he settles by credit card. 
This is especially true when the card is used in America and Britain, where the 
non-discrimination rule of Visa and MasterCard has been held to violate 
competition law. Many retail merchants in Singapore charge a 3% extra for sale 
transaction paid by credit card to recoup their cost of paying the commission fee 
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to the acquirer. The only reason that the cardholder chose to pay the additional 
fee is that he expect the issuer to render certain assistance in case the 
merchandize was defective or the merchant fails to perform the sale contract. 
Therefore, it would be unfair to allow the issuer to point to a fine print in the 
cardholder agreement to excuse itself from all responsibility. Secondly, it is not 
difficult or expensive for the issuer to assist the cardholder in a situation of 
dispute with the merchant because all the issuer has to do is to utilize the 
chargeback procedure of the card association. The remaining question is how we 
construct the issuer’s responsibility? We will consider this question in the next 
section. 
 
(b) Nature and extent of the cardholder’s right  
 
As discussed above, the American and British law uses the ‘like claim’ formula to 
give the cardholder the right to assert against the issuer the same claim he may 
have against the merchant in the sale contract as a basis to withhold payment to 
the issuer in respect of the disputed transaction or to seek compensation. The 
problem with this formula is that if the issuer, for any reason, were unable to 
pursue the claim against the merchant, it would have to bear a loss of not less 
than the disputed transaction amount. In Britain, as the debtors are entitled not 
only to make claim in both contract and tort, including claims in restitution and 
consequential damages, the potential loss the issuer may have to bear is 
substantial. For this reason, a very strong consumer lobby is needed to put the 
formula in place. Such a lobby does not yet to exist in Singapore. However, the 
purpose of the reform we propose is not to cause any loss to the banks. Quite the 
opposite, we wish to improve their business practices, which will ultimately result 
in their better business performance. What we need is that the Singapore banks 
 256
render reasonable assistance for their cardholders in situations of disputes with 
the merchant. Therefore, it is suggested that instead of a simple ‘like claim’ 
formula a more elaborate set of rules and procedure in respect of the resolution of 
disputes between the cardholder and the merchant via the issuer should be put in 
place. 
 
Firstly, all holders of credit, debit, or charge cards (including both consumers and 
corporate holders) should be entitled to request the issuer to lodge a chargeback 
claim to suspend the payment of the transaction amount to the merchant, or if it 
has already been paid, to recover the same to the card account, if the cardholder 
can adduce evidence that the following situations occurred: 
 
(i) The contract of sale were for tangible goods, the delivery of which was not 
made within the period of time promised by the merchant (or in the absence of an 
indication of expected delivery 30 days from the date of purchase); or the goods 
delivered were defective or not as described in the contract of sale, in the 
merchant’s written representation or the sale invoice; 
 
(ii) The contract of sale was for services of a continuing nature (e.g. the 
storage and maintenance of an internet web site) and paid by card-absent 
method, the quality of which were not as described by the merchant in the sale 
contract; 
 
(iii) The payment transaction was duplicated, the amount of the card-present 
transaction was altered, the amount of the card-absent transaction did not 
correspond with the correct purchase price, the payment for goods, services or 
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no-show fee was paid by other means or the recurring payment was cancelled by 
the cardholder; or 
 
(iv) The cardholder has returned the goods purchased or cancelled the service 
within the period allowed as stated in the sale contract or invoice but the 
merchant has failed to process a refund. 
 
It should be a condition precedent for the cardholder to become entitled to 
request the issuer to lodge a chargeback claim that he must have attempted to 
resolve the dispute directly with the merchant and that the defective or returned 
products have been delivered to the merchant. The cardholder’s claim should be 
limited to claim in relation with the performance of the contract of sale in the 
above situations, and excluding claims in tort.  
 
Secondly, within a reasonable period after the cardholder has requested the issuer 
to lodge a chargeback claim (e.g. 60 days) the issuer should be responsible to 
inform the cardholder of the outcome of his request. The dispute must be 
resolved in favor of the cardholder if: 
 
(i)  The issuer failed to respond to the cardholder request within the 
prescribed period; 
 
(ii) The merchant failed to provide documentary evidence that the tangible 
goods purchased were delivered to the cardholder billing address or that 
intangible goods or services have been delivered; 
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(iii) The merchant failed to provide documentary evidence that the goods or 
services supplied were not defective, damaged or otherwise were the same as 
described in the sale contract or invoice; or 
 
(iv) The merchant failed to provide evidence that a credit has been processed 
for returned goods or cancelled services. 
 
Thirdly, if the merchant was successful to adduce evidence to disprove the 
cardholder’s chargeback claim, the cardholder must provide further evidence to 
enable the issuer to pursue a second chargeback attempt, failing which the 
dispute would be resolved in favor of the merchant. After the second chargeback 
attempt, if the arbitration procedure under the rules of the card association 
decided in favor of the merchant, the cardholder should not be entitled to pursue 
further claim against the issuer. If the cardholder were dissatisfied with the 
dispute resolution outcome, he would have to pursue action against the merchant 
directly. 
 
A dispute resolution procedure as the above may not cause any harm to the banks 
as it is constructed around the typical chargeback rules of the card associations. If 
the issuer comply with the associations’ rules, it is guaranteed to be paid if the 
dispute was resolved in favor of the cardholder, even if the merchant or the 
acquirer were unable of unwilling to pay. If the dispute were resolved in favor of 
the merchant, the issuer would not suffer loss either, because it is not liable to the 
cardholder in this case. The only cost to the issuers is the efforts to submit the 
chargeback claims to the card associations. In fact, every card issuer is submitting 
chargeback claims to the card association on a daily basis. However, they only do 
so for certain cardholders, probably those who are determined enough to 
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overcome the obstacles in the banks’ fine print and customers services. If the 
banks have to incur costs to make the chargeback efforts, that cost is only 
reasonable considering the fact that the banks are paid by the cardholder, not 
only by membership fee but also via the exchange fee out of every card 
transactions. The above suggestions simply make the existing chargeback 
procedure known to the cardholders but it can bring many benefits. The 
cardholders can make use of the chargeback procedure only if they know their 
rights. The issuers would be more accountable and responsible to its customers. 
The credit card, as a payment system would be a more transparent and reliable to 




The above suggestions are relatively easy to implement. The cardholders can be 
better protected against merchants’ default or misrepresentation without putting 
excessive burden on the issuers. Without having to wait for a consumer credit act 
to be enacted, the reform can be carried out either by a regulation to be issued by 
the MAS or by a voluntary code for credit card practices to be issued by the 
Association of Banks of Singapore (ABS). In the first way, the regulation would 
have a force of law. In the second way, the force of competition and the benefits of 
publicity will help to ensure the issuers adoptions of and compliance with good 
practices in doing credit cards businesses. We will look at the issue of 







TOWARDS A REFORM OF CREDIT CARD LAW IN SINGAPORE 
 
In this chapter, we will attempt to propose a reform of the regulation of credit 
cards, charge cards, and debit cards in Singapore. We will first look at the current 
statutes and regulations that govern the licensing of card issuers and the 
regulatory requirements relating to issuance and use of cards. After that, we will 
consider problem areas of the current regulatory framework and the possible 
measures of improvement. 
 
1.  EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
1.1 Overview of consumer credit protection in Singapore 
 
In any society, there is the need to control and regulate the business activities of 
providing financial accommodation to individuals for his consumption as 
opposed to business purposes. That regulatory system is usually referred to as 
consumer credit protection.  
 
The credit card not only enables the cardholder to make retail payment without 
carrying cash along, it allows him to do so without having the money. The credit 
card is a standing offer by the issuer to provide financial accommodation to the 
cardholders. Among the cardholders, there are companies, government agencies 
but the majority of cardholders are individuals. For this reason, the law on credit 
card closely relates to consumer credit protection. In many countries, such as 
Britain and America, the laws and regulations relating to credit card takes up a 
considerable proportion of the consumer credit legislations. As lending 
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transactions frequently entails security transactions, the law on consumer credit 
is also closely related to the law on security over personal property. Although not 
popular, there are credit cards secured by cardholder’s property. In this case, the 
security transaction may be affected by the law on security. The law of security 
over personal property is, therefore, related to the law on credit card, albeit at a 
lesser extent compared to the law on consumer credit.  
 
The law on consumer credit in Singapore has been developed on an ad hoc basis 
as new forms of consumer credit came into existence. The current system consists 
of separate components built around different models and approaches. As a 
result, the area of consumer credit law has long been in an unsatisfactory state 
marked by the lack of uniformity. The insufficiency of the consumer credit 
protection law has been thoroughly analyzed and possible paths of reform in the 
area have been proposed as early as 1978287. Within the limit of this paper, it is 
not intended to repeat or re-evaluate the entire analysis and proposal for a reform 
of consumer credit protection law. It is, however, necessary to briefly summarize 
the major problems of consumer credit law.  
 
Consumer credit in Singapore takes various forms ranging from money-lending 
to credit accounts, credit sales, conditional sales, credit cards, hire-purchase and 
pawn-broking. Unlike most of other common law jurisdictions such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom where all forms of consumer credit have been 
regulated systematically in a unified manner, the consumer credit protection law 
of Singapore is old and complicated with a large volume of legislations, including: 
Moneylenders Act (discussed in Chapter 2), Pawnbrokers Act (Cap 222), Hire-
                                                        
287 See C.Y.Lee, ‘Consumer Credit and Security over Personalty — The Law in Singapore’ 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1978) and “Towards new Consumer Credit 
Protection Legislation in Singapore’, Mal. L.R. 266 (1979). 
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Purchase Act (Cap 125), Banking Act (Cap 19), Finance Companies Act (Cap 108). 
Each of the legislations provides a different treatment for the form of credit that it 
is concerned with. The deficiencies of the current legislations are evident both in 
individual statutes and when looking at the entire picture. 
 
As a former colony, Singapore has ‘inherited’ most of its legislation from the 
Britain. The Money Lender Act and the Pawnbrokers Act are patterned after old 
British acts, which date back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
(Pawnbrokers Act, 1872 Moneylenders Act, 1900). Both of these British acts were 
repealed by the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA). Before the enactment of the 
CCA, the regulation of consumer credit in the United Kingdom suffered from a 
disparity problem because separates legislations were enacted on an ad hoc basis 
when new forms of credit were invented. Singapore has chosen to inherit the old 
acts together with their problems, which have been well known since the 
Crowther Report in 1971. The Moneylenders Act and the Bills of Sale Act have 
long been criticized in Britain and Singapore for failing to distinguish between 
consumer and commercial transactions and excessively harsh civil consequence 
of statutory violation. A technical error under these acts (such as the change of 
business address of the lender) might render a transaction not only void but the 
loan irrecoverable. A double licensing system requiring the lender to be licensed 
under the Money Lender Act and the mortgage of chattel has to be registered 
under the Bill of Sale Act in order for a secured loan transaction to be valid is so 
rigid and time consuming that even legal practitioners prefer to avoid.  
 
Along side with the above antique legislations, a series of newer legislations on 
various forms of consumer credit were created in late 1960s and early 1970s 
(Hire-Purchase Act in 1969, Banking Act in 1970, Finance Companies Act in 1967 
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and Insurance Act in 1966). The new acts used relatively more modern approach 
to regulation and controls. For example, the treatment of consumer credit under 
the Hire-Purchase Act, which was patterned after the Australian legislation 
contrasts sharply with the treatment of money-lending transaction under the 
Moneylenders Act. For example, a consumer needs financing to purchase a car. If 
the transaction is structured as a secured loan the lender must be licensed under 
the Moneylenders Act and the mortgage must be registered under the Bill of Sale 
Act to be valid. The same transaction if structured as a hire purchase would 
require no registration in respect of both the finance provider and the security. 
Besides the widely varied regulatory treatments, some forms of unsecured credit 
transactions such as revolving accounts and credit sales are not subject to 
regulation at all. The disparity in Singapore is greater than that which existed in 
United Kingdom before the CCA 1974 because of the piecemeal development of 
the law. 
 
In the area of security over personal property, the position in Singapore is similar 
to the position in the UK. There are separate statutes regulating the different 
types of security according to their form and consequently there are multiple 
systems for determining priorities between creditors. The Companies Act, the 
Bills of Sale Act, the Policies of Assurance Act, the Hire-Purchase Act, the Sale of 
Good Act, the Factors Act and the Pawnbrokers Act each have devised different 
rules to determine priorities of creditors. Alongside with the systems of these acts 
are the common law and equitable rules and other rules to determine priorities in 
bankruptcy proceedings and distress.  
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In the next section, we will look into two regulatory regimes that most likely 
govern the credit card payment system, the Banking Act and the Money Lenders 
Act. 
 
1.2 Regulation of credit and charge card under the Banking Act  
 
(a) Licensing requirements 
 
Because the majority of credit, charge and debit cards are issued by banks and 
financial institutions licensed under the Banking Act (Cap. 19), this Act and the 
regulations issued under it has the biggest influence on the issuance and use of 
these cards. The Banking Act was first enacted in 1970 to govern traditional 
commercial banking business conducted by banks and financial institutions in 
Singapore. The Act defined “banking business” as “the business of receiving 
money on current or deposit account, paying and collecting cheques drawn by 
or paid in by customers, the making of advances to customers, and includes such 
other business as the Authority may prescribe for the purposes of this Act”. The 
regulator of banking business is the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) 
established under the MAS Act (Cap. 186). Pursuant to that Act, the MAS has 
power to grant many class of licence and to issue regulations and directions to 
control the operation of banks and other financial institutions. Under the Banking 
Act, there are “banks”, defined as companies licensed under Section 7, 11 and 79 
of the Banking Act (including companies licensed to carry on banking business, 
banks owned by foreign governments and banks that existed in Singapore before 
1/1/1971, respectively under the 3 sections) and “other financial institutions”.  
Unfortunately, the word “financial institution” was not defined in the Banking 
Act. The only definition of “financial institution” is found in Section 27A (6) of the 
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MAS Act (which was added in 1984) includes bank licensed under the Banking 
Act, finance companies licensed under Finance Companies Act (Cap. 108), 
merchant banks licensed as a financial institution under Section 28 of the MAS 
Act, money-changer licensed under the Money-changing and Remittance 
Businesses Act (Cap. 187), insurer registered or regulated under the Insurance 
Act (Cap. 142), insurance intermediary licensed under the Insurance 
Intermediaries Act (Cap. 142A); dealer or investment adviser licensed under the 
Securities Industry Act (Cap. 289); futures broker, futures trading adviser or 
futures pool operator licensed under the Futures Trading Act (Cap. 116); and any 
other person licensed, approved or regulated by the MAS under any written law. 
‘Financial institution’ also includes person who is exempted under the relevant 
law from being licensed, approved, registered or regulated.  
 
The regulation of payment cards was not at all contemplated in the original text of 
the Banking Act. In 1993, two new sections were inserted relating to payment 
cards including Section 77A which prohibits the issuance of multi-purpose stored 
value cards by non-bank without approval of the MAS and Section 78(2) which 
delegates to the MAS the legislative power to issue “regulations with respect to 
the operations and activities of banks and other financial institutions issuing 
credit and charge cards, including the minimum qualifying criteria for the issue 
of a credit or charge card”.  
 
Neither the Banking Act nor the MAS Act contains any prohibition of the issuance 
of credit, charge card or debit card by a person not licensed as a bank or financial 
institution or exempted from being licensed, approved, registered or regulated. 
However, if any bank or other financial institution issues such a card, they will 
have to comply with the requirements laid down by the MAS from time to time. 
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(b)  Operational requirements 
 
Based on the legislative power delegated under Section 78(2), on 15th October 
1993 the MAS issued the first regulations on credit and charge cards called 
‘Banking (Unsolicited Credit and Charge Cards) Regulations’. The 1993 
regulations were a very simple document of less than one page that only 
prohibited the unsolicited issuance of credit and charge cards whether or not the 
card is valid for immediate use except where cards are issued under previously 
made agreement or for renewal of expired cards. Banks or financial institutions 
that contravene this regulation may be fined up to S$5.000 upon conviction.  
 
On 19th February 2004, MAS issued longer Regulations labeled the ‘Banking 
(Credit card and Charge card) Regulations’ to replace the 1993 Regulations. The 
content of the 2004 Regulations can be summarized as follows: 
 
(i) While the prohibition of unsolicited mailing of credit and charge cards 
(except new card of the same type sent for replacement of old cards) were 
retained, an exception was made to allow the issuance of unsolicited cards 
to individual who are already a cardholder of a credit or charge card issued 
by the same issuer (albeit of a different type) provided that (i) the terms 
and conditions of the new card are disclosed fully to the cardholder, (ii) 
the cardholder bears no liability for any charge to the unsolicited card until 
his acceptance of the card is communicated to the issuer, and (iii) no 
additional credit is provided to the cardholder. 
 
(ii) Issuers are prohibited to issue credit or charge card to Singapore citizens 
or permanent residents unless they have annual income of at least 
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S$30,000 (if they are under 55 years old) or S$15,000 (if they are above 
55 years old) at the time of card application. As an exception, a corporate 
card or business card (i.e. cards issued to employees of companies and 
businesses where cardholder and cardusers are jointly and severally liable 
to all charges made to the cards) may be issued notwithstanding the 
carduser fails to meet the minimum income requirement if the carduser 
needs the card to pay for goods or services while travel or posted overseas 
for purposes of business of the cardholder. Card issuers are required to 
make sure the validity period of the corporate or business card so issued 
should not be longer than the reasonable period that the card is required 
for the purposes of its issuance. 
 
(iii) Card issuers are prohibited from issuing any supplementary cards (in 
relation to a principal cardholder who are Singapore citizen or permanent 
resident) to person under 21 years old except where the person needs the 
card for overseas study (including employment or attachment for purpose 
of study). The same requirement as to the validity period applies. 
 
(iv) Card issuers are prohibited from allowing the aggregate indebtedness (of 
all principal and supplementary cards issued by the same issuers and its 
related corporation) of any cardholder to exceed the maximum credit limit 
fixed at 2 months’ income of the cardholder. 
 
(v) Card issuers are required to furnish monthly reports to MAS to provide 
such information as may be required by the MAS from time to time. 
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(vi) Card issuers are required to use a standard wording in font size of at least 
9pt in bold to disclose finance and late payment charges in monthly 
statements of credit cards and charge cards. 
 
(vii) Any card issuers which contravenes the unsolicited card issuance 
prohibition, the minimum annual income and the maximum credit limit 
requirements of the Regulation may be liable on conviction to a fine of up 
to S$25,000 and, in the case of a continuing offence, to a further fine not 
exceeding S$2,500 for every day during which the offence continues after 
conviction. 
 
On 15th April 2004 the MAS issued the Banking (Credit card and Charge card) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2004 (No S198) to amend the February 2004 
Regulations. The new Regulations retained the general structure and contents of 
the earlier version and only inserted some patches in several clauses including:- 
 
(i)  The introduction of the concept of “secured credit limit” of credit or charge 
card whereby the indebtedness (and the related credit limit) is secured by 
deposit(s) placed with the issuer, in the name of the cardholder together 
with a contractual set-off agreement with the issuer, where the deposit(s) 
cannot be withdrawn by the cardholder until and unless the amount 
charged to or outstanding on the card is fully paid up. 
 
(ii) The requirement of a minimum of S$10,000 aggregate deposit to secure a 
secured credit limit before the issuance of a secured credit card. 
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(iii) The requirement that the credit limit of secured card not to exceed the 
aggregate amount of the deposit(s) used to secure the credit limit (or if the 
cardholder holds both secured and unsecured cards or a card with both 
secured and unsecured limit, the higher of the two amounts). 
 
On 29th September 2005 another amendment was made to the 2004 Regulations 
by the Banking (Credit and Charge Cards) (Amendment) Regulation 2005 (No. 
S439). The major change was allowing issuers to secure card indebtedness with 
deposits placed with any banks, finance companies or merchant banks in 
Singapore, in addition to deposits placed directly with the issuers. The only other 
change was to delete the words “or obtaining cash on credit” as one of the two 
intended usage of credit or charge card (besides “purchasing goods or services on 
credit”). This change means little in reality as holders of credit and charge cards 
apparently still have the option to obtain cash advances from card issuers either 
over the counter or at ATMs besides paying for purchases of goods and services. 
These cards are still known as credit or charge card notwithstanding that the cash 
advances option is not recognized by the Regulations as a feature of regulated 
credit or charge cards. 
 
In 2004 the practice of conducting road shows to receive credit and charge card 
applications at promotion counters on the streets and at crowded places were 
booming in Singapore. It seemed that the MAS viewed this practice as 
undesirable. Based on the Section 55 of the Banking Act, which provides that the 
MAS is empowered to give notice to banks to “give direction or impose 
requirements relating to the change of location of any place of business of 
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banks”288, the MAS issued Notice MAS603 dated 22nd December 2004 
prohibiting banks “to set up any temporary location where applications are 
received for credit cards, charge cards or any unsecured credit facilities” 
without prior approval of the MAS, which approval “would not ordinarily be 
granted”. The MAS acted within its authority as the definition of “place of 
business” of banks includes any place used by bank for the conduct of banking 
business (including any business that the MAS may prescribe)289 and the setting 
up of temporary location may be considered “change of location”. However, using 
the authority to approve change of location of place of business of banks as the 
basis to make regulation prohibiting conducting of road shows or street 
canvassing seems to be a situational solution. The authority was aiming at the act 
of conducting road shows and street canvassing while using locations as the basis 
for its prohibition. 
 
1.3.  Credit card and money lending 
 
(a) Money Lenders Act (Cap. 188) 
 
The Banking Act and the regulations made under it only apply to credit and 
charge card issued by banks and financial institutions. Credit or charge cards 
issued by other entities may be governed by other statutes. The only statute that is 
likely to apply in this case is the Money Lenders Act (MLA). The MLA requires 
‘moneylenders’ who reside and carry on the ‘business of moneylending’ in 
Singapore to be either licensed or exempted. The group of exempted persons 
                                                        
288 Section 55 (2) (n), Banking Act (Cap 19). 
289 The Banking Act defines “place of business” to includes “a head or main office, a branch, 
an agency, a representative office, a mobile branch of the bank, any office established and 
maintained for a limited period only and any other place used by the bank for the dispensing 
or acceptance of money on account or for the conduct of other banking business”; and 
"banking business" to include “such other business as the Authority may prescribe”. 
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includes the entities similar to the concept of ‘financial institutions’ of the 
Banking Act. These include banks, insurance companies, finance companies, 
pawnbrokers, cooperative societies and governmental bodies. Non-exempted 
person carry on the business of moneylending without a licence will face severe 
consequences.  The money lent may be irrecoverable as the contract may be 
unenforceable, and they may be subject to fines and a jail term. 
 
Unfortunately, the scope of application of the MLA was not clearly defined due to 
the lack of a definition of ‘business of moneylending’ although under Section 3 of 
the MLA there is a presumption that “any person who lends a sum of money in 
consideration of a larger sum being repaid shall be presumed until the contrary 
is proven to be a moneylender”. Therefore, to find out whether MLA applies to 
credit card and charge card arrangement we will need to consult the case law that 
interprets the meanings of the MLA. 
 
(b) Scope of application 
 
The only local decision that directly addressed the question whether credit or 
charge card arrangement amount to ‘moneylending business’ is the case of Victor 
Kee Yong Poey v Diners Club Malaya Sdn. Bhd290. In this case a holder of a 
charge card contended that the debt and service charge he owed to the charge 
card issuer, Diner Club was in fact a loan and thus the transaction was 
unenforceable as Diner Club did not have a moneylending licence. Chang Min Tat 
J. held that the transaction did not constitute money lending because interest was 
not charged since service charge did not constitute interest. If we rely on the 
                                                        
290 [1976] 2 M.L.J 30. 
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ruling of this case, we could have come to a quick and easy conclusion that credit 
card does not fall under the MLA as long as no interest is charged. 
 
However, several subsequent academic commentaries have criticized the decision 
of Chang Min Tat J. as erroneous291. The commentaries rightly pointed out that 
the decision had missed the central issue of the case, namely the characterization 
of charge card transaction. The question was not whether service fee constitutes 
interest but whether the charge card arrangement can be equated with a loan. 
Although a lender would be presumed to be a moneylender where interest is 
charged, it was a mistake to conclude that if no interest was charged, the 
transaction was not moneylending.  
 
As discussed in Chapter II, the credit or charge card arrangement can be 
characterized either as a loan by the issuer to the cardholder or an assignment of 
debt by the merchant to the issuer. Although the legal analysis shows that the 
majority of opinion tends towards the ‘direct obligation’ theory that characterizes 
the arrangement as a loan the possibility to characterize the credit card or charge 
card arrangement as an assignment has not been conclusively ruled out. If the 
credit card transaction is characterized as an assignment, the transaction will 
amount to the factoring of the merchant’s book debt and not extension of loan by 
the issuer to the cardholder. According to the established rule created under the 
English MLA the transaction would not amount to moneylending292. 
 
                                                        
291 See Tan Keng Feng, ‘Credit Cards and Money Lending’ [1976] 2 M.L.J. cxi; C.Y.Lee, 
‘Towards new Consumer Credit Protection Legislation in Singapore’, Mal. L.R. 266 (1979), 
‘Consumer Credit and Security over Personalty — The Law in Singapore’ (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of London, 1978) 
292 Olds Discount Co Ltd. v. John Playfair Ltd [1938] All E.R. 275. 
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On the other hand, even if the arrangement is characterized under the ‘direct 
obligation’ theory there are contradictory authorities on the question whether the 
payment mechanism of credit card transaction constitutes lending of money. In 
the case of In Re H.P.C. Production Ltd293, the court was faced with the question 
of interpreting the words ‘lending’ and ‘borrowing’ within the meaning of the 
Exchange Control Act, 1947, which prohibited the lending and borrowing of 
foreign currency by British residents from any person other than money dealer 
authorized under that Act. T.V., a company in Switzerland not being an 
authorized money dealer, made several payments to a third party at the request of 
K, a British citizen, which payment was later alleged to be a lending in foreign 
currency in contravention of the Act. While acknowledging that in most cases the 
payment made at a party’s request to a third party constitutes lending, the court 
decided that there are cases where the paying party should be considered as an 
agent for the requesting party (such as in the case of solicitors or stock brokers) 
making payment on behalf of his principal. In the latter cases, the payment does 
not constitute lending of money. Plowman J. held that if the third party is not 
accountable to the requesting party for the money and is entitled to keep the 
money for himself, the payment to him was not lending. The amount of payment 
was recoverable not as a loan but as an indemnity by the principal. If we apply 
this ‘accountability test’ to the similar credit card arrangement where the issuer 
makes payment to the merchant at the request of the cardholder, then the 
payment does not constitute lending of money to the cardholder because the 
merchant is not accountable to the cardholder and entitled to keep the money for 
himself. 
 
                                                        
293 [1962] Ch 466. See also Potts' Executors v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1951] A.C. 
443, [1951] 1 All E.R. 76. 
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However, there are several decisions suggesting the opposite view. In the 
Malaysian case of Associated Finance Corporation Ltd v. Poomani 294, a finance 
company carrying on the business of moneylending made a payment of $7000 to 
a building society who was threatening to foreclose on the house of Poomani. In 
return Poomani executed a charge over her land as security for the loan borrowed 
from the finance company. The transaction was held unenforceable for technical 
infringements of the Money Lenders Ordinance. This case is not of much 
assistance because the fact that the transaction was moneylending was admitted 
and the creditor was a registered moneylender. However, it is worthy to note the 
rule laid down that in a moneylending transaction, the money lent need not be 
paid directly to the borrower as long as it is paid in the manner agreed to by the 
borrower. 
 
In supporting the view that credit card payment constitutes moneylending, it is 
necessary to consider the several cases where arrangement closely similar to 
credit card was held as moneylending. It has been suggested295 that the credit 
card arrangement may be likened to the check trading system in Britain since 
1880 as described in the case of Progressive Supply Co., Ltd v Dalton296. In a 
check trading system, the check trader issues trading orders to its customers with 
specified face value such as £1, £3 or £4 on payment of a fee called poundage and 
in exchange for the customer’s undertaking to pay the balance to the check trader 
by multiple weekly installments. The check trader enters into agreements with 
selected shopkeepers (on average about 100 shops) who supply goods to holders 
of the trading orders at cash values up to the face value of the orders. Similar to 
the way a credit card transaction is effected, holders of trading orders select the 
                                                        
294 [1972] 1 MLJ 117. 
295 C.Y. Lee, “Law of Consumer Credit”, 1990. 
296 [1942] 2 All E.R. 646. 
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goods first and only present the trading orders to make payment at the till. When 
the trading order is presented, the shopkeeper writes the date of the transaction, 
his name, and the price of the goods obtained in the appropriate place provided, 
usually on the back of the order. If the trading order has not been wholly 
exhausted, the shopkeeper hands it back to the customer, who can continue to 
obtain goods from the same or other shops until it is finally exhausted. The 
shopkeeper at whose shop the trading order exhausted does not hand it back to 
the customer, but retains it and sends it back to the issuer. The check trader 
thereupon pays the shopkeeper the amount of his account, less the discount 
agreed between them. In Premier Clothing & Supply Co. v. Hillcoat297, a check 
trading system was held to constitute money lending, and as a result the contract 
was unenforceable for want of registration. In the New Zealand case of Goldberg 
v. Tait298 a cash-order arrangement similar to the check trading business was 
also held to be moneylending. In that case, the appellant issued to customers 
cash-orders, which when presented to the traders named in the cash-orders 
would be accepted for payment of goods purchases. The customer pays about 10% 
of the face value of the cash-orders upon issuance and undertakes to pay the full 
face value 20 weekly installments of 5% each. The trader then presents monthly 
accounts to the issuer to obtain payment of all cash-orders accepted for payment 
less a discount of 5%.  The Supreme Court of New Zealand held that the substance 
of the transaction was in fact a loan. Stanton J. pointed out that it is inappropriate 
to characterize the arrangement as money paid by the cash-orders issuers at the 
request of the customer and to use the quasi-contract device to enable the action 
for money paid. The reasons were that the customer in this case pays the issuer a 
sum substantially greater than the amount paid by the issuer to the trader and the 
                                                        
297 [1969] C.L.Y. 2279a. 
298 [1950] N.Z.L.R. 976 (Supreme Court). 
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issuer’s right to sue the customer was independent of the payment to the trader. 
The authorities relating to cheque-trading and cash-order business in Britain and 
New Zealand suggest that the credit or charge card arrangement should 
constitute moneylending business. 
 
It appears that the question whether or not the charge card scheme constitutes 
moneylending is not fully settled. While there is a reported local decision 
suggesting that charge card arrangement is not moneylending if interest is not 
charged, there are also persuasive authorities suggesting the opposite. The 
underlying problem is that, as noted in the Crowther report299, the credit card and 
charge card arrangement is of a hybrid nature between moneylending and credit 
sale. Although the weight of opinion in the case law tends towards moneylending 
the uncertainty remains. If this uncertainty should ever be settled, it has to be 
done by Singapore legislation or judicial decision since the MLA system has been 
abandoned in Britain, New Zealand and Australia and the body of case law 
developed under the MLA system has ceased to evolve except in Singapore and 
Malaysia. In the next section, we will conduct a practical analysis to see whether 
the MLA system is suitable to regulate credit card and charge card arrangement 
even if it squarely fit under the ambit of this regulatory system. 
 
(c) Regulatory regime: 
 
The Singapore MLA is one of the oldest legislations of the country that dates back 
to 1959 and patterned after the English Money Lenders Act of 1900 and 1927. In 
addition to the uncertainty in the scope of application discussed above, the 
                                                        
299 The Crowther Committee report on Consumer Credit (Cmnd 4596, 1971) at para 4.1.10 and 
6.12.3. 
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system of the MLA is outdated and not suitable to govern credit card or charge 
card arrangement. After several minor amendments, the Singapore MLA remains 
pretty much the same as the MLA that existed in the U.K. in early 20th century. It 
deserves all the criticisms in the Crowther report in 1971 that were accepted as 
accurate. The biggest problem with the MLA is its failure to distinguish between 
consumer and commercial transaction. The MLA applies regardless of the status 
of the borrower. Reading the local suits involving the MLA, we can see that in 
most of these cases the MLA was utilized as the device for borrowers (many of 
which are companies) trying to escape paying their debt by alleging that the 
lenders were unlicensed moneylender.  
 
As a regulatory system, the MLA controls moneylending activities by a scheme of 
moneylenders licensing. Currently there are 133 individuals, small firms and 
limited liability companies licensed as moneylenders. The Registrar of 
Moneylenders (together with Registrar of Pawn Brokers) is the Insolvency and 
Public Trustee Office under Ministry of Law, not the main authority supervising 
the entire financial services sector, which is the MAS. As a result, the supervision 
of the business of moneylending is not in any way similar to the supervision 
conducted by the MAS over banks and financial institutions. It seems that the 
MLA system is considered the tail end of the consumer credit business that does 
not deserve much attentions or active supervision. Licensed moneylenders are 
subject to many restrictions that are highly technical and strictly enforced. A slip 
in the process of registration, change of address or signing of contract may render 
the entire transaction unenforceable300. These restrictions include limits to which 
                                                        
300 In Hawkes Bay Investment and Finance Co. v. White [1934] N.Z.L.R. 46 (Supreme Court), 
a failure to register change of address resulted in unenforceable transaction. In Menaka v. 
Lum [1977] 1 M.L.J. 91, usage of partner’s name in moneylending transaction instead of 
registered firm’s name resulted in void contract. 
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interest may be charged, prescribed form and detail of moneylending agreement, 
particulars to be shown on the licence and advertising of moneylenders. Section 
23 (1) of MLA delegates power to fix maximum interest rate charged by a licensed 
moneylender. Currently Section 14 Money Lenders Rules fix the ceiling rate at 
12% p.a. for secured loans and 18% p.a. for unsecured loans. In addition, Section 
18 (1) prohibits the charging of compound interest. Section 23(5) provides that 
the sum recoverable by any person who has lent money but is not a licensed 
moneylender (or banks, financial institutions, pawnbroker, cooperative societies, 
governmental bodies) shall not exceed the aggregate of the amount lent and a 
simple interest at the rate of 20% p.a. A special feature of the Singapore MLA (not 
found in English, Australian and New Zealand legislations) is the extensive power 
of courts under Section 22 to reopen and strike down unconscionable and harsh 
moneylending transactions at common law. Interest higher than the ceiling rate is 
presumed to be harsh and unconscionable until the contrary is proven. All the 
rate limits prescribed under the MLA are lower than the current rate of 24% per 
annum usually charged by Singapore banks to their credit cardholders. The form 
of lending memorandum prescribed as Schedule to the Money Lenders Rules is 
not suitable to the credit card system. Furthermore, moneylenders are required to 
conduct their business strictly within only one location, the address of which 
must be registered with the registrar. 
 
It is evident that the regime created by the MLA was neither intended to regulate 
credit card and charge card transaction nor suitable for such application. Due to 
the unsuitable regulatory system and the severe consequences of having 
unenforceable contracts and facing criminal charges, card issuers would, 
practically, try to avoid the MLA as far as possible by either becoming one of the 
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exempted persons named in the MLA or obtaining a certificate of exemption from 
the registrar.  
 
1.4 Reform of credit card regulation in Singapore 
 
(a) Existing regulatory controls 
 
The above analysis shows that the MLA has little practical effect to regulate the 
issuance of credit, debit, or charge cards in Singapore. The issuance of credit 
cards by a company not licensed as a bank or a financial institution under the 
Banking Act is likely to fall under the MLA because interest is charged. However, 
the majority of credit cards are issued by banks and financial institution, which 
are exempted from the MLA. Furthermore, it is not certain whether issuance of 
charge cards comes under the MLA and the regulatory regime of the MLA seems 
unsuitable for application to credit or charge card.  
 
Therefore, the main regulatory controls of credit, debit and charge card issuance 
are found under the Banking Act. There may be issuers who escape both the 
Banking Act and the MLA but this seems to be a rare301. So far, there have been 
three measures of regulatory control put in place by the ad-hoc Regulations and 
Notices issued by the MAS.  
 
The first and probably most important control is the requirement of minimum 
annual income a Singapore resident must earn before he may obtain a credit card 
                                                        
301 We have found one issuer of charge card (which now also issues credit cards), Diners Club 
Pte. Ltd. which is neither registered as a bank or financial institution nor as a moneylender. 
Our search shows that this company name is neither found in the MAS’s official directory of 
banks and financial institutions nor in the current list of moneylenders licensed by the 
Moneylenders Registrar. 
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together with a ceiling limit of the amount of credit an issuer may extend to a 
cardholder currently fixed at two times of the cardholder’s monthly income. This 
control seems peculiar to Singapore, as it is not commonly found in other major 
commonwealth jurisdictions. 
 
The second control is the prohibition of unsolicited issuance of credit and charge 
card by banks and financial institutions. There are similar provisions found in the 
consumer credit legislations in Britain and America302. 
 
The third control is the prohibition of issuer’s setting up temporary location to 
solicit applications for credit cards or charge cards. This control is comparable to 
the prohibition of off-trade-premise canvassing of debtor-creditor agreements 
under Section 49 of the British Consumer Credit Act. The control measure 
currently applied in Singapore seems more stringent because in Britain creditors 
are allowed to canvass debtor-creditor agreements in places where business is 
carried on by the creditor, the supplier, the canvasser or the consumer, regardless 
of whether it is on a permanent or temporary basis303. 
 
The comparisons we made throughout this paper between the current regulatory 
controls in Singapore and what has been in place in other commonwealth 
jurisdictions in the last 3 decades shows a sharp contrast. This indicates that in 
Singapore a reform of consumer credit protection may be an overdue task. In the 
next section, we will attempt to look at the likelihood that such a reform may 
                                                        
302 US Code §1642 prohibits the issuance of unsolicited credit cards, §1693(i) prohibits the 
issuance of unsolicited debit card except where the card is not validated for use; Section 51 of 
the British Consumer Credit Act makes it an offence to issue unsolicited credit token. 
303 Section 48 of British Consumer Credit Act. 
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happen in Singapore in the near future. A consumer credit reform will likely 
entail substantial improvement of cardholder protection. 
 
(b) Likelihood of a consumer credit reform 
 
As early as 1979, an author who conducted a remarkable research on consumer 
credit protection in Singapore concluded that “the picture [of consumer credit 
law] which unfolds reveals a chaotic state of the law” 304. In that research, it was 
proposed that a reform of consumer credit protection law should be conducted by 
the enactment of a Consumer Credit Act to replace the Hire Purchase Act, Money 
Lenders Act and Pawn Brokers Act. However, as was observed in the same 
proposal, there were much constraints and obstacles for reform in this area:  
 
“There are certain constraints to which the reformer must address his mind 
when considering the shape and structure of consumer credit reform. Chief 
among these is that there is considerable lack of manpower and funds which 
may be allocated to the protection of consumer interests. There are more 
pressing priorities than consumer credit in a tiny republic with a population of 
2.3 million and lacking natural resources. Moreover, the Government’s aim in 
relation to finance is to make Singapore one of the world’s main financial 
centres. Thus it is more concerned with upgrading the level of sophistication of 
credit facilities and services geared towards international banking and finance, 
international trade, the international money market, and industry. In the 
present financial structure, other credit providers like moneylenders, 
pawnbrokers and chit fund companies occupy only the tail end of the hierarchy. 
                                                        
304 C.Y.Lee, ‘Consumer Credit and Security over Personalty — The Law in Singapore’ (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of London, 1978) and ‘Towards new Consumer Credit Protection 
Legislation in Singapore’, Mal. L.R. 266 (1979).  
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In moving ahead and improving the services of the higher ranking institutions, 
this fringe end is often ignored. This is deemed essential for Singapore’s survival 
as a nation. Moreover, there is lack of a strong consumer lobby to press for 
improvements in the field of consumer credit. The average citizen is normally 
apathetic and unwilling to fight for his rights”.  
 
Some of the constraints may have become less significant today. Since 1979 
Singapore has advanced much further in its efforts to establish itself as a major 
financial centre of the world. There have been signs that the awareness of 
consumer protection have improved and the issue of consumer protection now 
receives more attention, manpower and funds from the Government305.  
 
However, the prospect of a reform on such a large scale as an introduction of a 
new Consumer Credit Act seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. The current 
regulatory framework established by the major legislations including the Banking 
Act, the Hire Purchase Act and the Finance Companies Act seems to work fine, 
despite criticism of its disparate treatment of different forms of credit. As banks 
and financial institutions of Singapore grow steadily, credit is now easily available 
to consumers at costs lower than many other countries. The moneylending and 
pawnbroking businesses, which have been considered the tail end of consumer 
credit hierarchy are becoming less and less significant. The consolidation of the 
various components of consumer credit protection into one unified legislation, 
although seeming desirable and helpful, will cost a considerable investment of 
manpower and funds. Considering the costs and benefits of a reform, it seems 
that a large scale reform by the enactment of a new Consumer Credit Act in 
Singapore will not happen in the near future. 
                                                        
305 Such as the enactment of the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act (Cap 52A) in 2003.  
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In contrast with the shrinking tail end of consumer credit hierarchy of 
moneylending and pawnbroking businesses, as shown in chapter I, the business 
of issuing credit, debit, and charge cards is growing fast together with the process 
of globalization, the internet revolution and the unprecedented growth of 
electronic commerce. As the cards business is becoming more important, the 
reform in the area of law governing them is becoming so urgent that the task 
should not be left to wait until a large-scale reform of consumer credit become 
feasible. Therefore, a reform of the law relating to credit, debit and charge card 
could and should be separated from the area of consumer credit protection. 
 
(c) Reform of credit, debit and charge card regulation 
 
We have suggested a few times that a reform of the regulation of credit, debit and 
charge card can and should be done separately from the reform of consumer 
credit law. Because the current level of regulatory control of credit, debit and 
charge card in Singapore is primitive, the banks have the liberty to use standard 
terms agreements that shift all the risks and loss to the cardholder while giving 
the banks the greatest power and flexibility. Therefore, the introduction of any 
new measures that bring back some balance to the dealing between these two 
parties of unequal bargaining power, or to protect the cardholder should be 
desirable. We identify the 2 areas of cardholder’s liability for unauthorized card 
transactions and issuer’s liability for merchant’s default as places where changes 
are most urgently needed. In chapters III and IV several suggestions and proposal 
has been made specifically in these 2 areas with a view to minimize the impact of 
changes on the banks thus increase the chance of a reform. In the next sections, 
we will suggest several other measures that should be taken together with the 
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changes proposed in chapter III and IV. The suggestions will focus in the areas of 
resolution of disputes. 
 
2. BILLING AND RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES 
 
2.1 Card billing and cardholder’s duty to verify statements 
 
As discussed in chapter III, the traditional rule of English law is that a bank’s 
customer is not responsible for verifying the monthly statement unless 
contractually bound to do so. This rule however has little effect because all the 
banks’ standard terms invariably include a conclusive evidence clause, which 
requires the customers to verify statement and to inform the banks of any errors 
or discrepancies within a short period, failing which the cardholder will be liable 
for all the charges posted to the card account. In section 6.2 of chapter III, we 
have analyzed the contents of the clauses and some judicial assessment of their 
reasonableness under the UCTA. The analysis shows that in general, Singapore 
courts are likely to uphold the banks’ standard conclusive evidence clause. This 
tendency is attributable to the fact that the courts have come to recognize the duty 
of bank’s customers to verify their statements. The judge in Pertamina case306 
cited  §4-406 of the American Uniform Commercial Code307 [at 64] to support the 
argument to impose such a duty on the customers. It is submitted that this divert 
from the traditional English law position is in the right direction. The banks’ 
customers are at a better position than the banks to detect fraud and 
computational errors. Therefore, the cardholder should be responsible to verify 
card statement and report to the issuer of any suspicions, errors or disputes in a 
                                                        
306 Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v Credit Suisse [2006] SGCA 27, the case has been 
analyzed in more detail in section 6 of chapter III. 
307 http://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/4/4-406.html.  
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timely manner. However, we also submit that several regulatory controls should 
be put in place to prevent abuse of the conclusive evidence clauses. 
 
First, the conclusive evidence clause should not be applied to all the situations of 
dispute between the issuer and the cardholder. There are 3 remarkably different 
types of disputes that a cardholder may wish to raise relating to (i) computational 
errors (ii) unauthorized card transaction disputes and (iii) disputes with the 
merchant relating to quality of goods or services. Even if the customer’s duty to 
verify statement is recognized, such duty should confine itself to the task of 
detecting unauthorized transaction and timely reporting of fraud. If there is a 
computational error, the fault lies with the bank. It would be unreasonable to 
allow the bank to rely on the conclusive evidence clause to make the cardholder 
liable for the bank’s error. The conclusive evidence clause should not be applied 
to the situation of cardholder’s dispute with the merchant either because in this 
case the problem is not with the statement and the verification of it but a failure 
or deficiency of performance by the merchant. If the regulations or the issuers’ 
standard terms allowed the cardholder to request for a chargeback (which was 
proposed in chapter IV), the situation must be separate from the conclusive 
evidence clause.  
 
Secondly, the time limit for a cardholder to raise a dispute before the conclusive 
evidence clause kicks in to make the cardholder liable without more should not be 
too short. Singapore banks seem to realize the importance of the clause and they 
tend to shorten the time limit each time their standard terms were revised. They 
have an incentive to do so because the shorter the limit, the less likely the 
cardholders would raise a dispute. In the several judicial decisions where the time 
limit was mentioned, the courts seem to be reluctant to express a clear view on 
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how long a reasonable time limit should be. In the Elis case308, the UOB bank’s 
standard term which required individual customers to verify statements and 
report inaccuracy within 14 days from the date of the statement was considered 
reasonable for purposes of the UCTA. In response to the customer’s submission 
that the period of 14 days was unreasonably short, given the evidence that some 
statement may not be delivered to the post office until the 5th day of next month, 
Woo Bih Li JC suggested [at 92] that UOB should consider revising the period to 
21 days while refusing to hold 14 days as unreasonable because the plaintiff did 
not attempt to inform the bank of the inaccuracy at all. This seems to suggest that 
21 days may be considered by the courts as reasonable. We suggest that even 21 
days is unnecessarily short. The purpose of fixing the time limit is to give the 
issuer sufficient time to lodge a chargeback based on fraud reason codes to claim 
back the money. Currently the Visa and MasterCard rules allow the banks to 
chargeback within 6 months. Therefore, the only reason that the Singapore banks 
fix the time limit at 21 days or less (in fact most of them fixed the limit at 7 days 
from the date of receipt of 14 days from the date of the statement) is that they 
wish to deprive the customer of their right to raise disputes. The US Code 
§1693g309 which concerned with consumer’s duty to verify debit card statement 
allow the consumer 60 days to verify statement and to report fraud to the issuer, 
failing which the ceiling limit of the cardholder’s liability for unauthorized 
transaction would be raised from $50 to $500. We suggest that 60 days is a fair 
and reasonable time limit for reporting of unauthorized transaction. 
Furthermore, the time limit should be extended in exceptional circumstances in 
which the cardholder is prevented from verifying the statement, such as extended 
overseas travel or hospitalization. The time limit applicable to the cardholder’s 
                                                        




right to raise a dispute with the merchant for a chargeback claim should be fixed 
at not less than 30 days because the Visa chargeback rules does not allow the 
issuer to lodge a chargeback request based on failure of delivery of goods before 
30 days. The period should be long enough to allow the cardholder to inspect the 
goods he received and recover any defects or damage. 
 
Thirdly, the regulation should impose on the issuers (or alternatively the banks 
should voluntarily accept) the duty to send the statement to the cardholder in a 
timely manner. In the Elis case discussed above, there was evidence that monthly 
statements were not sent until the 5th day of the next month. If the time limit for 
the cardholder to raise a dispute is defined based on date of statement, the issuer 
would have more incentive to delay the delivery of the statement. The later they 
send the statement, the less chance the customer would be able to raise a dispute. 
The best practice should be fixing the time limit based on the date of delivery or 
transmission of the statement to the cardholder. Furthermore, the statement 
must disclose sufficient details of each payment transaction to allow the 
cardholder to detect any irregularities or inaccuracies. Currently the credit card 
regulation issued by MAS only requires that credit card issuer use the following 
template to disclose finance charge in the monthly statement: “Please settle this 
statement promptly.  If the minimum payment is not received by the due date, a 
late payment charge (calculated at __% of minimum payment) will be levied.  If 
payment is not made in full, a finance charge assessed at __% per annum on the 
outstanding balance and all new purchases from this statement date will be 
levied”, which must be printed in bold type of at least 8 points in size310. 
 
 
                                                        
310 Regulation 9, Banking (Credit Card And Charge Card) Regulations 2004 amended edition. 
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2.2 Timely response to cardholders’ disputes by the issuers 
 
The cardholder’s right to raise a dispute with the issuer would be meaningless if 
the issuer is not responsible to respond to the cardholder’s complaint in a timely 
manner. In this section, we will consider the standard for timely response 
adopted by Singapore banks. 
 
(a) Disputes resolution standards under the Banking Code  
 
The “Code of Consumer Banking Practice” (Banking Code) issued by the 
Association of Banks Singapore (ABS), has one section (section 19) that generally 
deals with resolution of disputes between bankers and their customers. According 
to this section, banks are required to accept customer’s complaint by telephone, 
email, mail, and personal visits. Upon receipt of a customer complaint the banks 
are to acknowledge the complaint in writing within two working days and assign a 
member of staff to investigate and handle the dispute within 14 working days 
(except where the dispute requires investigation by a third party). Customers 
dissatisfied with the outcome in this first step may  contact the Quality Service 
Department of the bank, which is required to give a written response within 14 
working days to inform the customers of further action the customer can take, 
including going to a third party.  
 
If the customer remains dissatisfied with the response from the Quality Service 
Department of his bank, he may approach the Consumer Mediation Unit of the 
ABS for assessment of the case and/or mediation within 3 months from the date 
of the final response from the bank. The CMU is required to respond to the 
customer within 14 working days to inform him that the CMU will refer the case 
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back to the bank (in case the CMU decides not to give an assessment) or to 
mediate the case between the customer and the bank. If the dispute cannot be 
resolved at this stage, it may be referred to a Panel of Mediators on payment of a 
nominal fee. The Panel of Mediators will comprise a current banker, a solicitor 
and a non-bank professional who will consider the dispute and give an 
assessment based on interview with the customer and/or the bank. The customer 
will be informed of the Panel’s decision within 14 working days, which decision 
will end the process of dispute resolution under the Banking Code. As far as the 
ABS is concerned, the case will be closed even if the customer does not accept the 
decision. 
 
The CMU only deals with disputes involving consumer where the amount in 
dispute is less than $50,000. Cases involving corporate, sole proprietorship and 
partnership and complaints about banks’ pricing policy and other policies (e.g. 
increase in interest rates, introduction of fees), complaints about commercial 
decisions of banks (e.g. facility denied, cessation of service or product) are 
expressly excluded.  
 
The CMU is placed under the supervision of a Board of Advisors comprising at 
least 5 members including representatives from the Chairman bank of the ABS, a 
qualified full-licensed bank member of the ABS, a grassroots leader and a non-
bank professional and chaired by a retired Judge or a retired senior civil servant. 
The Board of Advisors reviews the activities of the Unit on a periodic basis, 
monitors the key performance indicators of the CMU and provides an annual 
report to the ABS of the performance of the CMU. 
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The Banking Code is a plausible effort by the Singapore banks “in reaching out to 
their customers”. The Code has significantly improved the accountability of the 
banks in the relationship with their customers by setting out the minimum 
standards of good banking practice that the consumers can expect from the 
banks, including specific timelines for the bank to resolve consumer’s complaints. 
In the next section we will suggested some changes that can be made to the 
Banking Code to improve its effectiveness. 
 
(b) Suggestions for improvement 
 
First, the legal effect of the Banking Code in its current form is limited. Although 
the Banking Code was addressed to the consumers and the banks are said to 
“subscribe to the commitment of standards” if a bank is in breach of a provision 
of the Code, the consumer does not have the right to take legal action against the 
bank, or the ABS. The banks’ effort as reflected in the Code seems half-hearted. 
The practical effect of the Code is to prevent the consumer from taking legal 
action against the banks rather than giving them the right to do so. Therefore, the 
first improvement that can be made to the Code is to require the banks to 
incorporate relevant parts, if not all of the Code into their standard terms of 
agreement with their customers. Most ideally, the Code could specify model 
clauses ready to be incorporated in to the banks’ standard terms either by 
reference but most effectively by copying the entire model clauses. This would 
give the Code real legal effectiveness and enhance the consumer’s rights 
tremendously. 
 
Secondly, section 19 of the Code fails to elaborate on the types of disputes in 
which a customer may complain to the bank. To be useful in the context of credit 
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card disputes, the section should specify that the banks must accept customers 
complaints relating to all of the 3 types of disputes, namely unauthorized 
transaction, billing computational errors and disputes with the merchants. 
Section 19 in its current form seems to suggest that the procedure of dispute 
resolution under the Code only concerns with disputes between banks and the 
customers. The banks may rely on that to refuse customers’ request to chargeback 
a payment transaction in the event the goods were defective or the merchant 
failed to deliver the goods. If, as suggested in chapter IV, the cardholders are 
allowed to make such a request, the Banking Code should be amended to include 
this type of disputes. 
 
Thirdly, if the timeline specified in the Code within which the issuer must 
respond to customers’ disputes is given real legal effect, there must be a 
consequence in the event the banks fail to adhere to the requirements specified in 
the Code. Without specific consequences, the Code’s requirements are just empty 
promise. The most effective and simple way is to provide that the customer’s 
complaint would be automatically deemed as correct in the event the banks failed 
to respond to the customer’s disputes within the specified timeline. This is exactly 
the approach taken by the legislations concerning credit and debit card in 
America to ensure timely respond by issuers to cardholder’s disputes. 
 
2.3  Attorneys fees in disputes resolution 
 
In a contract entered into between parties of unequal bargaining power (e.g. 
tenancy agreements), a clause making one party bear the legal costs (e.g. attorney 
fees, court fee, etc) for the other is frequently found. This is also the case with 
credit card agreements in Singapore. All standard terms agreement drafted by 
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bank include a term similar to the following, which is currently used by DBS in its 
standard cardholder agreement:  
 
“Clause 14.2: Any costs, fees or expenses (including legal costs) that are incurred 
by us as a result of your breach of the terms and conditions of this Agreement or 
arising out of our enforcement of any of our rights shall be recoverable by us 
from you on a full indemnity basis”.  
 
From the bank’s point of view, the clause is necessary to cut the costs of debt 
recovery where the cardholder is unwilling to repay. The clause such as the above 
may be justified by the argument that it is only by the fault of the cardholder, who 
refuses or delays to repay debt when due, that the bank needs to commence 
action against the cardholder. Therefore, the cardholder should bear the legal 
costs incurred by the issuer in such action. However, because of the lack of 
agreement control in the regulations, some cardholder agreements contain wider 
indemnity clause covering not only full legal costs for enforcing the bank’s rights, 
but also other costs or losses that bank may incur directly or indirectly by reasons 
or in connection with the cardholder agreement. An example of this type of clause 
is found in the UOB’s cardholder agreement:  
 
Clause 19.9: “You must indemnify and keep indemnified us against all claims, 
demands, action, proceedings, losses and damages of any nature suffered, 
incurred or sustained by us directly or indirectly, by reason of or in connection 
with this Agreement.” 
 
This type of clause allows the bank to recover legal costs in the event a dispute 
between the bank and the cardholder is resolved in the courts. As the bank is 
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guaranteed to have the legal costs covered as long as the cardholder is not yet 
bankrupt, it will have less incentive to negotiate and more incentive to commence 
legal action. The high costs of litigation in Singapore (generally ranging from one 
to tens of thousand dollars depending on the length of procedure) can easily 
exceed the cardholder’s indebtedness (which may not exceed two times monthly 
salary). Therefore, the clause effectively gives the bank advantages and prevents 
the cardholder from taking legal action against the bank in the event of a dispute 
with the bank. 
 
Therefore, a scheme of disputes resolution, whether adopted voluntarily by the 
Banking Code or imposed by a regulation, would not be fair without a provision 
that prevent the banks to recover their attorney fee from the cardholder in the 
event of a dispute between them. In America, the practice of recovering legal costs 
from customers by banks has been prohibited under the Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code311, which was adopted by many states312. 
 
2.4 Combination or account, set-off, closing of account and credit 
reporting during disputes resolution 
 
It is a well-established rule of English law that a bank is entitled to combine all 
and any accounts a customer has with that bank and set-off the outstanding debt 
in an account with the amount standing in credit in other accounts at any time 
                                                        
311 U.C.C.C. S5.207: “With respect to a consumer credit transaction, the agreement may not 
provide for the payment by the consumer of attorney's fees. A provision in violation of this 
subsection is unenforceable.”  
312 From 1968 to 1974 eleven states (Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin and Wyoming) have adopted the Code and 
enacted the code as state’s acts. 
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without giving any notice to the customer313. All cardholder agreements in 
Singapore have a clause expressly reserving the banks’ right to combine all 
accounts whether held in any branch in Singapore or overseas, in any currency, 
close the account and set-off in payment of any amount due in a card account. In 
contrast, US Code §1666h314 prohibits  card issuers to set off a credit cardholder’s 
indebtedness against funds held on deposit with the issuer except where the 
issuer was previously authorized in writing by the cardholder to pay debts 
incurred by permitting the card issuer periodically to deduct all or a portion of 
such debt from the card holder’s deposit account. Furthermore, US Code § 1666315 
prohibit banks to close account regarded by a customer as containing a billing 
error.  
 
Although such a provision as the US Code §1666h and §1666 may be beneficial for 
the consumers, it seems unlikely that such a rule would be adopted in Singapore 
either by the Banking Code or the MAS regulation. What we suggest is that the 
banks should refrain from closing accounts and set off while a dispute between 
the banks and the cardholder has not been finally resolved. Allowing the banks to 
do so only gives them an additional advantage that may affect the fair resolution 
of the dispute with the cardholder.  
 
Since 2002, the Banking Act has allowed banks, financial institutions and credit 
card issuers being members of the Credit Bureau Singapore Pte Ltd to share with 
each other credit related information for the purpose of checking on their existing 
                                                        
313 European Bank, Agra Bank Claims (1872) LR 8 CH. App. 41; Garnett v. M’ Kewan (1872) 
LR 8 Ex. 10; James Kirkwood & Sons v. Clydesdale Bank Ltd. 1908 SC 20; Re Sutcliffe & Sons 
Ltd., ex p. Royal Bank [1933] 1 DLR 562; National Wesminster Bank Ltd. v. Halesowen 






and prospective customers’ creditworthiness. A typical credit report provided by 
the credit bureau as illustrated by the sample report316 includes various 
information relating to the creditworthiness of a banks’ customer including a 
basis personal profile (name, date of birth, NRIC number and postal code of 
residence), records of all credit checks made on the consumer, latest 12 cycles of 
repayment trend showing the promptness of payments relative to their due dates 
(without amounts displayed); records of default and bankruptcy records. The 
information is frequently updated by all members of the bureau. The Code of 
Conduct published on the bureau’s website317 did not specify the manner in which 
each member supplies information to the common database of credit 
information. There is a chance that when a cardholder has a dispute with an 
issuer being a member of the bureau, and the cardholder suspends settlement of 
the credit card bill, the amount in dispute may be reflected in the credit report as 
a record of payment default. This will adversely affect the dealing of the 
cardholder with other banks. Therefore, reporting to a credit bureau may be 
another factor, which may be used to the advantage of the issuer in the situations 
of dispute with the cardholder. US Code §1666a318 provides that a credit card 
issuer shall not report to any credit bureau or third party as delinquent any 
amount in dispute with the cardholder or reported by the cardholder as a billing 
error until the dispute or error has been finally resolved. It is suggested that 
either the Code of Conduct of the Singapore credit bureau or the Banking Code 
should be amended to include provisions similar to the US Code §1666a to 
prevent abuse of the credit bureau. 
 
                                                        
316 http://www.creditbureau.com.sg/samplereport/smplreport1.htm.  




3. METHODS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORM 
 
3.1 Issuance of new regulations by the MAS 
 
The suggestions we made in chapter II, III, IV and section 2 above may be 
implemented by a credit, debit and charge card regulation to be issued by the 
MAS. The regulation should be applicable to all issuers of credit, debit or charge 
cards, regardless of whether they are licensed as bank or financial institution or 
not. Below is a list of possible components, which we have suggested to be 
included in the regulation. 
 
(1) Finality of card transaction: Card-present transactions are presumed to 
be unconditionally discharge the cardholder’s obligation to pay the merchant. 
Card-absent transactions only constitute a conditional discharge of the 
cardholder’s obligation.  
 
 (2) Liability for unauthorized transaction: 
Issuers will be liable for unauthorized transaction (whether credit, debit, charge 
card, consumer or corporate card) in 4 situations: 
 
• A card was lost or stolen and the transaction occurred after the cardholder 
has already informed the issuer of such loss.  
• A new card or renewal/replacement card was lost or stolen in the mail 
before reaching the card-applicant/cardholder.  
• Card-present transaction occurred while the genuine card remained in the 
possession of the cardholder (not lost); and 
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• The card was not lost, but unauthorized transaction still occurred by card-
absent method, because the card particulars were stolen from somewhere. 
 
Cardholders will be liable for up to a certain limit (e.g. S$500) if the card was lost 
and unauthorized transaction occurs before the cardholder informed the issuer. 
The cardholder will be liable for all unauthorized transactions without any ceiling 
limit if he failed to report lost of card after 48 hours after he knew of the loss. 
 
(3) Liability for authorized transaction: The cardholder will be liable for card 
transactions made with his express, implied or apparent authority (including 
situations where the card was voluntarily given by the cardholder) 
 
(4) Cardholder’s duty to verify statement: The cardholder has a duty to verify 
the card monthly statement provided the statement state clearly the amount and 
date of transaction, trading name of merchants, brief identification of goods or 
services purchased. The cardholder must inform the issuer of any suspected 
unauthorized transactions or billing error within 60 days from the date he 
received his card statements (the 60 days period may be extended in case of 
cardholder extended overseas travel, hospitalization). The issuer must 
acknowledge receipt of the cardholder notice in writing within 2 days and give 
feedback within 14 days (Banking Code), failing which the cardholder’s complaint 
will be deemed correct. 
 
(5) Chargeback: credit, debit or charge cardholder (including both consumers 
and corporate holders) are entitled to request a chargeback against the merchant 
to suspend or recover the payment amount to the card account if the cardholder 
can adduce evidence that the following situations occurred: 
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• The contract of sale was for a tangible goods which were not delivered to 
the cardholder within the period of time promised by the merchant (or in 
the absence of an indication of expected delivery 30 days from the date of 
purchase); or the goods delivered were defective or not as described in the 
contract of sale, in the merchant’s written representation or the sale 
invoice; 
• The contract of sale was for services of a continuing nature (e.g. the 
storage and maintenance of an internet web site) and paid by card-absent 
method, the quality of which were not as described by the merchant in the 
sale contract; 
• The payment transaction was duplicated, the amount of the card-present 
transaction was altered, or the amount of the card-absent transaction did 
not correspond with the correct purchase price, the payment for goods, 
services or no-show fee was paid by other means or the recurring payment 
was cancelled by the cardholder; or 
• The cardholder has returned the goods purchased or cancelled the service 
within the period allowed as stated in the sale contract or invoice but the 
merchant has failed to process a refund. 
Before requesting for a chargeback, the cardholder must attempt to resolve the 
dispute with the merchant within 60 days from the date of the transaction. If after 
the chargeback has been resolved in accordance with the chargeback rule of the 
card association in favor of the merchant, the cardholder will not be entitled to 
pursue further claim against the issuer. If the issuer failed to assist the cardholder 
in attempting the chargeback, the issuer will be liable to the cardholder for the 
transaction amount.  
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(6) No attorneys’ fees, set-off, or credit report during dispute: Card issuers 
must not recover from any cardholder legal costs incurred in the event of a 
dispute between the cardholder and the issuer. Issuers must not attempt to 
combine accounts, set-off, close accounts, or report as delinquent any disputed 
amount until after the dispute has been fully resolved. 
 
(7) Existing regulations to be retained: the improved cardholder’s protection 
may result in more cards being issued. Therefore, the existing regulation 
concerning Income barrier and credit limit should be retained to prevent low-
income earner to obtain credit card and borrow at impoverishing interest rates.  
 
(8) No waiver, no contracting out, and disclosure of terms. The cardholder 
should not have any liability except as provided in the regulation. Contractual 
clauses or notices with the effect that the cardholder waive any statutory rights or 
contract out of the regulatory protection shall be void. The rights of the 
cardholder must be disclosed clearly in the cardholder agreement. 
 
3.2 Self-regulation  
 
The alternative to the issuance of a regulation by the MAS is by using self-
regulation method. Self-regulation is not new in Singapore, the Association of 
Bank of Singapore (ABS) was incorporated since 1973, and it has issued the 
Banking Code since 2002. More recently, the ABS published a “Code of Practice 
for Banks - Credit Cards” and the “Consumer Guide: Credit Cards”. These two 
publications were meant for educational purposes only. They focused on guiding 
the banks in making sufficient disclosure of terms to the customers while on the 
other hand tell the customer what liabilities they may have in the relationship 
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with the banks. Where all the banks use similar terms that places as much liability 
on the cardholder as possible, reading the terms and even understanding them 
would not help the consumers because they do not have any viable alternative. As 
discussed in section 2.2 above, the Banking Code in its current form also lacks 
legal effect and is not specific enough to be capable of application. However, the 
very existence of the ABS and the Banking Code in itself is a good sign. The 
Banking Code may be improved to provide better protection for the consumer. 
The usefulness of self-regulation should not be underestimated. The British 
Consumer Banking Code and Business Banking Code 2005 are comprehensive 
documents that have real legal effects319. 
 
Most of the suggestions listed in the previous section (except for item number (1)) 
may be incorporated into the Banking Code. The only drawback is the Banking 
Code only applies to consumers. Therefore, if we wish to apply the suggestion to 
corporate and business cards, the document has to be separated from the existing 
document. Regardless of the form, if the banks incorporate the content of the 
banking code into their standard terms with customers either by reference but 
most effectively by copying the entire model clauses, the proposed changes will 
become effective, not much less so than a regulation. It is suggested that the ABS 
may draft a set of model clauses. There are not many of them, may be eight 
clauses labeled as best practice of credit card business. The banks may have more 
incentive to adopt such practices for the publicity benefit of being known as a 
consumer friendly financial institution. If some of the banks adopted the clauses, 
the competition will force the rest of them to join the club. The effect of self-
regulation approach may take longer to be realised but the possibility is real. 
                                                        
319 Please refer to pages 218, 219 and footnotes 255, 256 for a more detailed discussion of the 
two UK Banking Codes. 
 301
TABLE OF CASES 
Cases Page(s) 
Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728. [1972] 1 
MLJ 117 
177 
Amalgamated Investment & Property Co. Ltd. (in liquidation) v. 
Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] QB 84 
152 
American Express Europe Limited v. McCluskey (unreported) 92 
American Express Travel Related Services Co. v. Web, Inc. 261 
Ga. 480, 405 S.E.2d 652 (1991) 
133 
Associated Finance Corporation Ltd v. Poomani 274 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas)Ltd v 
Price Waterhouse [1998] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 85 
176 
Bayley v. Wilkins (1849) 7 C.B. 886 114 
Blaisdell Lumber Co. v Horton 242NJ Super 98, 575 A.2d 1386 
(1990) 
132 
Borden Chemical Co. (Canada) Ltd v. J.G. Beukers Ltd (1973) 29 
D.L.R. (3d) 337, Supreme Court of British Columbia 
138 
Braithwaite v Thomas Cook Travellers Cheques Ltd [1989] 1 QB 
553, [1989] 1 All ER 235 
164 
Canada and Dominion Sugar Company, Limited v. Canadian 
National (West Indies) Steamships, Limited [1947] AC 46 
152 
Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v. Bank of Montreal (1981) 122 DLR 
(3d) 519 
159 
Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 174 
Charternay v Brazillian Submarine Telegraph Co [1891] 1 QB 79 224 
Chaudhry v. Prabakhar [1989] 1 W.L.R. 29, Court of Appeal 167 
City Stores Co. v. Henderson, 116 Ga. App. 114, 156 S.E.2d 818 
(1967) 
71 
Clarke v. Dunraven (Earl) [1897] A.C. 59A 166 
Collyer v Isaacs (1881) 19 Ch.D. 342 46 
Commissioners for Customs and Excise v Barclays Bank Plc 
[2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 165, [2005] All E.R. 789 
176 
Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Association 69 Cal. 2d 
850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969) 
240 
Consmat Singapore (Pte) Ltd v Bank of American National Trust 196 
 302
& Savings Association [1992] 2 SLR 828 
Crabtree-Vickers Pty. Ltd. v. Australian Direct Mail Advertising 
and Addressing Co. Pty.Ltd (1975) 133 C.L.R. 
168 
Crabb v Arun D.C. [1976] Ch. 179 121 
Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. Ltd. v. Veitch [1942] A.C. 
435 
142 
Customs And Excise Commissioners v Diners Club Ltd 50 
Debenham v. Mellon (1880) 6 App. Cas. 24 116,120 
Deposit Protection Board v. Dalia [1994] 2 AC 367 47 
Delbruek v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F 2d. 1047, 
1051 (1979) 
47 
Dixon v. Kennaway & Co [1990] 1 Ch 833 155 
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] All E.R. Rep. 1 (H.L.) 104 
Durrant v. Holdsworth (1886) 2 T.L.R. 763 120 
Edmund Murray Ltd v. BSP International Foundation Ltd (1992) 
33 Con LR 1 
195 
Egyptian International Foreign Trade Co. v. P.S. Refson & Co. 
Ltd (The Raffaella) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 36 
121 
El Awadi v Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. Ltd. 
[1990] 1 QB 606 
164 
Elis Tjoa v United Overseas Bank [2003] SGHC 1 [2003] 1 SLR 
747 
198, 200, 286 
Elvin & Power Ltd v. Plummer Roddis Ltd (1933) 50 T.L.R. 158 141 
Emerson v American Express Company, Municipal Court of 
Appeals of District of Columbia (United States of America), 6 
Legal Decisions Affecting Bankers 337 
164 
European Bank, Agra Bank Claims (1872) LR 8 CH. App. 41 294 
Felthouse v Bindley (1862) 11 C.B.N.S. 869 75 
First Sport Ltd v. Barclays Bank Plc [1993] 3 All E.R. 789 82 
Fred Chappell Ltd v National Car Parks Ltd The Times 22 May 
1987, (Transcript:IV Gilbert) 
196 
Freeman & Lockyer v. Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd 
[1964] 2 Q.B. 480 
113, 118, 120, 124 
Fung Kai Sun v Chan Fui Hing [1951] AC 489 159 
Furness Withy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Metal Distributors (UK) Ltd 151 
 303
Garnett v. M’ Kewan (1872) LR 8 Ex. 10 294 
Goldberg v. Tait [1950] N.Z.L.R. 976 (Supreme Court) 225 
Greenwood v. Martins Bank Ltd [1932] 1 KB 371, Court of Appeal 156, 159 
Hawkes Bay Investment and Finance Co. v. White [1934] 
N.Z.L.R. 46 (Supreme Court) 
227 
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 173, 241 
Hely-Hutchinson v. Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 Q.B. 549 115, 117, 118, 121 
Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1952] 2 AC 145 110, 175 
Hiort v. Bott (1874) L.R. 9 Ex. 86 140 
Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Thornburgh 106 P 2d 511 123 
Houghland v. R.R. Low (Luxury Coaches) Ltd. [1962] 1 Q.B. 694 145 
Household Fire Insurance Co. Ltd v. Grant, (1879) 4 Ex. D. 216 73 
Hume-Dick v. Herries, Farquhar & Co (1888) 4 T.L.R. 541 163 
Hyland v. First USA Bank, 1995 WL 595861 (E.D. 
PA.Sept.28,1995) 
243 
In Re H.P.C. Production Ltd [1962] Ch 466 273 
James Kirkwood & Sons v. Clydesdale Bank Ltd. 1908 SC 20 294 
K Lokumal & Sons (London) Ltd v Lotte Shipping Co Pte Ltd, The 
August Leonhardt [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep 28 
151 
Khoo Tian Hock & Anor v Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation 
Limited [2000] 4 SLR 673 
191, 192 
Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 AC 548 per Lord Goff at 
578 
152 
Lloyd’s Bank Ltd v. Chartered Bank of India etc. [1929] 1 K.B. 40 139 
London Joint Stock Bank v. Macmillan and Arthur [1918] AC 777 155, 157, 159, 161, 172 
Lornho Ltd v. Shell Petroleum Co. (No. 2) 1982 A.C. 173 142 
Lowe v. Lombank [1960] 1 WLR 196 152 
Magripilis v. Baird [1926] St. R. Qd. 89 121 
Marchant v. Morton Down & Co [1901] 2 K.B.829 46 
Martin v American Express, Inc. 361 So. 2d 597 (ala. 1978) 132 
Menaka v. Lum [1977] 1 M.L.J. 91 277 
 304
Mercantile Bank of India v Central Bank of India Ltd [1938] A.C. 
287 
122 
Mercantile Credit Co. Ltd v. Hamblin [1965] 2 Q.B. 242 122, 155 
Metall und Rohstoff A.G. v. Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc 
[1990] 1 Q.B. 391 
142, 226 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner v. Charles (1977) 83, 186 
Midlink Development Pte Ltd v The Stansfield Group Pte 
Ltd[2004] 4 SLR 258 
76, 136 
Minskoff v American Express Travel Related Services Co 98 F.3d 
703, 708 
131 
Miss Gray Ltd v. Earl Cathcard (1922) 38 T.L.R. 562 116 
Mitchell v. Ealing London B.C. [1979] Q.B. 1 137 
Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Twitchings [1977] A.C. 890 122, 153 
Moss v Hancock [1899] 2 QB 111 10 
National Wesminster Bank Ltd. v. Halesowen Presswork and 
Assemblies Ltd [1972] AC 785, [1971] 1 QB 1 
294 
Office of Fair Trading v. Lloyds TSB Bank plc and others [2006] 
EWCA Civ 268, [2006] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 629 
247 
Olds Discount Co Ltd. v. John Playfair Ltd [1938] All E.R. 275 272 
Oricon Waren-Handels GmbH v. Intergraan NV [1967] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 82 
116 
Pacol Ltd v Trade Lines Ltd (The Henrik Sif) [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep 
456 
154 
Panorama Developments (Guildford) Ltd v. Fidelis Furnishing 
Fabrics Ltd [1971] 2 Q.B. 711 
120 
Parno v SC Marine Pte Ltd [1999] 4 SLR 579 226 
Peh Teck Quee v Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale [2000] 1 
SLR 148; [1999] SGCA 79 
224 
Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v Credit Suisse [2006] SGCA 
27 
199, 284 
Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 220 
Pole v. Leask (1863) 33 LJ CH 155 126 
Potts' Executors v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1951] A.C. 
443, [1951] 1 All E.R. 76 
273 
Premier Clothing & Supply Co. v. Hillcoat [1969] C.L.Y. 2279a 275 
 305
Progressive Supply Co., Ltd v Dalton [1942] 2 All E.R. 646 274 
R. v. Handsford (1974) 8 S.A.S.R. 164 140 
R.v. Lambie (1982) 83 
R. v. Preddy [1996] AC 815 59 
Rama Corp. v. Proved tin & General Investments [1952] 2 Q.B. 
147 
118, 119 
Rhodes v. London and County Bank (1880) 1 Legal Decisions 
Affecting Bankers 
163 
Re Bonacina [1912] 2 Ch 394 226 
Re Charge Card Services Ltd [1987] 1 Ch. 150 41, 42, 53, 59, 82 
Re Charge Card Services Ltd [1989] Ch 497 (CA) 60, 96 
Re London & Northern Bank [1900] 1 Ch. 200 73 
Re Sutcliffe & Sons Ltd., ex p. Royal Bank [1933] 1 DLR 562 294 
Ri Jong Son v Development Bank of Singapore Ltd [1998] 3 SLR 
64 
189 
Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, House of Lords 142 
RSP Architects Planners & Engineers v MCST Plan No 1075 
[1999] 2 SLR 449 at [31] 
176, 178 
Scholfield v. The Earl of Londesborough [1896] A.C.514(H.L.) 160, 172 
Siu Yin Kwan v. Eastern Insurance Co. Ltd. [1994] 2 A.C. 199, 
207 
63 
Smith v. Eric S. Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 174 
Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd v. Martin & Co (Contractor) Ltd 
[1973] 1 QB 27 
173 
Spiro v Lintern [1973] 1 WLR 1002 77 
Sidney Bolsom Investment Trust Ltd. v. E. Karmios & Co. 
(London) Ltd [1956] 1 QB 529, CA 
152 
Societé Générale v. Metropolitant Bank 27 L.T. 849 172 
Stephan Machinery Singapore Pte Ltd v Overseas-
ChineseBanking Corp Ltd [2000] 2 SLR 191 
198 
Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd [1992] All E.R. 257 196 
Swan & Edgar Ltd v. Mathieson (1910) 103 L. T. 832 120, 122 
Tai Hing Cotton Mill v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80 157, 159, 191, 194, 241 
 306
The Amazonia [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 236 151 
The Indian Endurance (No 2) Republic of India and another v 
India Steamship Co Ltd [1996] 3 All ER 641 
151 
The Satanita [1895] P. 248 44, 166 
The Stolt Loyalty [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 281 154 
The Vistafjord [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 343 151 
Thomas v. Central Charge Service Inc, 212 A 2d. 533 (DC Cir. 
1965) 
52 
Thomas Witter Ltd v. TBP Industries Ltd (1994) 12 Tr LR 145 195 
Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd v. Cousins [1969] 2 Ch. 106 142 
Tower World Airways Inc. v. PHH Aviation Systems Inc. 933 F.2d 
174 (2d Cir. 1991) 
132 
United Project Consultants Pte Ltd v Leong Kwok Onn Singapore 
Court of Appeal, [2005] 4 SLR 214; [2005] SGCA 38 
178 
Victor Kee Yong Poey v Diners Club Malaya Sdn. Bhd [1976] 2 
M.L.J. 30 
271 
W. J. Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr Export and Import Co. [1972] 2 
Q.B. 189, 210A 
93 
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones 672 P2d 73 (Utah 1983) 134, 167 
Watteau v. Fenwick [1893] 1 Q.B. 346 125 
Waugh v. H.B. Clifford & Sons Ltd [1982] Ch. 374 121 
William Brandt’s Sons & Co v. Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd [1905] 
A.C.454 
46 
Wilson v. Brett (1843) 11 M.&W. 113 140 
Wimpey Construction (UK) Limited (and others) v. Martin Black & 
Co (Wire Ropes) Limited (1982) SLT 239 
173 
Woodhouse AC Israel Cocoa Ltd v. Nigerian Produce Marketing 
Co Ltd [1972] AC 741 
152, 153 
Woods v. MONY Legacy Life Ins. Co.,641 N.E.2d 1070,1071 
(1994) 
133 





1. A.C. Drury and C.W. Ferrier, ‘Credit Cards’, Butterworth 1984. 
2. A.P. Dobson, ‘Credit Cards’ [1979] JBL 332. 
3. Barkley Clark, “The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards”, 
3rd Edition. 
4. Boustead & Reynolds on Agency, 17th Edition Sweet & Maxwell 2001. 
5. C.Y. Lee, “Law on Consumer Credit”, 1990. 
6. C.Y. Lee, “Towards new Consumer Credit Protection Legislation in 
Singapore’, Mal. L.R. 266 (1979). 
7. Chitty on Contracts, 28th Edition. 
8. Clerk & Lindsell on Tort, 17th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell 1995. 
9. David Kreltszheim, “The legal nature of electronic money” (2003)14 
JBFLP 161. 
10. E. P. Ellinger, E. Lomnicka and R.J.A. Hooley, Modern Banking Law, 3rd 
Edition. 
11. Eric Chan, “All about time: finality and completion of Payment by funds 
transfer”, (2005) 17 SAcLJ 
12. G Bower & A Turner “The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation”, 
3rd Ed, 1977. 
13. Geva Benjamin, “The law of Electronic Funds Transfer”, Release No. 7, 
October 1999, Matthew Bender  
14. Marcus Smith and Patricia Robertson, Chapter 4, Law of Bank Payments, 
Editor Michael Brindle and Raymond Cox, 3rd Edition, 2004. 
15. Mark Budnitz and Margot Saunders, Consumer banking and payments 
law: credit, debit & stored value cards, checks, money orders, e-sign, 
electronic banking and benefit payments, 2nd Edition, National 
Consumer Law Center, 2002. 
 308
16. Mark Hapgood, Paget’s Law of Banking (LexisNexis, 11th Ed, 1996) 
17. Michael Brindle & Raymond Cox, Law of Bank Payments (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2nd Ed, 1999). 
18. N.E. Palmer, “Bailment”, 2nd Edition. 
19. Payment Systems in Singapore 2001, Bank for International Settlement. 
20. Peter E. Sayer, ‘Credit Cards and The Law, an Introduction’. 
21. Poh Chu Chai, Law of Banker and Customer, Lexis Nexis, 5th Ed, 2004. 
22. Poh Chu Chai, Annual review of Singapore cases 1-2000, Banking Law. 
23. R. M. Goode, Payment Obligations in Commercial and Financial 
Transactions (2nd Ed, 1995). 
24. Roy Goode, Payment Obligations in Commercial and Financial 
Transactions, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1983. 
25. S.A. Jones, ‘Credit Cards, Card Users and Account Holders’, [1988] JBL 
457. 
26. Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Tort, 21st Edition, Sweet & Maxwell. 
27. Sean Wilken and Theresa Villiers, “Waiver, Variation and Estoppel”, New 
York, J. Wiley 1998. 
28. Spencer Bower and Turner, Estoppel by Representation, 3rd ed. (1977). 
29. Tan Keng Feng, ‘Credit Cards and Money Lending’ [1976] 2 M.L.J. 
 
 
 
 
